

超越分歧 走向双赢

——中美智库研究报告(中方)

China-US Relations: Exploring a New Pathway to a Win-win Partnership

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序 言

一个时期以来，中美关系总体稳定，两国合作面日益宽广，但挑战和摩擦也在积聚，在有些方面的分歧显现。2016年11月8日唐纳德·特朗普赢得美国第45届总统大选并于2017年1月宣誓就职。预期中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会也将在2017年秋季召开。在两国重要的政治周期出现之际，中美关系的走向受到瞩目。

2017年4月6日至7日，中美两国元首在美国佛罗里达州海湖庄园举行会晤，建立起良好的关系，重塑了两国间的对话沟通机制，进一步稳固了中美关系大局，为新时期两国关系发展指明了方向。如何准确把握元首会晤精神，如何增进信任、推动合作，不断扩大中美间的共同利益；如何管控危机、避免大的摩擦，这都是学界与政策界需要思考的重大课题。

2016年3月，中国社会科学院国家全球战略智库启动《中美关系的现状与未来》中美智库联合研究项目，并在该年6月和美国战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）达成联合研究意向。项目组织了由中美两国近40位资深专家、学者组成的团队，旨在以联合研究的方式，以务实和建设性的态度，阐释对双边关系一些重要领域政策的看法和关切，探讨影响中美关系前景的具体问题，提出建议意见，向两国社会提供可以参考的资讯。项目动议得到了亨利·基辛格、斯蒂芬·哈德利等美国前政要的高度肯定，引发了中美两国战略与政策界的广泛关注。

在一年多的研究过程中，中美双方多次在北京及华盛顿组织大型学术研讨会，并在项目小组层面进行了充分的讨论。在此基础上，根据各自的认知与理解，中美双方将各自撰写并发表自己的研究报告。另外，双方将争取形成一个共同的建议，计划在2017年6月对外发布。

现将中方报告结集出版，希望能为关心中美关系的人们提供些许思路或借鉴。由于该项目涉及经济、政治、军事、亚太安全、全球治理等方方面面，加之编者水平有限，难免存在一些疏漏和不足，还望读者朋友们不吝赐教。

项目能够顺利实施并完成，离不开项目组全体人员的不

懈努力和指导委员会的大力支持，也离不开北京大学国际战略研究院、盘古智库、中国人民大学重阳研究院等机构的鼎力协助。

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总 论

王 绎 思 袁 鹏 赵 明 昊

2017年1月，唐纳德·特朗普正式就任第45届美国总统，组成新一届政府。美国共和党政府产生的同时，共和党在国会参、众两院也占据多数。中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会将于2017年下半年召开，这次会议对于未来一个时期中国的国家发展走向具有至关重要的意义。在两国领导层不久将出现人事变动并对各自内政外交政策进行调整之际，我们期待中美关系不因两国国内政治的变动而出现严重颠簸，双方关系能在新的起点上取得积极进展。

近年来，中美关系总体稳定、日益复杂，两国合作与竞争都在上升。与此同时，中美两国战略思想界再度掀起对中美关系的大辩论，相对悲观的论调在两国均似乎更有市场。两国战略界人士都感到，在国际秩序面临更大挑战的背景下，中美关系正处于冷战后新一轮的重大转型之中，

既有老麻烦也有新挑战，双方领导层需要高度重视中美彼此战略误判、两国关系“战略漂移”会带来的巨大风险和代价。

实际上，过去几年来，中美关系在很多方面都取得了积极进展。两国高层交往频密，战略沟通的意识强化，规避危机的能力和经验增多。中美经贸合作向前推进，有望互为最大贸易伙伴，中国企业在美投资增长迅速。双方在南海争端、网络安全等问题上互有妥协，尽力“止损”。两军关系成熟度上升，成为中美关系新亮点。中美在气候变化等全球治理问题上的合作实现突破，协调应对伊朗核、朝核等国际安全热点。两国人文交流持续扩大，教育、地方交往等更趋密切。

2017年4月，中国国家主席习近平与特朗普总统在美国佛罗里达州海湖庄园举行首次会晤。习近平强调，“合作是中美两国唯一正确的选择”，“我们有一千条理由把中美关系搞好，没有一条理由把中美关系搞坏”。特朗普表示，美中两国作为世界大国责任重大，此次会晤取得重要、丰硕成果，有力推动了美中关系向前发展。尽管如此，仍有分析人士指出，坚持“美国优先”理念的特朗普政府将深刻地调整美国对华政策，包括在贸易和人民币等议题上对中国采取强硬做法，继续强化美国在亚太地区的军事力量

建设，在南海、朝核问题等方面增大对中国的压力。

显然，中美关系在变得越发复杂的同时，其风险也在上升，各方面对中美关系的看法也存在很多分歧。无论如何，本报告坚信，保持中美关系的稳定对两国民众的福祉乃至整个世界的和平与繁荣至关重要。本报告希望能为两国民众和决策者就中美关系提供平衡和全面的分析，这项研究基于中美两国战略界人士的深度交流和合作。本报告力图梳理中美双方对彼此的最主要政策关切，阐明两国各自在内外政策上的调整 and 变化，找出中美之间的分歧和冲突领域，并努力寻求促进中美关系稳定和健康发展之道。

一 中美关系处于重要转型阶段

中美关系正在经历过去三十多年来最深层次转型，两国对彼此的能力、意图和动向都难以做出明确判断，由此带来巨大的不适应和不确定感。中美关系进入一种合作与竞争同时增强的“新常态”，而分歧与竞争的一面更受两国国内公众和国际社会的关注。人们过去常常讲，“中美关系好也好不到哪里，坏也坏不到哪去”；现如今，“中美对抗可以坏大事，合作可以成大事”。

中美关系的深刻转型，主要源于以下几个方面。第一，

中国和美国各自内外政策都出现了重要变化。就中国而言，在以习近平总书记为核心的中国共产党领导下，为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦，中国正在开启新一轮改革进程，其艰巨程度不容低估。此外，中国 GDP 总量已突破 10 万亿美元，经济增长对世界经济的贡献率在 25% 以上，已经成为世界上 120 多个国家的最大贸易伙伴。中国实现了初步的崛起，开始努力从全球的视角审视和推进外交政策，中国的海外利益快速扩展，也要求中国更加主动地参与全球事务，并在世界政治、经济和安全格局中确认自己新的定位。中国希望维护以联合国为核心、以联合国宪章宗旨和原则为基础的国际秩序和国际体系。在中国看来，“一带一路”“亚投行”等新举措是对既有国际秩序的补充和完善，而非“另起炉灶”、试图颠覆国际秩序。

美国则面临“让美国重新伟大”的挑战，即便美国国内对于如何实现这一目标存在分歧。美国正致力于推进国内经济社会发展的变革，包括重塑制造业优势、减少财政赤字、调整移民政策、扩大医疗保险覆盖面、提高能源效率，以及加大对教育和基础设施的投入等。美国还需要应对经济不平等加剧、政党政治“极化”、政治体制“失能”等国内挑战，有人担心美国社会中的“裂痕”正在加大。在对外政策上，美国始终没有放弃对“全球领导地位”的

追求，并通过维系同盟体系、重塑国际规则、主导国际机制等方式巩固这一地位。美国对使用武力变得更为审慎，更加注重寻求合作伙伴与其分担国际责任。从 GDP 总量等指标看，中国与美国的力量差距在缩小，目前中国 GDP 规模相当于美国的约 60%，但在军事和软实力等方面与美国差距仍较大。

第二，中美关系所面临的全球环境出现了显著变化，双方围绕国际秩序问题存在较大分歧。应当看到，中美关系中的“规则之争”有所加剧。中国大力推动全球治理和国际体系变革，在政治领域，中国主张“国际关系民主化”。美国则继续鼓吹巩固“自由主义的国际秩序”，推动“世界民主化”，实则坚持具有排他性、“你输我赢”色彩的规则。这两种规则理念之间，存在着难以逾越的障碍。在经济领域，美国希望全面调整国际贸易规则，强调“买美国货、雇美国人”，针对限制国有企业、提高劳工标准、信息自由流通等制订新的国际规则，对中国加大施压。虽然特朗普政府已经决定退出 TPP，但美国将通过双边条约的方式将新的国际规则付诸实施。此外，中美在国际海洋法、网络安全等方面也存在分歧，缺乏在规则上的共识。

当前，世界经济增长速度放缓，全球化仍在前行但势头受挫，特朗普和欧洲的一些政治人士对全球化似乎持消极

态度。各国民族主义、保护主义、民粹主义普遍上升，社会分配不公带来贫富差距加大，技术创新增加了失业率，教派族群矛盾突出，难民问题严重，社交媒体发达的同时也加深了社会撕裂，带来对政治精英不满的放大效果。宗教极端主义和暴力恐怖主义的威胁增大，西方国家和伊斯兰世界关系存在很大风险。影响全球安全与稳定的“失序”现象越来越多，迫切需要加强中美等大国协调合作，加强国际秩序建设，促进全球范围的经济繁荣和社会公正。中美面临的共同挑战包括如何阻止大国再次走向集团对抗、如何保障全球基本稳定、如何实现“全球化 2.0”、如何完善“以共同规则为基础”的秩序等。

第三，亚太地区的战略态势正在重塑，这对中美关系产生了重大影响。美国近年来实施“亚太再平衡”的战略调整，增加在中国周边的军事存在和活动，巩固亚太安全同盟体系，高调介入南海争端，部署“萨德”系统。这些举动加深了中国对美国实施对华“遏制”战略的疑虑。中国在亚太地区的外交更为积极主动，通过“一带一路”等倡议强化影响力，同时坚定捍卫领土主权权益。美国努力“重返亚太”，中国则努力立足亚太、走向全球。百年来，中美首次在亚太出现利益的直接对撞。如果中美在亚太地区的分歧和摩擦得不到有效管控，未来几年，很可能在亚

太形成以美国同盟体系为一方、以中国及其战略伙伴为另一方的“对立”态势。中美两国军方或执法部门在南海等区域或会发生武装冲突。朝核、台海等问题也可能成为中美冲突的“导火索”。

第四，两国决策环境出现变化，国内因素、“第三方”因素的影响增大。中美各自国内的政治、经济、社会生态都处于深刻调整期，都存在狭隘民族主义、社会民粹现象等问题。社交媒体日趋发达，民意对决策层的影响增大。尽管两国政府层面保持顺畅沟通，交往气氛尚好，但两国的民间舆论往往“不买账”，期待政府更加“强势”。中美关系中任何“一招一式”的不当，都可能引发舆论战。这种国内政治背景和舆论环境，加大了中美政府达成战略谅解的难度。此外，近年“第三方因素”集中发酵，中美关系日益受到朝、韩、日、越、菲、俄等“第三方因素”的牵扯。

值得强调的是，两国之间在价值观和政治方面的分歧仍很突出，成为未来中美关系发展的重大阻碍。美国对华战略以其价值观为基底，这是中美矛盾（人权问题、“颜色革命”等）的直接来源，中国对美损害其政治安全、政权安全始终保持高度警惕。近年，对中国政治走向的判断，成为美战略界对华政策辩论的重要内容之一。针对中国制定

《境外非政府组织境内管理法》等做法，美方人士多表达不满。他们对中国政治、经济的新形势表示不安或不解，并因此更加担心中国在对外行为中放弃“韬光养晦”方针，对邻国、对美国咄咄逼人，图谋排斥美国，成为亚太地区新霸主。

二 中美关系面临战略选择

近年，中美关系总体保持稳定，在相互理解、管控分歧、避免危机方面，两国政府是成功的，也有能力继续维护中美关系的大局。虽然媒体、战略界感到悲观，但双方高层仍在积极把握中美关系的航向，工作层交往极为密切。中美高层都认识到“修昔底德陷阱”的危险性，对“不对抗、不冲突”互有需求，双方努力“避撞”，防范两国关系“脱轨”。两国政府防范危机的意识都在增强，在南海争端等问题上能把握住“止损点”，也都清楚双方承受不起陷入“恶斗”的代价。

然而，两国关系仍呈现较大脆弱性，存在战略误判的风险。中美之间的双向怀疑和不信任不但没有减轻，反而更多、更深了。尤其是，国际秩序问题开始成为双方争论的焦点，这是过去所不曾有的。中国方面担心，美国新政府

会因国际战略不甚清晰而拉长磨合期，导致不确定因素增加。特朗普政府外交、国防班子的成员可能有一些中方不大了解的“新面孔”，整体对华认知也许会朝着消极方向变动。美国方面则对中国政治、经济形势感到不安，认为“美国衰落论”在中国精英层中日趋盛行，中国展现出“必胜主义”情绪并在外交上变得更加强硬，甚至担心中方在2017年的中美磨合期中趁新政府立足未稳“出手”。

应当看到，未来数年，世界仍将处于既有秩序受到冲击、新秩序尚待建立的特殊阶段，这增加了中美关系整体外部环境的不确定性。中美关系是走向激烈冲突还是维持竞争与合作及至稳定合作大局，两国需要做出战略选择。

从世界历史看，新兴力量的崛起并不必然导致激烈冲突，各方选择什么样的战略至关重要。国际体系转型绝不仅仅是“中国崛起、美国衰落”的简单故事。无论是中国还是美国，它们既拥有巨大力量，同时也有其脆弱性和战略可塑性，而且其脆弱性和可塑性是相互作用的。中美双方都有必要保持战略克制，要看到各自面临的现实挑战和力量限制，应在共同维护中美关系稳定和全球秩序稳定上力争有更大作为。如果中美两国陷入激烈冲突，中国的现代化进程将陷于迟滞，以至于失去实现“中国梦”的机遇；美国也将失去“重新伟大”的机遇，经济上遭受重大创伤，

国际地位降低；国际秩序的基本稳定将难以维持，亚太地区将陷入分裂，全球性挑战也无法得以有效应对。

中美避免战略对抗并非“不可能的任务”。人们常认为，作为世界上的“霸权国家”和最重要的“崛起国家”，中美之间存在着难以化解的“结构性矛盾”或“结构性冲突”，然而中国和美国之间实际上也存在着“结构性合作”的巨大动力。当前，双方需要对各自的发展方向和战略意图进行再确认，对中美日益增长的共同利益进行再确认，对双方维护和平、稳定与发展承担的责任进行再确认。着眼于未来10—20年，中美关系需要一种新的战略框架。未来一个时期，中国需要应对的核心挑战是“权力”（power）问题，即如何更好地使用自身不断增长的权力，如何构建在国际层面维护和平和促进繁荣的能力，以及参与制度建设的意识。美国需要应对的核心挑战在于，能否认识到自身一直追求的“绝对优势”（primacy）已不符合时代现实，能否适应与中国等新兴大国分享权力和协调合作的需求，以及如何以更包容的方式推进国际秩序的改革。

中美关系的走向已经成为塑造未来世界的最关键因素，而管理中美关系也已成为两国最艰难的挑战。为了避免与美国陷入所谓的“修昔底德陷阱”，中国提出构建中美“新型大国关系”的倡议，旨在管理两国之间“竞争性共存”

(competitive co-existence) 关系，避免滑向战略对抗。美方不应忽视中方的积极意愿和主动作为，中方也需要以更加具体和有效的方式阐明自身战略意图。构建新型大国关系之路将是复杂的、渐进的，双方不应因为某些具体问题未能获得满意的解决就失去信心和方向感。中美两国有责任也有必要更准确地界定国家利益和优先任务，更诚实地面对自身局限和困难，更有力地推动国内变革，更明智地选择彼此相处之道。双方完全可以在重新调适自我的基础上合力应对国际体系转型带来的挑战。中美构建新型大国关系，实际上并不是一种博弈，而是必然之举，是一个对彼此和世界都事关重大的选择。

三 如何避免中美战略对抗

本报告从经济、亚太、军事、政治和全球治理五个领域分析中美关系现状，希望增进对两国各自政策变化和中美关系整体变化的认知与把握。针对中美关系如何保持稳定和健康发展，报告的各个部分提出了较为具体的建议。本报告认为，中美双方需要深入思考以下几方面的关键问题。

一是就国际秩序愿景进行持续沟通，中美应当成为全球持久稳定的共同维护者。全球不稳定因素正在多个地区、

多个领域急剧涌现，如果放任自流，终将威胁两国的共同利益。作为世界上最大的两个经济体，中美有义务维护开放的世界经济格局，促进全球金融、贸易、货币、投资治理体制的渐进性变革，纠正全球经济失衡，实现“全球化2.0”，而不是竞相建立排斥对方的经济集团。在地区热点问题，核安全和太空安全、网络安全等新疆域问题上，应主动推动形成更多共识，并努力使之成为更大范围的国际共识。双方要防止世界走向结盟对抗的时代，保障全球持久稳定。可通过共建亚太自贸区等方式建立利益共同体，通过“跨太平洋安全合作架构”建立安全共同体，通过加强应对气候变化等全球性问题的合作构建责任共同体。中美有责任培育和构建一个包容、公正、开放、以规则为基础的国际秩序，这也将为中美关系的长期健康发展提供有力的保证。

二是加深理解彼此的发展道路和历史文化，避免做出战略误判。更好地应对国内因素对双边关系的影响。“好的外交政策始于国内”，中国和美国选择什么样的发展道路，是分道扬镳还是殊途同归，是两相对抗还是“共同进化”，这将从根本上决定中美关系的性质和走向。中美领导层面临的最主要挑战实际上都在于国内事务，中美都在推进富有挑战性的国内变革议程。双方需要更深入地了解 and 把握对

方的国内政治和对内政策，还要避免中美受国内因素驱动而对对方做出战略误判，或因考虑不周、表达不清晰而引起对方的战略误判。美方应认识到国家统一、政治稳定等对中国的重要性，承认中国的自主变革努力。中方需认识到美国自身的价值理念和全球领导地位理念等对美国的重要性。中美双方都有较强的大国抱负和“例外主义”传统，两国都需要保持战略克制，克服“必胜主义”情绪。双方需要审视各自正在推进的变革和转型，培育新的合作互补性，避免对对方国家的政治关切造成伤害。随着中国经济结构的深入调整、中产阶级消费能力的提升，美国的企业界正更多地从“中国转型”中获得新的机遇。双方需要加强人文交流，寻找中美共通的人文精神和价值，促进本国社会和舆论更好地了解 and 认识彼此。

三是对“第三方因素”进行更好的管理，避免被干扰甚至绑架，发挥“第三方”正面效应。在涉及“第三方因素”的情况中，有些是美国的关切，需要中国配合；有些则是中国的关切，需要美国配合。双方需要切实管控那些可能导致两国直接对抗的“第三方因素”，而在那些有可能实现更大合作的“第三方因素”上加强协调协作。在东亚地区，日本、菲律宾、朝鲜都可能是导致中美关系“破局”的“第三方因素”。中美可以用合作共赢精神和开放包容的

姿态建构“中美+X”的新型三边/多边合作框架。中国推动“一带一路”等国际合作倡议，也为中美构建促进全球发展的伙伴关系提供了广阔空间。

四是中美应大力培养“合作的习惯”，探索以“新型”方式有效应对“新型”难题。无论是网络安全、气候变化，还是海洋方向的挑战，对于中美两国来说都是新问题，需要双方以一种直面问题、相向而行的“新型”心态和方式予以应对。中美两国政府近年处理气候变化、网络安全等问题的经验表明，只要双方本着冷静、务实的态度，就有可能使敏感问题降温，甚至将中美之间的“冲突领域”转变为“合作亮点”。此外，中美两国还应就国际治理机制的改革和完善持续进行沟通，在国际维和、反恐、公共卫生等方面继续大力拓展“新型”协作。

五是中美双方应找到界定相互关系的、便于表述的准则(formula)，建立更为通畅、坦诚、高效的对话机制。20世纪末，双方共同提出了“建立面向21世纪的建设性战略伙伴关系”；2005年，美方提出中国应成为“负责任的利益攸关方”，得到中方正面回应；2009年，中方提议建设中美合作伙伴关系，美方高级官员提出了“战略再保证”的想法；2013年中方提倡建立中美“新型大国关系”。随着特朗普政府上台执政，双方可在以往关系定位的基础上，根据中美

关系的新现实制订双方都能接受的共同准则。两国元首的非正式对话对于促进中美关系健康、稳定发展具有良好效果。双方需要用好在 2017 年 4 月新建立的“全面对话”机制以及其他官方、半官方和民间对话机制，并努力使它们更有效率、更具实效。中美两国智库可围绕上述问题，秉持建设性的态度，继续向两国政府提出可操作的政策建言。

Overview

Wang Jisi, Yuan Peng and Zhao Minghao

In January 2017, a new administration came to power in the United States as Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th president. The new Republican administration entered office with the Republican Party in control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This fall, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China will be convened and it will have a major impact on the direction of China's national development. As both the the United States and China undergo personnel changes, the leaders of both nations will readjust their domestic and foreign policies. In this context, we hope these domestic political changes in both countries will not lead to a serious regression in China-U. S. relations. We believe that positive progress can be made in China-U. S. relations from the point on.

While the China-U. S. relationship has remained stable, it has also become increasingly complex over the past few years, with both expanding areas of cooperation and intensifying competition. Meanwhile, strategists in both countries have, once again, engaged in a debate over the destiny of China-U. S. relations, with many holding a pessimistic view. Against the background of an international order faced with new difficulties, the China-U. S. relationship, with longstanding problems and new challenges, has experienced a fundamental transformation in the post-Cold War era. Leadership in both countries should step up efforts to avoid strategic miscalculations and prevent the huge risks and costs potentially brought about by a strategic drift in the bilateral relation.

In fact, the past few years have witnessed positive progress in China-U. S. relations with frequent exchanges between top leaders, enhanced awareness of strategic communication and strengthened capabilities and experiences in crisis prevention. The economic and trade cooperation between the two countries has strengthened, China and the United States are expected to be each other's largest trade partner. Chinese enterprises' investments in the United States are on the rise. The two sides

have also made compromises on issues such as the South China Sea and cyber security to reduce friction. The military-to-military relationship between the two countries has been strengthened, and it has become a new highlight in China-U. S. relations. Breakthroughs have been made in cooperation on global governance issues like climate change, and the two governments are coordinating with each other to deal with global security hotspots such as the Iran and Korean nuclear issues. People-to-people and educational exchanges have been enlarged, and communications between localities have become more frequent.

In April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping held his first-ever meeting with his U. S. counterpart, Donald Trump in Florida. Xi emphasized that there are “a thousand reasons to make the China-U. S. relationship work and no reason to break it”. Trump said that as two major countries in the world, the U. S. and China shoulder great responsibilities, and hoped to build a sound working relationship with President Xi Jinping, in a bid to achieve greater development of China-U. S. relations. However, analysts have expressed concerns that the Trump administration that adopts “America First” doctrine might make a comprehensive and thorough readjustment to its China policy. It

may take tougher policies on issues such as trade and the RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the United States may further strengthen its military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The new administration will put remarkably higher pressures on China over the issues of the South China Sea and the DPRK nuclear among others.

Obviously, China-U. S. relations are becoming more complicated and the associated risks have increased. Different parties hold different views about China-U. S. relations. This report believes that the stability of China-U. S. relations has a great bearing on people's well-being in both countries, and the relationship will also contribute to the world peace and prosperity. This report, based on the in-depth exchange of views and cooperation between strategists from both countries, intends to provide the public and policy makers in both countries with a balanced and thorough analysis of China-U. S. relations. It aims to summarize the major policy concerns of both sides, define possible adjustments and changes in each other's domestic and foreign policies, and pin down the areas of differences and conflicts in order to promote a stable and healthy development for China-U. S. relations.

The China-U. S. relationship is in a critical phase of its transformation

The China-U. S. relationship is experiencing its most profound transformation in the past 30 years. Neither country can make an accurate assessment of the other's capabilities, intentions and moves, which leads to potentially serious maladjustments and uncertainties. The China-U. S. relationship is entering a new normal of the simultaneous growth of cooperation and competition. Differences and competition are gaining wider attention from the public in both countries, as well as from the broader global community. People used to say that China-U. S. relations can neither fare much better nor fare much worse. Nowadays, people often say that cooperation between China and the United States would lead to major progress globally, while rivalry will lead to regression.

The following factors are contributing to the profound transformation of China-U. S. relations. First, the domestic and foreign policies in both countries have been undergoing significant changes. In China, a new round of reform is being carried out

under the leadership of the Communist Party of China with Xi Jinping as the core leader to realize the Chinese Dream. This dream consists of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” although the difficulty of this reform should not be underestimated. Besides, China’s GDP has topped \$10 trillion and it contributes to more than a quarter of global growth. China has become the biggest trade partner to more than 120 countries across the globe. As a rising power, China has begun to evaluate and promote its foreign policies from a global perspective. The rapid expansion of China’s overseas interests also requires China to actively participate in international affairs and to find a new position in the global political, economic, and security landscape. China hopes to uphold the international order and system with the United Nations as its core institution and with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as its foundation. From China’s perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB are supplements and improvements to the existing international order and are not about dismantling the order or replacing it with a new one.

The United States is facing challenges in making itself “great again”, as there are differing domestic views as to how to

achieve this goal. The United States is committed to reforming its economic and social development and its measures include reshaping the edge of the manufacturing industry, cutting budget deficits, readjusting its immigration policy, expanding the coverage of medical insurance, improving energy efficiency, and increasing investment in education and infrastructure. The United States must contend with domestic challenges, such as the growing economic inequality, the polarization of its political parties, and dysfunction in its political system. Some are worried that American society is disintegrating. In formulating its foreign policy, the United States has never given up seeking global leadership and has been trying to consolidate its leadership role by maintaining an alliance system, reshaping international rules, and dominating international mechanisms. The United States is now more prudent when exercising its military force, and instead gives more weight to seeking partners and sharing international responsibilities with them. Judging from such indices as GDP volume, the gap between China and the United States is narrowing with China's GDP now about 60% of U. S. GDP. However, a considerable gulf still exists between China and the United States in terms of military capacity, soft power, and other

dimensions.

Second, significant changes have taken place in the global environment, and differences have arisen over issues surrounding the international order. It should be noted that the disputes between China and the United States over the “rules of the game” are increasing. China is working to reform the current global governance and the international systems. In the political sphere, China advocates “democratization in international relations” based on national sovereignty. In contrast, the United States continues to advocate and consolidate the “liberal international order” and promotes what it sees as democratization in other countries of the world. In essence, the United States is clinging to exclusive and zero-sum strategies. Insuperable barriers exist between these two differing concepts. Economically, the United States wants to reshuffle international economic and trade rules that would place limits on state-owned enterprises, raise labor standards, and promote the free flow of information, which would put more pressure on China. Although Trump has withdrawn from TPP, the United States will likely put new international rules into practice by way of new bilateral treaties. Besides, China and the U. S. hold different views about international maritime law and

cyber security, and have not reached consensus over rules on these issues.

Currently, the world economic growth is slowing down and globalization, albeit with a relative loss in momentum, is still pressing ahead. However, Trump and some politicians in Europe seem to hold a negative attitude toward globalization. Nationalism, protectionism, and populism are gaining more momentum in many countries throughout the world. Unfair distribution of wealth has given rise to a widening gap between the poor and the rich, and technological innovation has resulted in higher unemployment. The world is fraught with prominent ethnic and sectarian conflicts, as well as a serious refugee problem. With the development of social media, social disintegration is accelerating and public discontent with political elites has grown. Religious extremism and violent terrorism pose a greater threat to the world, and relations between the Western countries and the Muslim world pose huge risks. There are more and more manifestations of disorder undermining global security and stability, which calls for coordination and cooperation among larger countries like China and the United States in order to strengthen the international order and achieve worldwide

economic prosperity and social justice. The common challenges that China and the United States are facing include trying to prevent major countries from engaging in a rivalry, maintaining overall world stability, realizing “Globalization Version 2.0” and improving the international order based on common rules.

Third, the reshaping of strategic power relations in the Asia-Pacific region has a great impact on China-U. S. relations. Under the Obama administration, the United States implemented a “pivot to Asia” rebalancing strategy. It enhanced its military presence and activities on China’s periphery, consolidated its Asia-Pacific security alliance system, conducted a high-profile intervention into the South China Sea, and moved to deploy the THAAD system. These moves deepened China’s concerns over the U. S. “strategy of containment” against China. China carried out a more proactive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. It enhanced its influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and firmly upheld state sovereignty and territorial integrity. While the United States has been implementing its “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region, China, with the Asia-Pacific region as its base, has been attempting to enlarge its sphere of influence by going global. For the first time in the past

100 years, China and the United States are facing head-on conflict of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Ineffective management of the differences and frictions between the two sides may give rise to rivalries between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and China and its strategic partners, on the other. It is likely that armed clashes between military or law enforcement will occur in regions like the South China Sea. The North Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan question can also spark conflicts between China and the United States.

Fourth, the environment for policy making is undergoing a change, and the influence of domestic, as well as third-party factors are on the rise. The political, economic, and social ecology in both countries is undergoing profound readjustment, and both countries are facing narrow nationalism and populism. With the rapid development of social media, public opinion has a greater impact on policy makers. Although the two governments have maintained relatively smooth methods of communication, the general public in both countries—more often than not—does not believe what the governments openly say to each other, therefore urging their respective government to be more assertive toward the other side. Any improper or unthoughtful move in China-U. S.

relations can set off a public opinion warfare between and within the two countries. Such domestic political environments make it more difficult for the two governments to reach a strategic understanding. Additionally, third-party factors have surged in recent years, and China-U. S. relations are increasingly affected by outside factors and actors, including the DPRK, the ROK, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Russia, and many others.

It is worth noting that daunting disparities still exist between the two countries' values and politics, and they have become serious obstacles to developing future China-U. S. relations. U. S. strategy toward China is based on its own value system, and this is an immediate cause of conflict between China and the United States, as reflected in the lingering human rights issues and China's resistance to the "color revolution." China has consistently maintained high vigilance against the U. S. attempts to undermine its political security and stability. The assessment of China's political trends has been an important topic of debate among American strategists. Many people on the U. S. side have expressed concerns and complaints regarding, among other things, the passing of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Management of Activities of Overseas NGOs. They are puzzled

and agitated over China's new political and economic changes. They are even more worried that China might give up the principle of "keeping a low profile" in conducting foreign affairs due to these changes, thereby becoming more aggressive toward neighboring countries and the United States, and attempt to become a new hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific by excluding the United States from the region.

China-U. S. relations are facing a strategic choice

In recent years, China-U. S. relations have been stable overall, and the two governments have been successful in promoting mutual understanding, managing differences, and forestalling crises. Moreover, they are capable of continuing to maintain the bilateral relationship as a whole. Although much of Chinese and American media and strategists tend to sound pessimistic, leaders and senior officials on both sides have been carrying out frequent working-level exchanges in an effort to keep China-U. S. relations on track. They are fully aware of the possible hazards of the Thucydides Trap. The two sides have a

mutual need to avoid conflict and confrontation, and both are striving to avoid clashes and prevent a derail in bilateral relations. The two governments' awareness of crisis prevention has been enhanced, and both sides grasp severity of the South China Sea issue, fully aware that neither can afford a fierce military engagement.

However, China-U. S. relations are still vulnerable and there are risks of miscalculations being made. Mutual distrust has broadened and deepened rather than lessened. The international order, in particular, has for the first time become the focus of dispute between the two sides. The Chinese side is worried that the new U. S. government may undergo a protracted reorientation period due to its ill-defined international strategies, which add another layer of uncertainty in China-U. S. relations. There will be some new faces in the diplomatic, defense, and national security establishments of the Trump administration, some of whom will probably have a negative view on China—its trajectory, intentions, and global influence. That will likely push the U. S. public opinion of China towards a downward spiral. The American side feels uneasy about China's economic and political situations, believing that the notion of a declining U. S. power is

prevailing among Chinese elites and that the triumphalist move in China will result in the adoption of a more hawkish foreign policy. Moreover, they are even worried that China might make a “surprise move” to take advantage of the new administration’s reorientation period in 2017.

It should be noted that in the next few years the world will still be in a particular stage where the established order is challenged and a new order has yet to be ushered in. This adds to uncertainties in the overall external environment for China-U. S. relations. The United States and China have a strategic decision to make: slide into a fierce rivalry or maintain the combination of competition and cooperation so as to achieve stable cooperation.

Judging from history, the rise of a newly emerging power does not necessarily lead to fierce conflict. The strategic choices that nations make are of critical and of the utmost importance. The transformation of the international system is not simply a story about “China’s rise and America’s decline.” On one hand, both China and the United States are remarkably powerful. On the other, they are vulnerable and strategically changeable. This vulnerability and changeability interact with each other. Both China and the United States should demonstrate strategic

restraint, and both sides should be aware of the limits of their power and the realistic challenges that they face. They should join each other and make greater contributions to maintaining a stable China-U. S. relationship and a viable international order. If China and the United States slide into a fierce rivalry, China's modernization would come to a standstill, and eventually, China will lose the opportunity to fulfill the "Chinese Dream". The United States would also lose the chance to be "great again" and would suffer from substantial economic losses and a lower international status. In such a case, it would be difficult to maintain the overall stability of the international order, the Asia-Pacific region would disintegrate, and global challenges would not be effectively addressed.

It is not impossible for China and the United States to avoid antagonizing each other. A number of analysts have argued that China and the United States, as the hegemonic power and the most important rising power nowadays, have irreconcilable structural conflicts. But, in fact, there is also a strong impetus for structural cooperation between the two countries. Currently, both sides need to reaffirm their respective directions for development and their strategic domestic and foreign policy

intentions. As such, they need to reaffirm their ever-growing common interests and their respective responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability, and development. A new strategic framework is needed for China-U. S. relations in the next 10 to 20 years. In the near future, China has to deal with key challenges in regards to its growing power. It has to find ways to better exercise its power, improve its capabilities for peace and development, and enhance its awareness of system construction at an international level. The United States has to realize that the primacy it has always been seeking is no longer realistic in this era, it has to learn whether it can meet the needs of such rising major countries as China for power sharing, coordination and cooperation, and whether it can press ahead with reform of international order in a more inclusive way.

China-U. S. relations are the most critical factor in shaping the world's future, and managing this relationship has become the greatest challenge for both sides. In order to not fall into the Thucydides Trap, China proposed the initiative of a "new model of major-country relations," which aims to manage the competitive co-existence between the two countries and to prevent them from sliding into a strategic rivalry. The United States should not ignore

China's positive will and proactive efforts, and China should clearly state its strategic intentions in a more concrete and effective manner. The building of a new model of major-country relations is a complicated, gradual process. Therefore, neither side should lose faith and sense of direction despite failing to satisfactorily solve certain problems. Both countries have the responsibility to accurately define their national interests and priorities, to be honest about their own limitations and difficulties, to put more effort into domestic reforms, and to be wiser in choosing how to get along with one another. In the process of self-readjustment, it is entirely possible for the two sides to join hands and jointly deal with the challenges brought about by the transformation of the international system. The building of a new model of major-country relations is not a game but a necessary move, a choice that has a great bearing on both sides, as well as the whole world.

China and the United States should strive to avoid
becoming strategic adversaries

This report analyzes the current situation with regard to

China-U. S. relations in five areas: the economy, the Asia-Pacific region, the military, global governance, and politics. This report intends to enhance the appreciation and understanding of the changes in their respective policies between China and the United States in order to foster more effective and constructive cooperation in the future. The different sections in this report put forward concrete proposals as to how best to maintain a stable and healthy China-U. S. relationship. The authors of the report hold that both China and the United States should deliberate on the following key issues:

First, China and the United States should have sustained exchanges on their vision for the future of the current international order. Both China and the United States should be the guarantors of sustained stability of the world. Factors of instability are constantly emerging in different fields and regions, and if we turn a blind eye to them, these factors will eventually jeopardize the common interests of the two countries. As the world's two largest economies, China and the United States should not vie with each other to build economic alliances that undermine each other's development. Instead, it is crucial to appreciate the fact that both countries are responsible for maintaining an inclusive world

economy, facilitating reforms in international finance, trade, currency, and investment management systems, correcting the global economic imbalance, and eventually realizing “Globalization Version 2.0.” On the topic of regional hotspots, and on the new issues of nuclear, space, and cyber security, the two countries should strive to reach further international agreements. Both sides should try to prevent the world from moving into alliances and rivalries in order to ensure sustained stability in the world. The two countries can build a community of shared interests by co-constructing the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), a community of common security through the Trans-Pacific Security Cooperation Framework (TPSCF), and a community of common responsibility by enhancing cooperation on global issues like climate change. China and the United States have the responsibility to establish an inclusive, just, open, and rules-based international order that guarantees the long-term and healthy development of China-U. S. relations.

Second, both sides should deepen their understanding of each other’s history and culture, as well as develop a path for development to avoid strategic miscalculations. Both sides should

better cope with the influence of domestic factors on bilateral relations. A good foreign policy is rooted in the domestic environment. Will China and the United States walk in different directions or work towards the same goal? Will they slide into rivalry or achieve common development? This will decide the nature and the future of the China-U. S. relations. Domestic affairs pose the greatest challenges to top leaders on both sides, and both China and the United States are working on a challenging agenda for domestic reforms. Both sides need to get a deeper understanding and grasp of each other's domestic politics and policies. Both sides should try to avoid strategic miscalculations due to a misunderstanding of domestic factors and also avoid strategic miscalculations of the other side's intents and capabilities because of thoughtlessness or a lack of clarity. The American side should realize the importance of national unity and political stability to China, and acknowledge China's efforts in terms of voluntary reforms. The Chinese side should realize the importance of American values and global leadership to the United States. Both China and the United States have strong aspirations as major countries and have a tradition of believing in its own historical exceptionalism. They should maintain strategic constraint and

reject triumphalism as an ultimate goal of their respective foreign policy. Both sides should review their respective reforms and transformation, enhance complementary cooperation, and avoid endangering each other's political concerns. With China's deepening readjustment of its economic structure and with the improved consuming capacity of the middle class, American enterprises are reaping more and more opportunities from China's transformation. Both sides need to strengthen people-to-people exchanges to enable the people and public opinion at home to gain a better understanding of the other side.

Third, both sides should avoid being unduly affected or allowing the conversation to be distracted by third-party factors. Instead, we should make use of the positive effects of these third-party factors through improved management. China should cooperate with the United States when a third-party factor is of concern to the United States, and vice versa. Both sides should manage those third-party factors that might lead to direct confrontations between the two countries. Furthermore, both sides should strengthen coordination and cooperation on those third-party factors that might lead to greater cooperation. In East Asia, Japan, the Philippines, and the DPRK are third-party

factors that might lead to a breakthrough in China-U. S. relations. Under the spirit of win-win cooperation and with an open and inclusive posture, China and the United States can build a new trilateral or multilateral cooperative “China-U. S. + X” framework. The Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China also provides a great platform for China and the United States to build a partnership for global development.

Additionally, China and the United States should strive to develop a habit of cooperation and explore new ways to cope with new problems, such as cyber security, climate change, and maritime issues. Both countries should face these problems and work toward solving them with a new mentality and in a new way. Recent experience in dealing with climate change and cyber security by the two governments shows that, with a hardheaded and pragmatic attitude, it is possible to de-escalate sensitive issues, and even turn these areas of conflicts into highlights of cooperation. Besides, both countries should carry out constant exchanges to reform and improve global governance mechanisms and promote new types of cooperation in international peace-keeping, counter-terrorism, and public health.

Finally, both sides should work out an explicit formula to

define their relationship, and establish a more open, straightforward, and efficient dialogue mechanism. At the end of the 20th century, China and the United States proposed the notion of building a global constructive strategic partnership for the 21st century. In 2005, the United States proposed that China should be a responsible stakeholder, and this proposal was met with a positive response from the Chinese side. In 2009, China proposed to build the China-U. S. cooperative partnership and top officials on the American side put forward the notion of strategic reassurance. In 2013, China proposed to build a new model of major-country relations between China and the United States. With Donald Trump taking office, both sides can take into consideration the new reality of China-U. S. relations and work together to make mutually acceptable common rules on the basis of past China-U. S. relations. Informal dialogues between top leaders on both sides may be effective in stabilizing and developing bilateral relations. Washington and Beijing also need to full utilize Comprehensive Dialogue established in April 2017 as well as other official, semi-official, and non-governmental dialogue mechanisms, which should be more efficient and result-oriented. With a focus on the above-mentioned problems, think

tanks on both sides should continue to propose constructive policy recommendations that can be carried out by the governments of the two countries.

中美经济金融关系走向 预测与应对

何帆 管涛 熊爱宗 苏庆义

中美经济合作长期是两国关系的“压舱石”，在全球金融危机之后已形成“你中有我、我中有你”的利益交融格局。未来，随着中美各自经济模式的转型和国内经济政策的调整，两国的经济关系机遇与挑战并存。中美间确在贸易逆差、汇率等问题上有着现实的矛盾，中美经济关系在继续向着纵深发展的同时，各类分歧与摩擦也在积聚。是打“贸易战”还是加强对话协商，中美经济关系的前景主要取决于中美选择的解决问题的方式，两者导致的结果会大相径庭。2017年4月6日至7日，习近平主席同特朗普总统会晤的重要成果之一是双方针对贸易问题讨论制订“百日计划”，让我们看到了双方对话协商的努力。

一 中国未来五年的经济发展趋势

在经过 30 年高速增长之后，中国经济增速已逐步回落。特别是 2008 年全球金融危机爆发后，中国经济对内改革与对外开放的红利逐步消退，简单依靠投资等原始要素积累的经济增长方式难以为继。因此，中国经济将步入中高速增长的新常态。2016 年，中国经济增速下降至 6.7%，未来可能会进一步走低。

在经济增速下降的背景下，中国的经济结构正在两个方面发生改变：一是内外需的转换。出口对经济增长的贡献逐步降低。按此方向发展，未来五年，中国高度依赖外需的时代可能要结束。中国将会更加依赖于内生经济，定位国内市场，激活并释放国内消费潜能，依靠国内消费引导经济高质量、和谐、可持续发展。二是经济结构出现重大调整，制造业占经济的比重下降，而服务业占国内生产总值（GDP）的比重不断上升。2015 年，服务业占 GDP 的比重首次超过 50%，这意味着产业结构迎来重要转折点。服务业占 GDP 的比重在未来数年内将持续上升。

未来五年中国将会继续坚定地扩大对外双向开放水平。中国共产党（CPC）十八届五中全会通过的《中共中央

关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议》，提出了形成对外开放新体制的要求，在促进贸易便利化、完善外商和外资投资管理体制、扩大服务业对外开放、扩大金融业对内对外双向开放等方面提出了具体的政策举措。从2018年起，中国将正式实行市场准入负面清单制度，这意味着除了明确禁止的“负面清单”外，所有行业都将允许外商投资。

服务业是中国未来改革开放的重点领域。目前，中国正在四大自贸试验区就服务业开放进行先行先试。但服务业开放相比中国原有的制造业开放更为复杂，牵涉的利益、涉及的体制较多，开放面临的风险也更大，因此，迅速地完全开放服务业，不利于中国经济稳定。

中国将继续坚定地推动市场化改革，其重要内容是国有企业（SOE）改革。在总体要求、分类改革、完善现代企业制度和国资管理体制、发展混合所有制经济、强化监督防止国有资产流失等方面，中国政府都提出了国企改革的目标和举措。但中国是社会主义市场经济，原来国有企业占比较高，国企改革将会有有一个过程，而且具有中国自身特色。

伴随经济结构的调整，中国对外需的依赖逐步降低，国际收支趋于平衡。伴随着人均可支配收入的增长，中国进

口将会增加，给世界包括美国提供更多的机会。伴随着产业结构升级，中国对高附加值商品和服务的需求增多，将从初级重型物品，如原材料、能源、大型机械等，转向“软性”、数字的高附加值产品，也将为美国等发达经济体带来机遇。

未来五年中国经济面临的一些潜在风险或将更为突出。从对内方面看，经济下行所带来的产能过剩、投资乏力、债务累积等问题日益突出。债务规模上升速度较快，特别是企业债务负债率过高，成为制约未来中国经济的一大风险。与此同时，收入差距扩大、环境污染等问题也对未来经济发展带来约束。从对外方面来看，全球经济减速所带来的外部需求疲弱、贸易保护主义抬头、国际资本流动波动性加大等，也会在一定程度上加剧中国经济的波动。

当前中国经济正从高速向中高速过渡。但中国依然是全球经济增长最快的大型经济体之一，未来五年维持6%以上的增速不仅能为中国经济转型提供保障，还将对全球经济做出巨大贡献。

二 美国未来五年的经济发展趋势

未来五年美国经济可能呈温和增长态势。从20世纪80

年代开始，美国经济平均增速不断下降，特别是全球金融危机爆发后，经济增速基线出现下移，2010—2015年美国经济增长维持在1.5%—2.5%的低速增速区间，明显低于金融危机前3%以上的增速。未来五年，温和缓慢增长或将成为美国经济增长的基调。受人口老龄化、科技创新、移民改革等不确定性因素影响，美国劳动生产率的提升受到制约。

美国经济在全球金融危机之后也出现了一些结构性变化。第一，美国作为全球最后消费者（consumer of the last resort）的作用有所降低。全球金融危机对美国依赖信用驱动消费的增长模式带来冲击。第二，美国希望重振制造业。全球金融危机之后，美国政府希望借助制造业复兴，来巩固经济复苏和刺激就业。在国内，美国政府提出“再工业化”战略，新任总统唐纳德·特朗普甚至喊出“雇美国人、用美国货”的口号，对外则积极鼓励制造业回流。尽管有评论认为，这可能只是创造就业的政治需要，制造业带动就业的效果并不会太明显，但这种转变趋势值得关注。

美国经济在未来五年也面临着一定的风险。从美国国内来看，劳动生产率放缓、政府财政状况恶化、基础设施投资不足、收入不平等、政党两极分化严重等问题正困扰美国经济。美国出现劳动生产率长期放缓趋势，研发投入以

及在新技术上的投资势头较全球金融危机前的水平有所下降。这表明，美国生产率的下降可能不只是周期性的，而是结构性的，会进一步导致美国经济长期放缓。

美国社会贫富差距正在拉大。美国皮尤中心的民调显示，2013年美国高收入家庭财富中位数为650074美元，是中等收入家庭（98057美元）的6.6倍、低收入家庭（9465美元）的近70倍，^①差距达美国人口统计局1967年开始监测以来的最大值，美国因此成为发达国家中收入最不平等的国家。中国希望美国努力弥合国内收入差距，以扩大中产阶级比例，同时应防止以增加就业、保护低收入阶层为由，对中国对美贸易和投资实施歧视性待遇。

三 未来中美经贸关系发展的可能趋势

与全球金融危机之前相比，中美两国潜在经济增长水平都将有不同程度的下移。未来五年，中国潜在经济增长率将会进一步下降，结构性改革进入深水区，潜在金融风险有所增加。美国经济虽持续复苏，但不确定性因素也很多，

^① Pew Research Center, “The American Middle Class is Losing Ground: No Longer the Majority and Falling Behind Financially”, Report, December 2015.

其潜在增长较此前也可能有所下降。双方经济增长将会更为平缓，相比 2008—2015 年应该更为稳定，但是深层次的问题仍在累积，为双方带来挑战与风险。

中美两国未来经济的变化既会促进两国的合作，也会促进两国的竞争。中国经济从外需驱动向内需驱动转型将会促进双边贸易平衡、为双边贸易的发展提供更多的机会，从而增加两国的紧密度。但随着中美经济结构向趋同方向发展，在制造业等方面可能产生更大的竞争。但无论如何，中美经贸关系将会更为紧密。

世界经济的新变化将会促进中美在全球的合作。作为世界第一和第二大经济体，未来两国都将面对全球化退潮、收入差距扩大、政治经济因素相互交织等不利影响，唯有加强相互合作才能对这些挑战做出应对。两国如果放弃已有的合作，将会对两国经济及全球经济带来巨大的负面影响。

中美经济相互依存，合作多于竞争，两国经济在共同演进（co-evolution），总体仍然向好，但在具体领域双方利益冲突会有所加剧，与此同时，政治因素对经济关系的影响将会更大，加剧双边关系的复杂性。

尽管中国经济增长在全球金融危机之后越来越少地依赖贸易顺差，中国对美国出口占总出口的比重也总体呈下降

趋势，但一些美国政要仍不断控诉中国导致了美国巨额贸易逆差以及“窃取”了美国人的工作。可以预见，今后美国在贸易政策方面将会更趋强硬，有可能会通过提高关税、反倾销、反补贴以及指责中国为货币操纵国等方式对中国实施贸易保护。对此，不少国际媒体和观察家都认为，“中美贸易战”已呼之欲出。中国担心美国放弃自由贸易原则，追求贸易与投资保护，在世界范围内造成不良的示范效应，阻碍世界经济复苏，也给中国经济带来负面影响。

中国对美直接投资增长迅速。据美国荣鼎咨询公司的统计，2016年中国企业对美国投资较2015年增加了两倍，达到456亿美元，未来有望继续保持快速增长势头。^①但是，中国企业在对美投资面临非常多的安全审查壁垒，如果特朗普政府以保护美国企业竞争、消费者利益和国家安全为名，采取针对性的行动来增加中国对美投资障碍，将极大阻碍中国企业在美加大投资的兴趣与力度。

部分美国人士对中美贸易的解读与事实存在较大偏差，认为中国出口对美国就业产生冲击，中美贸易对美国劳动力市场产生不利影响。此类认识如果上升为美国政策，将

^① Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, Rhodium Group, “Record Deal Making in 2016 Pushes Cumulative Chinese FDI in the U. S. above \$ 100 Billion”, Note, December 30, 2016.

极大破坏中美间密切的经济合作。

中美经贸关系的本质是互利共赢，不能用零和博弈的视角去看待。中美建交 30 多年来，双边经贸合作从无到有、从小到大，合作领域不断拓展，已形成“你中有我，我中有你”的利益交融格局。中国商务部数据显示，中美贸易额从 1979 年的 25 亿美元增长到 2016 年的 5196 亿美元，38 年间增长了 211 倍；中美服务贸易额已超过 1000 亿美元，美方对华保持顺差。同时，中美双向投资迅猛增长，截至 2016 年年底，双向投资已累计超过 1700 亿美元。美中贸易全国委员会联合牛津经济研究院发布的一份报告显示，2015 年美中双边贸易和双向投资为美国创造了约 260 万个就业岗位，为美国经济增长贡献了 2160 亿美元，相当于美国国内生产总值的 1.2%。^① 中国商品出口到美国，使美国物价水平降低了 1—1.5 个百分点。

不少学者的研究都表明，美国通过与中国的贸易提高了自身的整体福利。^② 除了产业竞争力方面的原因外，美国学

① The China-U. S. Business Council, “Understanding the China-U. S. Trade Relationship”, Report, January 2017.

② Hsieh, C. T., Ossa, R., “A Global View of Productivity Growth in China”, *National Bureau of Economic Research*, 2011; Di Giovanni, J., Levchenko, A., Zhang, J., “The Global Welfare Impact of China: Trade Integration and Technological Change”, *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2014, pp. 153 - 183.

者的研究表明，美国人失业的真正原因在于美国的产业升级与转型，而不是对其他国家的贸易逆差。研究发现，美国对所有国家的贸易逆差仅贡献了美国制造业失业的16.3%（中美贸易逆差的贡献度应该更低）。该研究同时发现，美国制造业失业的最主要原因是制造业的生产率相对服务业提高更快，其对失业的贡献度超过80%。^①换句话说，大部分的失业是由于生产效率提高导致的。

四 中美经贸关系的应对

美国是第二次世界大战以后经济全球化的主要受益者。美国主导并受益于战后的制度安排，比如，布雷顿森林体系的建立为商品、资本在全球范围内的流动提供了制度保障。美国受益于第二次世界大战后的这种制度安排。中国加入世界贸易组织（WTO）等一系列行动，表明中国基本接受了这种制度安排。中国也是现行全球经济秩序的受益者。

然而，中国也注意到，在全球金融危机之前出现的经济全球化存在一定的缺陷，这导致了贫富差距拉大、国际收

^① Kehoe, T. J., Ruhl, K. J., Steinberg, J. B., “Global Imbalances and Structural Change in the United States”, *National Bureau of Economic Research*, 2013.

支失衡等问题。但全球化不能走回头路，而是应走向升级版。正如中国国家主席习近平 2017 年 1 月在达沃斯世界经济论坛演讲中指出的那样：“世界经济的大海，你要还是不要，都在那儿，是回避不了的。想人为切断各国经济的资金流、技术流、产品流、产业流、人员流，让世界经济的大海退回到一个一个孤立的小湖泊、小河流，是不可能的，也是不符合历史潮流的。”

中国希望与其他各国一同，构建更加包容、和谐、平衡的经济全球化，希望中美共同探讨有利于各方的经济全球化的安排，共同提供全球公共产品。中国将继续坚持改革开放、愿意更积极地参与全球经济治理，并将继续为区域及全球的和平与发展发挥积极的作用。中国愿意并积极努力成为全球政治经济体系中重要的“稳定器”。

中国关注美国对于中美经贸关系以及中国参与全球经济治理的态度，希望在以下（但不限于）领域探讨与美方加强双边和全球合作的可能：

第一，建设性缓和中美贸易摩擦。中美经济合则两利、斗则双输，中美贸易战将不会有赢家。中国非常希望增加来自美国的进口，只要美国愿意放开不必要的出口管制，美国对华出口就会有一个大的增长。希望削减美国对华贸易赤字的“百日计划”能遵循后者的思路。习近平主席曾

在达沃斯论坛上表示，预计未来五年，中国将进口 8 万亿美元的商品、吸收 6000 亿美元的外来投资，对外投资总额将达到 7500 亿美元，出境旅游将达到 7 亿人次。无疑，这将为包括美国在内的世界各国提供更广阔市场、更充足资本、更丰富产品、更宝贵合作契机。

第二，加强投资领域的合作。对外投资有利于中美两国创造就业。投资协定将为投资繁荣提供制度保障。尽快完成中美双边投资协定（BIT）谈判符合双方利益，并为未来的全球多边投资规则奠定基础。

第三，加强在全球基础设施建设方面的合作。中方希望能与美方加强合作，促进各自国内以及第三方国家和地区的基础设施建设，促进全球经济持续发展。中方对美国加入亚洲基础设施投资银行和“一带一路”倡议持开放立场，中方企业也愿意在平等、互利的基础上积极参与特朗普总统的基础设施建设计划。

第四，加强宏观经济政策的协调与合作。作为世界第一大经济体和第二大经济体，中美双方的合作对于稳定世界经济至关重要。我们注意到，2016 年，中美双方在 G20 等领域的紧密合作对于稳定全球金融市场曾发挥了巨大作用。中美双方都应注意自身政策的“溢出”和“回荡”效应，寻找政策工具的国内与国际目标的最佳平衡点。

The Future of Economic Cooperation and Conflicts between China and the U. S.

He Fan, Guan Tao, Xiong Aizong, and Su Qingyi

Economic cooperation used to be the foundation of the China-U. S. relationship. After the global financial crisis, the economic ties between China and the United States have evolved to a stage where mutual interests are now co-dependent and intertwined. Both countries' economic growth models undergo transformations along with adjustments to their domestic economic policies. This may create more opportunities for bilateral cooperation, or induce more potential conflicts. Apart from long-running conflicts surrounding trade imbalances and exchange rate issues, China and the United States have also seen growing disagreements and frictions in an array of other areas, despite

deepening economic relations. The way in which China and the United States choose to solve these problems will determine the future of China-U. S. relations. Between April 6 and 7, 2017, U. S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to a 100-day plan for trade talks on their meeting, which indicated efforts to peacefully solve trade issues.

1. Chinese economy in the coming five years

After 30 years of rapid growth, China's economy is undergoing a slowdown. The traditional export-driven and investment-driven development strategy is no longer sustainable. China's economy now enters a "new normal" of medium to high-speed growth. In 2016, China's economic growth rate fell to 6.7 percent, and may fall even lower in the coming years.

There are also changes of China's economic structure. First, China will rely more on domestic demand rather than external demand. Exports' contribution to economic growth is gradually diminishing. If this trend continues, in the next five years the era of China's high dependency on foreign demand may come to an end. China will become more reliant upon indigenous growth,

placing more emphasis on domestic markets, in order to release untapped potential for domestic consumption. This policy will rely on domestic consumption to steer the economy toward manufacturing high-quality products and pursuing sustainable development. Second, manufacturing's share of the economy is dropping, while the service industry's share continues to rise. In 2015, the service industry exceeded 50 percent of economic growth for the first time, marking an important turning point in China's economy, and it is expected that the service industry's share of GDP will continue to rise in the coming years.

Over the next five years, China will continue its opening up policy to the outside world. The Fifth Plenum Report of the 18th CPC National Congress, which outlined the blueprint for China's development strategy, proposed higher standard of openness to the outside world. The plan also put forward concrete policy measures for promoting foreign trade, improving the system that regulates foreign businesses and investments, increasing the level of market openness and promoting openness of finance industry and other sectors in two directions, both domestic and foreign. Beginning in 2018, China will also formally implement the "market access negative list" system, meaning that foreign

investments will be allowed in all industries except those expressly forbidden on so-called “negative lists”.

China’s service industry will be the focus of reform and opening policies in the future. Chinese government is encouraging pilot aimed at opening the service industry in four major free trade pilot zones. Opening up the service industry, however, is more complicated than the opening up of manufacturing industry, as there are complex interests, multiple systems involved, and greater risks associated with the policy. As such, a rapid opening up of the service industry may not be advantageous to the stability of the Chinese economy.

China will continue to steadily promote marketization reforms, the most important aspect of which is reforming the state-owned enterprises (SOE). The Chinese government has proposed objectives and concrete measures for SOE reform in areas such as demand, classification reforms, improving modern corporate governance institutions and systems for managing state-owned assets, developing a mixed-ownership economy, strengthening oversight, and preventing state-owned assets from flowing out of the country. China’s economy, however, is a socialist market economy, which SOEs formerly dominated. As

such, reforming the SOEs will be a process defined by Chinese characteristics.

As the economic structure is adjusted, China's reliance on foreign demand will decrease, and the international balance of payments will tend toward equilibrium. As per capita disposable income rises, China will import more, presenting more opportunities for the rest of the world, including the United States. As China's industry structure is upgraded, there will be more demand for high value-added products and services, accompanied by a shift away from primary goods. There will also be a shift toward "soft goods," including digital and high value-added products; this too will present an opportunity for the United States and other developed economies.

Some potential risks within China's economy may become more prominent in the coming five years. Debt is accumulating rapidly, especially corporate debt. This will become a major risk in inhibiting future economic growth in China. Meanwhile, the widening income gap, worsening environmental pollution, and other problems will also harm growth. At the international level, the global economic slowdown has brought about decreased external demand, emerging trade protectionism, increased

fluctuations in international capital flows, and other issues that to a certain extent have blurred China's growth prospect.

The Chinese economy is currently transitioning from a period of high-speed growth into a period of moderate-to-high-speed growth. Nevertheless, China will continue to be one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Maintaining an annual growth rate of more than 6 percent for the next five years will not only provide support for the country's economic transformation, but will also contribute significantly to the growth of the global economy.

2. American economy in the coming five years

The U. S. economy may enter a period of moderate growth in the coming five years. Annual average growth of the U. S. economy began falling in the 1980s. Particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis, the American baseline for economic growth continued to fall, hovering at a low level of between 1.5 to 2.5 percent from 2010 to 2015, much lower than the pre-crisis level, 3 percent and more. In the coming five years, moderate or

sluggish growth may become the defining theme of the American economy. Plus, the U. S. labor productivity rate has been restricted by such unpredictable factors as population aging, technological innovations, and immigration reforms.

Some other structural changes took place within the American economy after the crisis. First, America's role as a consumer of finished goods diminished. The crisis damaged the American growth model that is driven by credit consumption. Secondly, the U. S. government has been trying to revive manufacturing, in an attempt to solidify the economic rebound and spur employment. Domestically, the government has rolled out a "reindustrialization" strategy, and President Trump has put forward a "Buy American, Hire American" slogan and been actively encouraging manufacturers who have moved operations abroad to return home. Although some commentators hold that this is no more than a political ploy to bring back jobs in manufacturing—one that won't be very effective at creating jobs—this change is noteworthy.

The U. S. economy will also face a degree of risk in the

coming five years. The U. S. economy is currently plagued by a host of problems, including a decreasing labor productivity rate, a worsening state of fiscal affairs, insufficient investments in infrastructure, income inequality, and severe political polarization. As the U. S. labor productivity rate has fallen, so too have investments in research and technology compared to pre-crisis levels. This demonstrates that the drop in the U. S. productivity rate may not be merely cyclical, but rather structural. This may lead the American economy to slow down further in the long term.

U. S. wealth disparity is also growing. A survey conducted by the U. S. -based Pew Research Center indicates that in 2013, the median household wealth of high-income families in the United States was \$650,074 — 6.6 times the median of middle-income households (\$98,057) and nearly 70 times the median of low-income households (\$9,465).^① The disparity is now at its highest point since the U. S. Census Bureau began

① Pew Research Center, “The American Middle Class is Losing Ground: No longer the majority and falling behind financially.” Report, December 2015.

collecting this data in 1967. The United States now has the most unequal income distribution of all developed nations. China hopes that the United States will make an effort to mitigate the domestic income disparity to expand the middle class, so that the United States does not impose prejudicial treatment on China-U. S. trade and investments in the name of increasing employment and protecting the low-income stratum.

3. Possible Future Trends in China-U. S. Economic Relations

Potential economic growth of both China and the United States will diminish, to differing extents, as compared to pre-crisis rates. In the coming five years, China's potential economic growth rate will further decrease, and structural reforms will become more difficult, at which point potential financial risks will multiply. Although the U. S. economy has continued to rebound, there are many unpredictable factors, and its potential economic growth rate may also fall from previous levels. Economic growth may stabilize in both countries, particularly when compared to the period from 2008 to 2015, but deep-seated

problems continue to accumulate, and will present challenges and risks to both countries.

Changes to either the American or Chinese economies will spur increases in both cooperation and competition between the two. China's shift from growth driven by foreign demand toward growth driven by domestic demand will promote bilateral trade equilibrium and present more opportunities to further develop trade relations, in turn making the relationship closer. But as the economic structures of both countries become increasingly similar, there may be increased competition in areas such as manufacturing. However, China-U. S. economic relations will become closer no matter what.

New changes to the global economy will drive cooperation between China and the United States. As the world's number one and number two economies, they will both be negatively influenced by the tide of anti-globalization movements, increasing income disparities, intermingling political and economic issues, and other factors.

The Chinese and U. S. economies are mutually dependent, with cooperation outweighing competition. The overall trend of the co-evolution of their economies has been good, but conflicts of interest in specific areas have been exacerbated. At the same time, political factors will come to exert a growing influence on economic relations, further increasing the complexity of bilateral relations.

Eventhough China's trade surplus has become much less the source of economic growth after the crisis, and the share of its export to the U. S. also saw a general trend of declining over the past decade, some politicians kept blaming China for causing a massive trade deficit of America and stealing jobs from Americans. It would be no surprise for the U. S. to increasingly take protectionist measures against China by raising tariffs, imposing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy restrictions, and labeling Beijing as a currency manipulator. In light of this trend, many international media outlets and political observers are concerned about an imminent trade war between the two countries. For China, the main concern is that other countries may follow suit if the United States abandons the principles of free trade and

instead pursues trade and investment protectionism, which would impede the global economic recovery process and harm China's economy.

China's direct investment in the United States has grown rapidly. According to the U. S. Rhodium Group, Chinese enterprises' combined investment in the United States tripled from 2015 to 2016, reaching \$ 45. 6 billion. ^① This growth trend will continue in the future. However, Chinese enterprises face obstacles when investing in the U. S.. If the Trump administration escalates these barriers by taking targeted moves against Chinese enterprises in order to protect American companies, consumers, and national interests, it will dampen Chinese companies' enthusiasm to invest in the United States.

There is a misconception among some people in the United States that trading with China adversely affects American labor market because Chinese exports cause American workers to lose

^① Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, Rhodium Group, "Record Deal Making in 2016 Pushes Cumulative Chinese FDI in the U. S. above \$ 100 billion." Note, December 30, 2016.

their jobs. This perception, far from reflecting the facts, will create a huge impediment to China-U. S. economic cooperation if it is represented in American policies.

The economic and trade relationship between China and the United States is currently mutually beneficial and shouldn't be viewed from a zero-sum game perspective. This relationship started growing more than 30 years ago after the normalization of China-U. S. relations, and it has developed to include more areas of cooperation, with both countries' interests becoming increasingly entwined. Data from China's Ministry of Commerce shows that, from 1979 to 2016, the amount of China-U. S. bilateral trade has increased from \$2.5 billion to \$519.6 billion, an increase of more than 200 times in 38 years. Meanwhile, bilateral trade in the services industry with the United States has a surplus of more than \$100 billion. Cross-border investments in both directions have surged, accumulating to more than \$170 billion as of the end of 2016. According to a report jointly published by the China-U. S. Business Council and Oxford Economics, trade and investment with China created approximately 2.6 million jobs in the United States in 2015 and contributed \$216 billion to the growth of the U. S. economy,

equating to roughly 1.2 percent of its GDP in the same year.^① Additionally, because of exports from China, consumer price levels in the United States were 1-1.5 percentage points lower than if the goods were not imported.

The work of many researchers indicates that the U. S. aggregate welfare improved as a result of trading with China^②. Besides, American academics have found that, apart from causes associated with industrial competitiveness, unemployment in the United States is actually caused by industrial upgrading and transformation, not a trade deficit with other nations. According to the studies, the U. S. net trade deficit with all countries explains about only 16.3 percent of its unemployment (the contribution of its trade deficit with China have been lower), while a faster improvement in manufacturing productivity relative

① The China-U. S. Business Council, “Understanding the China-U. S. Trade Relationship.” Report, January 2017.

② Hsieh C T, Ossa R. A global view of productivity growth in China [R]. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. Di Giovanni J, LevchenkoAA, Zhang J. The global welfare impact of China: Trade integration and technological change [J]. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2014, 6 (3): 153 - 183.

to that of the service sector contributed the most to factory layoffs, accounting for more than 80 percent of manufacturing unemployment^①. In other words, most unemployment in the United States has been caused by higher productivity.

4. Potential Responses in China-U. S. Economic Relations

The United States was the primary beneficiary of globalization. The U. S. guided and also benefitted from post-war institutional arrangements, for example, the establishment of the Bretton Woods System, which imposed institutional barriers on the flow of products and capital at the global level. China's accession to the WTO and other recent actions indicate that China has come to accept such institutional arrangements. Embracing the current global economic order, China has made the most of it.

① Kehoe T. J. , Ruhl K. J. , Steinberg J. B. , Global imbalances and structural change in the United States [R] . National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.

Chinese officials have likewise realized that certain flaws existed with economic globalization prior to the financial crisis. These flaws exacerbate the gap between the wealthy and the poor, imbalances in the international balance of payments, and contribute to various problems. Globalization, however, is here to stay, so we should not be discussing how to get rid of it, but rather how to upgrade it. Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January, “Whether you like it or not, the global economy is the big ocean that you cannot escape from. Any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible. Indeed, it runs counter to the historical trend.”^①

China, just like all other nations, wants to build a form of globalization that is more inclusive, harmonious, and balanced. Chinese officials want to find arrangements for economic globalization with their American counterparts that are beneficial

^① http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135997350.htm.

to everyone, so that all parties can come together to provide global public goods. China will continue its reform and opening policy and is willing to participate more actively in global economic governance. In light of this, it becomes clear that China is ready to play an active role both regionally and globally in the areas of peace and development. China is willing to be, and is actively striving to become, an important “stabilizer” of the global political and economic system.

The United State and China can strengthen their cooperation in many areas, especially the following ones:

First, constructively alleviate friction in trade relations. A trade war will have no winners, because both China and the United States will either prosper or lose together. China has been keen on increasing its imports from the United States. If Washington can remove unnecessary trade restrictions, American exports to China will surge. Hopefully the 100-day trade plan will aim at this goal. President Xi Jinxing said at the Davos forum that China plans to import \$8 trillion of goods over the next five years, attracting \$600 billion of foreign investment, making

\$ 750 billion of outbound investment, and achieving 700 million overseas visits. This will undoubtedly provide foreign countries, including the United States, with greater market opportunities, more capital and products, and better opportunities for cooperation.

Second, strengthen cooperation in investment. Foreign investment can help to create more jobs for both the United States and China. Investment agreements will provide institutional safeguards to the proliferation of foreign investments. Concluding talks on the Bilateral BIT between China and the United States as quickly as possible is in the interests of both countries, and this agreement will lay the foundation for a set of rules for global and multilateral investments.

Third, strengthen cooperation in global infrastructure construction. China hopes to collaborate with the United States in promoting infrastructure development in both countries and in third-party countries, and so contribute to the sustainable development of the global economy. China has remained open to the United States joining the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank

and proposals related to the Belt and Road initiative. Chinese enterprises are also willing to seek participation in American infrastructure construction projects promoted by President Trump on the basis of equality and mutual benefits.

Fourth, increase coordination and cooperation in macroeconomic policies. Cooperation between the United States and China, the world's largest and second-largest economies, is extremely important for stabilizing the worldwide economy. We have noted that in 2016, close cooperation between China and the United States in the G20 and other forums played an important role in stabilizing world financial markets. Officials in China and the United States should pay attention to the spillover effects of their policies, and use policy tools to identify an equilibrium point between domestic needs and international objectives.

中美亚太分歧与缓解路径

朱 锋 黄仁伟 胡 波

当前，中国日渐成为对亚太事务有巨大影响的大国，而美国在亚太的地位和影响依然举足轻重，中美间崛起国与主导国的权力竞争，突出地表现在亚太地区，而中美利益交融也最突出地表现在亚太地区。关于亚太，中美的认知与视角有所不同。在中国看来，“亚太”主要是指东亚和西太平洋地区；而美国人往往持有“泛亚太”的观念，还有人提出了“印太地区”（Indo-Pacific）的概念，包括太平洋东西海岸、亚洲及印度洋。

在战略认知方面，中国的利益关切主要是维护该地区的和平稳定与繁荣、捍卫本国领土完整与主权，以及成为亚太秩序中的重要角色；美国同样需要亚太和平与繁荣，同时强调维护地区安全规则、盟友安全，以及亚太主导地位。两国在亚太的矛盾与竞争随处可见。未来中美会走向战略

对抗或冲突，还是和平与合作，将取决于中美两国特别是美国的选择。关键在于理性界定彼此的利益与空间，并寻求秩序理念上的相互包容。

一 中美在亚太地区的角色

可以从三个阶段来观察近代以来中国在亚太的角色与定位。第一阶段为1840—1949年，中国的主要任务是争取民族独立和解放，开始融入基于民族国家原则的现代国际体系，成为首先取得完全独立的亚洲国家之一，并为世界反法西斯战争的胜利做出了重要贡献。第二阶段为1949—1991年，中国共产党领导的新中国成立后，中国保卫自身主权和安全的能力提高，逐渐成长为维护地区和平与稳定的一支力量。面对冷战两极格局，中国坚持反对霸权主义，在和平共处五项原则的基础上，与周边国家发展睦邻友好关系。20世纪70年代初中美关系的解冻，大大改善了本地区的安全环境，为亚太各经济体的快速发展创造了良好条件。1978年开始，中国对内改革、对外开放，视和平与发展为时代主题，快速融入国际社会，中美开始超越分歧，加快经济合作的步伐。第三阶段为冷战结束以来，中国经济大幅增长，成为该地区新的增长引擎，成为牵动地区格

局发展演进的重要动力之一。中国支持东盟主导地区合作系列机制，提出综合安全观和“一带一路”倡议，开始在秩序层面探索和形成自己的观念和政策。

美国在亚太角色地位的演进也可以大致从三个阶段来看。第一阶段为美国独立到1945年，美国通过自身发展和陆、海战略扩张，参与两次世界大战，在确立世界超级大国地位的同时，也获得了主导亚太事务的权力。许多美国人士同情中国的民族独立事业，为中国的现代化进程做出了贡献，并在第二次世界大战时期支持中国抗日战争。第二阶段为冷战时期，美国以意识形态划界，以防范“共产主义扩张”为己任，并不惜介入朝鲜战争和越南内战，与中国爆发过激烈的冲突。冷战后期美国调整政策，与中国共同抵御苏联的扩张，双方建立了反对霸权的共同立场，与中国的关系得到缓和。第三阶段为冷战结束之后至今，美国成为全球唯一的超级大国。在亚洲发展较快的20多年，由于苏联威胁的消失，美国对亚太地区的关注度曾有所降低。但自2010年开始，美国突出安全因素，将维护亚太领导地位与牵制中国崛起联系在一起。奥巴马政府倡议“重返亚太”，提出了“亚太再平衡”战略，强化美国在亚太地区的盟友体系和前沿军事存在，防止一个崛起的中国侵蚀美国在亚太地区的主导地位，将中国崛起视为是其全球最

大的战略威胁之一。

2016年大选共和党候选人特朗普当选第45届美国总统。2017年1月20日，特朗普政府上台。特朗普政府究竟将实行什么样的亚洲政策和对华政策，还在观察之中。但从特朗普在竞选期间和竞选之后的对华政策主张来看，人们似乎难以对美国新政府上台后的中美关系持乐观态度。特朗普政府似乎想要重申里根政府时代的“以实力换和平”战略，不仅将大举扩充美国军备、建设更加强大的核武库，还威胁将对中国发动“贸易战”、让美国的产业投资重新流回美国国内、威胁不再接受“一个中国”政策的束缚。特朗普的亚洲政策似乎想要从奥巴马时代的保障“有规则的秩序”，转向“以实力为基础的秩序”。特朗普时代的中美关系究竟将如何演变，是更多的合作还是趋于更多的对抗，还需要我们拭目以待。

中国和美国都是亚太地区的重要国家，历史上，两国合作的时间远远超过对抗的时间，两国的地区角色多数情况下是互补的。冷战结束后全球政治的最大亮点，就是亚太地区的和平稳定与经济繁荣，这也离不开中美两国的贡献与合作。然而，美国对中国的政治制度一直抱有不认可和不信任的态度，期待中国市场经济成长起来后会致政治变革，在对华政策上从未放弃“两面下注”。近年来，由于

中美实力地位的变化，加之奥巴马政府亚太政策的急剧调整，中美战略分歧的一面日渐凸显，一些战略界人士甚至认为，“中美正在接近一个冲突的临界点”。

二 中国在亚太的战略目标 与对美方的关切

自 1978 年实施改革开放政策以来，中国在亚太的战略目标总体上是一以贯之的，具有较强的延续性，那就是为自身发展构建和维护和平与稳定的地区环境，捍卫领土完整、主权与主权权益，以及在亚太秩序的改革与完善中发挥建设性作用。

（一）地区的和平与稳定

亚太区域的稳定、和平与繁荣，直接关系到中国的发展前景和外部安全环境，影响到中国的国内政治社会稳定。过去 30 余年，得益于自身努力与和平的外部环境，中国人均 GDP 从 1978 年的不到 200 美元增长到 2015 年的 8000 美元。中国经济高度依赖面向东亚和太平洋方向的对外通道联系。如今，中国已经是世界头号货物贸易大国，且 60% 的对外贸易面向亚太地区，中国的海外利益也主要是通过

亚太地区向全球延伸。

2012年中国共产党的十八大提出“两个一百年”的奋斗目标，即到2021年中国共产党成立100年时实现第一个百年奋斗目标、全面建成小康社会，到2049年中华人民共和国成立100年时实现第二个百年奋斗目标，建成富强、民主、文明、和谐的社会主义现代化国家。实现“两个一百年”目标已经成为中国国家大战略的基点，这从根本上决定了中国要继续坚持走和平发展道路，中国的对外政策包括周边外交也将服务于这一目标，中国国防和军队建设的首要任务就是保证和平发展的内外安全环境。

长期以来，中国希望美国能成为维护地区和平稳定的重要力量与合作伙伴，也注意到美国在促进亚太经济繁荣、制止核扩散、治理非传统安全问题上所起过的积极作用。但近些年，美国国家安全战略、军事战略与作战概念等都日益瞄准中国，美国在亚太的同盟体系和前沿军事存在也在快速强化。这越来越引起中国对美国危及自身安全的担心，也促使许多中国人怀疑，美国究竟有无诚意尊重中国的和平发展？经济合作是中美关系的压舱石，两国在亚太的合作也是该地区经济繁荣的重要保证。中国倡导了“一带一路”建设和亚洲基础设施投资银行，欢迎美国参加，对美方表现出的批评和阻碍姿态难以理解，也希望美国自

己不要再试图在该地区建立排他性的地区性秩序安排。

（二）领土完整、主权与主权权益

近代以来中国曾多次遭受列强的侵略，有着百余年的民族独立斗争历史，时至今日，中国仍没有实现大陆与台湾的统一，在海上也有一些岛礁被其他国家侵占。中国十分珍视自己的领土完整和主权地位，在此类问题上异常敏感和警觉，不能放弃自己的严正立场，更不能允许对中国领土主权和权益的新的挑衅和侵犯。

考虑到历史和现实，出于维护地区和平稳定的需要，中国在相关问题上一一直奉行和平、务实而克制的态度。中国大陆对台湾的政策是争取以“一国两制”的方式实现两岸和平统一，只要台湾当局不搞“台独”，大陆愿意继续推动两岸和解。台湾问题的出现源自于美国对中国内政的干涉。中方认为美国始终将台湾问题当作牵制中国的一张牌。在台海力量对比发生急剧变化、中国综合国力显著提升、台湾岛内政局动荡的情况下，美国的既定政策面临巨大挑战，是倾向于约束“台独”？还是再次纵容台湾当局挑起危机？

在钓鱼岛、南沙岛礁等问题上，中国的政策是“主权属我、搁置争议、共同开发”，近些年来，中国在东海、南海的维权行动确实变得日益坚决，主要是针对日本、菲律

宾等国家挑衅行动的反制，中国处理上述问题的大政方针没有发生本质的变化。对此，中国国家主席习近平多次强调要坚持“主权属我、搁置争议、共同开发”的方针，“要坚持用和平方式、谈判方式解决争端，努力维护和平稳定”。美国频繁声称在领土主权争议问题上不“选边站”，但在具体问题上又支持甚至鼓励其他争议方给中国制造压力，在中方看来显得过于虚伪。考虑到历史上美国是钓鱼岛和南沙群岛问题出现的始作俑者之一，中国对美国在这些问题上“选边站”非常反感，更不能接受美国走上前台公开介入上述问题。至于美国所谓“维护国际法和地区稳定”的说辞，难以让中国人信服，事实上，正是美国“重返亚太”以来，这些海洋争端问题才愈演愈烈。美国需要严肃考虑自己在这些争端问题中的角色，如果后任美国政府仍坚持奥巴马政府的做法，中美走向对抗或冲突的危险只会越来越大。

（三）地区安全架构与秩序

中国一直坚持独立自主，主要依靠自身力量解决安全问题。在秩序观念方面，中国不主张泾渭分明的结盟和对抗，更青睐开放、包容的安全制度。冷战后，中国奉行合作安全理念，积极参与亚太地区的各种开放型安全机制，在东

盟地区论坛、上海合作组织等地区安全机制中发挥着重要的作用。

中国不在美国所界定的安全架构之内，游离于美国主导的同盟体系之外。不过，在 70 年代中美关系缓和后的相当长时期内，中国都与美国的同盟体系和平相处。虽然中国不欣赏（*appreciate*）美国的同盟体系，但只要它不针对自己，中国也没有采取强硬立场予以反对。中国尊重美国在亚太地区的传统存在和利益，但中国不希望成为美国所主导的同盟体系排斥、威胁甚至恐吓的对象。随着中国的发展和综合实力的上升，中国对此自然愈发难以容忍，反抗力度也会越来越大。

过去几年，美国的同盟体系建设明显针对中国，除美日、美菲、美澳等传统盟友体系外，美国还极力打造美日澳、美日菲等小多边的同盟网络。中美两国在亚太地区多个热点问题上关系趋于紧张，根本性的问题就在于美国同盟体系的日趋咄咄逼人。随着中国与美国的部分盟国间矛盾的日渐尖锐，美国需要认真考虑以同盟体系为支柱的地区安全架构的包容性问题，如果美国继续以盟友画线，在构建地区安全规则时继续绕着中国走，甚至毫不顾忌中国作为一个亚太大国的应有安全利益和活动空间，两国的安全困境和战略疑虑势必更加恶化。美方经常讲“基于规则

的秩序”，而规则的基础是共识，国际规则意味着主权国家利益和权利的让渡，因此必须基于相关国家间不同立场和主张的最大公约数。而以完全基于自身立场的所谓规则去规范他人，那就是霸权。中方的问题是究竟是谁的规则，哪些规则，如何根据现状的发展来定义规则，以及如何实现共同规则的演进和发展。

三 妥善应对亚太热点问题的建议

美国新政府上台后，近期有三大热点问题，中美双方无法回避，需要妥善处置。

（一）“台独”问题

台湾关系到中国的领土完整，攸关中国的核心利益。中国坚持不放弃武力遏止“台独”的选项。在台湾问题上，中美经过多轮激烈的折冲和博弈，逐渐形成目前相对稳定的共识，美方明确了自己不支持“台湾独立”的立场。美国近三届政府都充分认识到该问题的敏感性和危险性，保持审慎态度，台海形势总体上保持稳定。在马英九执政期间，两岸经济合作和人文交流也有了长足的发展。

2016年5月20日上台的台湾民进党政权拒绝承认“九

二共识”，两岸关系正在经历新震荡。中国关注美国的对台政策，反对美国继续向台湾出售武器，反对美国在亚太区域安全版图的调整过程中，鼓励和支持“台湾角色”。美国特朗普总统在上任之前，就台湾问题采取了一些不利于坚持“一个中国政策”的言行，一度给两国关系蒙上了阴影。2017年2月10日，特朗普总统在和习近平主席的电话通话中，声明将坚持“一中政策”，坚持发展对华合作，给两国关系开了个好头。台湾问题是中美关系中一个“不容谈判”的问题，中国对维护台海两岸和平统一进程的决心不容置疑。只要台湾方面不谋求改变台海两岸现状，中国不会对台实行强制性统一。中、美、台三方增进两岸关系在“一中框架”下的在台海局势问题上建设性地互动，降低台湾因素对北京—华盛顿关系的干扰，符合两岸三地的共同利益。

（二）南海问题

近两年来，随着美国加大介入，南海问题有从中国与邻国间的主权和海洋权益之争，滑向中美间地缘战略竞争的风险，双方应认识到，南海不应成为两国战略博弈的竞技场。中国拥有对南海岛礁的主权以及相关海洋权益，南海亦是中国通往远洋的最为重要的海上通道。美国既然宣称

在领土主权争议问题上不持立场，那么中美在南海不应该有实质性的分歧，两国均有责任维护南海通道和西太平洋地区的和平与稳定，保障南海“航行自由”，这也符合中美两国之间的共同利益。

然而，美国对南海问题的持续关注，特别是通过派遣军机和军舰在南海中国岛礁抵近航行，夸大中国在新建岛礁的“军事化”等行动，鼓励日本、澳大利亚、印度等“域外国家”在南海和美国联合巡航等干预性行动，不利于南海局势的稳定。美国军方更是倾向于将南海问题视为保障美国在西太平洋地缘战略优势、防止中国海上力量崛起的焦点地区。一方面，中国、美国和东盟国家之间的三边关系，因为南海问题复杂化难以降低；另一方面，日本在美国的鼓励下，加大在南海地区的外交和军事介入，未来南海局势的不确定性难以降低。如果美国只考虑自己和盟友的利益和安全，并且企图以牺牲中国主权和利益为代价维护其海上霸权，那么中国必然要进行反制，中美两国在南海的战略对抗似乎难以避免。

中美两国需要及时和冷静地处理两国在南海的争执，并努力发展在南海地区有利于主权争议解决与各自关注得以有效应对的合作架构。维护南海局势稳定与商业水道安全，中美不仅有竞争性的关注，同样也有重要的共同利益。美

国应该鼓励中国和东盟之间正在进行的 COC 框架谈判，鼓励中国和东盟就南海争议的解决启动双边对话，支持中国和东盟国家建立南海沿岸国合作制度。这些举措，都将实质性地有利于降低南海主权争议引发的冲突。

对于被他国侵占的南沙岛礁，中方在考虑历史和现实的基础上，应继续落实同有关声索国和东盟对话的“双轨”思路，通过谈判和平解决岛礁归属争端。中国原则上支持在南海地区建立“基于规则的秩序”，中国也尊重包括《联合国海洋法公约》在内的国际法原则。但中国在南海诸岛享有主权的法律依据与历史事实清晰。美方应对南海问题的经纬和中国的政策有更全面和准确的了解，避免将中国维护领土主权的立场曲解为要在西太平洋地区谋求排他性的“控制权”，坚守中立立场，停止鼓励、刺激盟友和伙伴在南海采取与中国对抗的行为。我们强烈建议中美双方应就南海问题展开对话。

（三）朝核问题

朝核问题是亚太地区目前最具威胁性和爆炸性的地区安全热点。从 2006 年以来，朝鲜已进行了 5 次核试验，其中 4 次都发生在 2008 年六方会谈停摆之后。朝鲜还不间断地进行卫星和弹道导弹发射。金正恩政府已经明确表明了不

再参加六方会谈、不会放弃核武器甚至是在竭力加速建立可投射的核能力的进程。2016年9月朝鲜进行的第五次核试验和2017年2月进行的导弹试验，意味着朝鲜的导弹与核威胁达到了新水平。中美双方有必要加强合作、采取共同的行动，打破目前朝核问题的僵局，切实推进朝核问题的解决进程。我们应该看到，“只制裁、不对话”的政策没有达到遏制朝鲜拥核的目的。美韩在半岛频繁举行大规模联合军事演习，也只会加剧朝鲜半岛的对立情绪。同时，美国一方面试图把责任推给中国，另一方面又鼓励韩国部署“萨德系统”，严重损害了在半岛无核化问题上联合应对的努力。

中国坚持朝鲜半岛无核化主张，坚持半岛局势“不生乱”和“不生战”的立场，主张以和平方式解决朝核问题和半岛分裂局势。2017年4月6—7日，中国国家主席习近平与美国总统特朗普在海湖庄园举行的第一次“习特会”，就朝核问题坦率地交换了意见，达成了重要共识。双方领导人认识到朝核问题的威胁性和严重性的上升，愿意加强合作，共同遏制朝鲜有可能采取新的核试验和导弹试验等挑衅性行动，推进朝核问题的和平解决进程。习近平主席与特朗普总统所达成的“海湖庄园共识”，需要进一步落实到行动上。在朝核问题上一旦重建中美紧密合作，打破目

前半岛的紧张局势，并切实启动朝鲜半岛“停、核机制”的转化，将十分有利于中美两国在亚太地区的安全与战略合作进程的发展。

四 中美亚太分歧的出路

1972年的中美上海联合公报声明：“任何一方都不应该在亚洲—太平洋地区谋求霸权，每一方都反对任何其他国家或国家集团建立这种霸权的努力。”这一原则今天仍然适用，关键在于中美两方都不应谋求在亚太地区的霸权。正如习近平主席所说：“太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国。”无论是分权共治、共同进化，还是安全共同体，归根结底都要看中美两国能否在亚太形成更具共识性、包容性和建设性的“共同愿景”。我们认为，推动中美关系良性发展，双方应做如下努力：

第一，有效的沟通与对话是缓解分歧的基础。中美双方应培养在采取任何重大行动前主动沟通的意识和习惯。从中美交往的历史和现实看，彼此的沟通 and 了解对战略判断的准确性至关重要。现在，中美业已成为亚太棋局中的两个最重要棋手，彼此的哪怕是很小的动作，都不可避免地会引发对方的猜测与反应。两国应围绕亚太重大问题进行

更加坦诚的战略沟通与对话，内容可包括“一带一路”倡议、中国海洋战略、美国亚太战略、美国同盟体系等，客观认知对方的战略意图，探索管控分歧、增进互信、促进合作的各种可能路径。

由于中美的亚太互动涉及主权、权力、发展、规则、荣誉等多重利益和原则，所涉议题高度敏感，中美需要加强高层对话和展现领导力，并在各自国内构建强有力的跨部门网络，切实落实高层沟通的成果。

第二，相互的战略调适是中美长期和平的保证。双方需要从战略高度探索“和平共存”和“共同进化”的可能性。中国从陆望海，海洋战略一定是区域性的；而美国从海看陆，其海洋战略通常是全球性的。两国不仅先天地理禀赋有很大差异，两国历史传统和发展路径也截然不同，这决定了两国的视角和目标具有天然的差异性和包容性。目前两国在海上的权力矛盾并非不可调和。中国在近海需要有适当的空间和地位，即便美国要保持在全球海洋的主导地位，在西太海域有利益关切和传统影响，但不应试图构建排他性势力范围，阻挡中国成长为海洋强国。双方都需要认识到自身实力的缺陷，相互包容妥协。

中国最需要改进的是追求目标的方式。中国在行动时，需要给予传统强国美国以适当的外交空间，更及时准确地

向美国表明自己的利益诉求，在海洋争端中需慎重考虑军事手段的应用，避免迫使美国在或是与中国对抗、或是抛弃盟友的两难境地中做选择；在追求近海利益时，要充分考虑美国有关海上航行自由等利益关切。中国需要建立强大的军事威慑，但要注意到自身海上力量发展的有限性，不宜追求美国那样的全方位的海上目标。

美国应调整其在亚太地区的战略目标。中美在亚太的主要矛盾，是中国维护主权及海洋权益与美国维护亚太海上主导地位之间的摩擦。美国应理性地认识到，只要中国保持崛起势头，亚太地区的力量对比终究会发生较大变化。美国必须正视中国崛起和走向海洋的追求，给予中国应有的空间和地位，避免过度激化中国民众的民族主义情绪；应放弃在该地区打造针对中国的“北约”的企图，肯定并鼓励中国增加在促进经济增长、维护航行自由与地区稳定等方面的贡献。

第三，共同塑造包容性的亚太秩序是两国的根本路径。美国在亚太的安全秩序、利益不能容纳也不能顾及非同盟国家，是当前亚太安全矛盾和摩擦的制度性根源。中美要想在亚太共存，没有别的出路，唯有超越现存安全架构，共同促成一个更具包容性的亚太安全秩序。特别是需要在未来亚太地区秩序问题上“重新对表”，防范该地区出现

“新冷战”，抑或“阵营化”的局面。中美两国应与亚太其他国家一道，共同筹谋地区安全合作架构，应比目前的各种次区域机制更具包容性和全面性，应涵盖非传统安全问题。在这个架构之下，美国主导的同盟体系与在亚太影响力日益增强的中国可以实现共处，避免亚太地区出现新的对立和对抗。通过更加包容的地区安全合作架构，美国、中国以及其他地区力量，可以在维护地区安全、降低紧张、管控危机等方面分担责任，中国与美国主导的同盟体系之间也可以建立起更为制度化和规则化的沟通机制。

第四，坚持用合作和非对抗性的方式来面对和处理中美之间的一切争议和冲突，是保持两国关系稳定和健康发展的关键。2016年11月14日，中国国家主席习近平在特朗普先生赢得2016年总统大选后的贺喜电话中表示：“中美建交37年来，两国关系不断向前发展，给两国人民带来了实实在在的利益，也促进了世界和地区和平、稳定、繁荣。事实证明，合作是中美两国唯一的正确选择。”特朗普先生在电话中对习近平主席强调以合作来应对美中关系中的一切问题的看法，也表达了积极的认同意见。中美关系今天确实面对着诸多的经济、贸易、安全与战略领域的争议。美国对于中国的战略意图、南海与东海的维权政策走向、中国国内市场状况、军事力量发展和政策含义都有诸多的

疑虑甚至焦虑；中国对美国是否在加大对中国周边形势的干预也存在着浓厚的疑问。然而，不管中美之间出现什么样的争议、摩擦甚至冲突，只要两国政府、两国军队坚持合作性的应对路径，中美关系就能保持积极和建设性的发展势头。这是两国领导人为了两国人民的福祉和世界的和平与繁荣，需要共同承担的历史性责任。

Competing Perspectives between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific and the Path for Mitigation

Zhu Feng, Huang Renwei, and Hu Bo

While the United States still plays a decisive role in the Asia-Pacific, China is now a major power with tremendous influence on the region's affairs. These two nations' interests are more intertwined in the Asia-Pacific than in any other region, and a so-called jockey for power is taking place between a rising China and a dominant United States.

China and the United States have different, and often competing, perceptions and perspectives on the Asia-Pacific in terms of the region's stability and prosperity. The former considers the 'Asia-Pacific' to be East Asia and the Western-Pacific region, while the latter usually entertains the concept of

“Pan Asia-Pacific” . Some in the United States have proposed the concept of “Indo-Pacific” , which includes both sides of the Pacific Ocean, the Asian continent, and the Indian Ocean.

Strategically speaking, China is deeply concerned about maintaining regional peace, stability, and prosperity, upholding its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and becoming a major player in the Asia-Pacific order. The United States also promotes peace and prosperity in the region, but focuses on maintaining the established rules to promote regional security, the security of its allies, and its dominant role in the region.

The differences and points of contention Concerning the Asia-Pacific affairs between China and the USA can be seen throughout the region. The United States has an especially strong role in deciding how bilateral relations will evolve in the future and whether the relationship will focus on strategic competition and conflict or peace and cooperation. For this reason, it is critical for the two nations to rationally define their interests and objectives, and accommodate each other’s respective understandings of the world order.

1. The Role of China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific

The evolution of China's current role and position in the Asia-Pacific can be divided into three distinct time periods.

During the first period, from 1840 to 1949, China focused on national sovereignty and liberation. It became one of the first Asian countries to win its full independence and made an important contribution to the victory of World War II.

In the second period, from 1949 to 1991, since the founding of the People's Republic of China by the Communist Party of China (CPC). It focused on strengthening China's capacity to safeguard its sovereignty and security. The country subsequently grew into a force for peace and stability in the region. During the Cold War, China was firmly opposed to the idea of one-state hegemony and developed friendly relations with its neighbors based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The thawing of China-U. S. relations in the early 1970s significantly improved regional security in East Asia, a time during which economies in the region enjoyed rapid growth.

China viewed the peace and development as an opportunity to integrate itself into the international community. During this timeframe, China and the United States were able to look beyond their differences and develop their economic cooperation at a faster rate. Since 1978, this cooperation was followed by an effort on China's part to carry out domestic reform and open up to the outside world.

During the third period, from the end of the Cold War in 1991 to the present day, China underwent remarkable economic development and has now become a growth engine in the region. As a growing regional force, China supports ASEAN as the main vehicle for regional cooperation. It has also advocated for the development of a comprehensive security concept, launched the Belt and Road Initiative, and explored and developed its own ideas and policies on global order.

On the other side of the ocean, America's position and importance in the region has also evolved over the course of these three distinct time periods.

During the first period, from 1776 to 1945, the United States became a superpower after undergoing its own developmental, territorial, and maritime expansion, in addition

to two world wars, which allowed it to dominate Asian-Pacific affairs. At the same time, many Americans sympathized with China's pursuit of national independence, contributed to its modernization process, and supported its resistance against Japanese aggression during WWII.

During the second period, which encompasses the full duration of the Cold War, the United States intervened in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War to counter what it saw as communist expansion. While this initially brought the United States into fierce conflict with China, the United States later changed its policy and joined hands with China against Soviet expansion, which improved bilateral ties.

In the third period, from the end of the Cold War to present day, the United States became the world's only superpower. During this period, East Asia enjoyed rapid growth for more than 20 years and, without the Soviet threat, the United States subsequently withdrew its presence from the Asia-Pacific region.

Since 2010, however, the United States is once again focusing on security in the Asia-Pacific region by taking on a leadership role and seeking to contain the rise of China. By pivoting and refocusing on the Asia-Pacific, the Obama

administration fortified its security alliances and increased its military presence in the region, viewing China's rise as one of the greatest strategic challenges in the world.

Donald Trump surprisingly won the presidential election in 2016, and took office on January 20, 2017. It remains unclear what President Trump's Asia and China policies will be, but little optimism can be gleaned from his China-bashing rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election. The "One China Policy" established by former President Jimmy Carter, and questioned whether U. S. interests should be bound by the "One China Policy". Furthermore, Mr. Trump recast his foreign policy with the idea of "peace through strength" —seeking to reinforce the U. S. nuclear arsenal greatly, vowing to launch a "trade war" with Beijing, and looking for a return of American manufacturing investment. What does Trump's Asia policy look like? It seems it will shift from the Obama administration's "rule-based order" to a "power-based order".

The United States, however, continuously discredits and distrusts China's political system. The United States has never given up on its "hedging" gamble on its China policy, consistently expecting political change to follow rapid economic

development in China. Changes to the balance of power and the drastic adjustment of the Obama administration's Asia-Pacific policy in recent years have exposed the strategically different perspectives of China and the United States, leading some people in the strategic community to believe that "China and the United States are edging towards a 'breaking point in their relationship'".

2. China's Strategic Objectives and Concerns with the United States in the Asia-Pacific

Since adopting a reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China's strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific have been consistent: Build and uphold a peaceful and stable regional environment, safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty, and sovereign interests, and play a constructive role in reforming the Asia-Pacific order.

(1) Regional Peace and Stability

Stability, peace, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific directly impact China's developmental prospects, external security

environment, and its political and social stability. Over the past three decades, China's per capita GDP rose from less than \$ 200 in 1978 to \$ 8, 000 in 2015, thanks to the government's efforts and a peaceful external environment. The Chinese economy is highly dependent on transport routes running through East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Indeed, as the largest nation trading goods in the region, China's trade with other countries in the Asia-Pacific accounts for 60 percent of its total trade. China's overseas interests are extending globally, mainly through the Asia-Pacific.

The CPC put forward two centenary goals during its 18th National Congress in 2012: Complete creating a moderately prosperous society by 2021—the year the CPC celebrates its centennial—and create a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, modern, socialist country by 2049, the People's Republic of China's centennial. These two centenary goals have become the basis of China's national strategy, meaning that China must continue to pursue a path of peaceful development. By extension, China's foreign policy, including its regional policy, must also serve this objective. The primary aim of developing China's national defense and military is to ensure

the security of internal and external environments for peaceful development.

Given the positive role the United States has played in promoting economic prosperity, checking nuclear proliferation, and addressing non-traditional threats in the Asia-Pacific, China hopes the United States will be a willing partner in upholding regional peace and stability. However, in recent years, the United States has increasingly targeted China in its national security and military strategy, and combative plans, and it is rapidly boosting its alliances and increasing its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, China increasingly questions whether or not the United States poses a threat to China's security, and many Chinese question if the United States is sincerely respecting China's peaceful development.

Economically speaking, cooperation is the linchpin of China-U. S. relations, and China-U. S. cooperation in the Asia-Pacific provides important support to the region's economic prosperity. While China welcomes U. S. participation in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, it finds it difficult to understand the United States' criticism and objections to the two initiatives. China also hopes the United States will not

attempt to build an exclusive regional order.

(2) Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty, and Sovereign Interests

China has repeatedly suffered from foreign aggression, and fought for national independence for more than 100 years. Even today, the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, and some islands and shoals are illegally occupied by other countries. Giving great priority to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, China is particularly sensitive and alert to these issues. China will not give up its stern position, nor will it allow new provocation and infringement on its territorial sovereignty, rights, and interests.

In light of this historical perspective and the current reality, China will follow a peaceful, pragmatic, and restrained approach to these issues in order to maintain regional peace and stability.

China's Taiwan policy can be summed up as "one country, two systems" with the goal of peaceful reunification. So long as the Taiwanese authorities do not pursue independence, the Mainland is willing to consider cross-Strait reconciliation. The Taiwan issue is the result of U. S. interference in China's internal

affairs, and China believes the United States plays the Taiwan card as a means of containing China. Current U. S. policy toward Taiwan is facing tremendous challenges given the drastic changes in the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, the Mainland's remarkable rise, and political turbulence within Taiwan. Will the United States restrain Taiwanese independence or once again indulge the Taiwanese authorities in provoking a crisis?

On the Diaoyu islands and Nansha islands and shoals, China's policy is essentially "sovereignty belongs to China, set aside differences, and promote joint development." China's actions to defend its sovereignty in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have become more resolute in recent years, but they are countermeasures targeted at provocations from countries such as Japan and the Philippines.

China's overall policy on these issues remains fundamentally unchanged. Chinese President Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed a policy of "sovereignty belongs to China, set aside differences, and promote joint development" and to "stay committed to a peaceful approach, resolve disputes through negotiations, and strive for peace and stability."

While reiterating it will not "take sides" on territorial

disputes, the United States supports and even encourages other claimants in specific issues to exert pressure on China, which is hypocritical from a Chinese perspective. Given the fact that the United States is one of the instigators of the Diaoyu islands and Nansha islands issue, China is opposed to the United States taking sides on these issues. China is not likely to accept America's open intervention on these issues, nor will China accept America's argument of upholding international law and regional stability. In fact, these maritime disputes have flared up since the United States pivoted toward the Asia-Pacific region. The United States should do some soul-searching on its role in these disputes. Should the new U. S. administration inherit the Obama administration's policy, China and the United States could come into conflict or, at the very least, the chances of such an encounter will increase.

(3) Regional Security Architecture and Order

In its commitment to independence, China relies on its own strengths to resolve its security concerns. China favors an open and inclusive security system, rather than an alliance system. Since the end of the Cold War, China has advocated achieving

security through cooperation. It has actively participated in open security measures in the Asia-Pacific, and currently plays an important role in regional security bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

China is part of the U. S. -defined security architecture and is outside the U. S. -led alliance system. Nevertheless, for many years after a warming in China-U. S. relations, China peacefully coexisted within the U. S. security system. Although it does not appreciate the U. S. alliance system, China is not firmly opposed to this system so long as it is not targeted against China. China respects America's traditional presence and interests in the Asia-Pacific region, but it does not want to be excluded, threatened, or even blackmailed by the U. S. -led alliance system. As it grows bigger and stronger, China naturally finds this U. S. system increasingly unacceptable and opposes its further growth.

In recent years, the U. S. alliance system has increasingly targeted China. In addition to its traditional bilateral alliances with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, the United States is vigorously building tripartite alliances with Japan and Australia and with Japan and the Philippines.

China-U. S. relations are strained on several contentious

issues in the Asia-Pacific, primarily due to the United States increasingly assertive security alliance. As the discord between China and some U. S. allies grows increasingly more contentious, the United States needs to take a closer look at the exclusiveness of the regional security architecture centered on the U. S. alliance system. If the United States continues to circumvent China, enforce regional security rules through the prism of ideology, and turn a blind eye to the China's security interests and place as a major Asia-Pacific power, the security dilemma and strategic suspicion between the two countries will only worsen.

The United States often talks about a “rules-based order”, but the basis of these “rules” is consensus. International rules, which require that sovereign states transfer some of their interests and rights, must be based on the greatest common denominator of the involved parties' different positions and propositions. If one country uses an approach based solely on its own position to regulate other countries, it should be seen as hegemony. China wants to know: Whose rules are these? What are these rules? How can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation? How can the evolution and development of common rules be ensured?

3. Suggestions for Properly Addressing Areas of Contention in the Asia-Pacific

After the Trump administration takes office in the United States, there are three contentious issues that China and the United States must squarely face and properly address.

(1) Taiwan Issue

China's territorial integrity and sequential core interest are at stake in cross-Strait relations. China insists that it will not give up the option of using force to stop Taiwanese independence.

On the Taiwan issue, Beijing and Washington reached a consensus after many rounds of negotiations, and the United States made it clear that it did not support Taiwanese independence. Fully recognizing the Taiwan question is both a sensitive and dangerous matter. The past three U. S. administrations took a cautious approach, leading to overall stability in cross-Strait relations. During that time, the Mainland and Taiwan made substantial progress in cross-Strait economic cooperation and cultural and people-to-people exchanges when Ma

Ying-jeou was in power.

The Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan refused to accept the 1992 consensus after it came to power on May 20, 2016. As a result, cross-Strait relations are once again getting unstable.

Beijing pays close attention to America's Taiwan policy. It is opposed to continuous U. S. arms sales to Taiwan and, and particularly to an assigned "Taiwan role", essentially encouraged and supported by the United States in the changed security landscape in the Asia-Pacific. President Trump, when he was president-elect, once did something to shake "One China Policy" by taking congratulatory phone call from Ms. Tsai Yingwen and suspecting the binding effect of "One China policy" which has lasted since the Carter Administration in 1979. Such the moves negatively clouded the relations with Beijing. Fortunately President Trump quickly returned to the sound tract by reaffirming his observance to the "One China policy" as he made phone-call to Chinese President Xi Jinping on February 10, 2017. His reaffirmation dismisses the cloud, and set a positive gambit for the China-U. S. ties.

The new U. S. administration should fully recognize hefty

sensitivity of the Taiwan issue. In the eyes of Beijing, Taiwan issue is by no means negotiable, and China's determination to ensure peaceful reunification with Taiwan, as far as the island would refrain from conspiring for the adjure independence, is insurmountable. Unfolding positive transactions between China and the United States over the Taiwan Strait will undercut disruption of Taiwan issue. This reality serves three parts' interest at best.

(2) The South China Sea Issue

Tensions in the South China Sea have escalated out of sovereign and maritime disputes between China and its neighbors to geopolitical competition between China and the United States, particularly as U. S. intervention has intensified over the past two years. The two countries need to recognize growing risks of clash between Beijing and Washington in the South China Sea, should not bog down in high-intensity strategic wrestling in the West Pacific. China has legitimate claims to both sovereignty and the associated maritime rights over the islands, shoals and reefs in the South China Sea. This water area is also the most important marine routes for China to access the Pacific Ocean and Indian

Ocean. Since the United States claims it does not take sides on the territorial disputes, China and the United States should not have substantially different positions on issues related to the South China Sea. Actually, both countries have shared responsibilities and common interests to ensure the peace and stability of the South China Sea, maintain safety of the busiest sea lane in the world, and safeguard “freedom of navigation” in the Western Pacific.

However, with its repositioning in the Asia-Pacific region, it seems the United States has dragged China into a geopolitical competition in the South China Sea, which could become an arena for the United States to attempt to check the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region. Particularly, sailing close to China’s on-construction islands and flyover with American warships and military planes, regrouping with Japan, Australian and India for proposed joint patrolling, overemphasizing China’s militarization process in the sea, combining together, have escalated the tension, and cast little help to preserving stability. U. S. Military has been strongly arguing for stronger reactions to keep Beijing back off from its island reclamation and construction. These actions would comport with America’s long-term strategy of

grapping its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific, but unnecessarily cost China's sovereignty defending. The South China Sea tensions-driven controversy is raging, and complicating the trilateral relations among China, the United States and ASEAN. On the other hand, Japan's South China Sea concerns are multiplying, and Tokyo is raising its involvements in the area militarily and diplomatically. It has no doubt to harden Chinese resolve to stand firmly for its South China Sea claims. As long as the United States attempts to enlarge its allies engagement to the South China Sea disputes, it would contrarily force China to adopt unexpected countermeasures. Thus the tensions would hardly de-escalate, and conflict would impossibly ease off between China and the United States in the South China Sea.

U. S. military preponderance in the South China Sea is obviously a vulnerable point for China in the geopolitical sphere. Both the countries need to craft a timely and efficient framework to manage their friction and rows in the South China Sea. This framework should facilitate the settlement of maritime territorial disputes while bolstering the stability in the South China Sea. For this regard, China and the United States need to respect their common interests in realizing the sea lane safety, and freedom of

navigation. Neither side should take any act to impede on such commonalities in the region. Simultaneously, the U. S. should encourage China and ASEAN to work through their way to conclude the COC negotiation and maritime cooperation in the settlement of their disputes bilaterally. Particularly, China proposes establishment of coastal states cooperation institution in the South China Sea to aim at multilateral governance over a wide range of issues from fishery, environmental protection, ecosystem conservation and collective response to non-traditional challenges just like anti-piracy and humanitarian rescuing. All such “China-ASEAN way” is on horizon, and will conceivably benefit all countries in the region.

In regards to the Nansha islands and shoals that are occupied by other countries, China will continue to push for bilateral dialogues with other claimants, as well as other ASEAN countries, and will strive to peacefully resolve territorial disputes through negotiations. China is quite supportive to the concept of “rule-based order”, and respecting all international legal norms and UNCLOS as well. But China is clearly opposed to selective application of international legal norms in the examination of the South China Sea disputes. The United States needs to project its

alleged fairness in tackling history-rooted and contending sovereign claims in the South China Sea, and stop rushing to any discriminatory arrangement. In that sense, the United States needs to cast a better understanding of China's claims and policies, holding on its proclaimed neutrality in the territorial disputes and staying away from sparking confrontational behaviors from its allies and partners. Thus we strongly suggest both militaries and governments would step up their negotiation due to effectively find the way for confidence building measures.

(3) North Korea's Nuclear Ambition

Currently, nuclear N. Korea issue is the most dangerous flash point in the Asia-Pacific. The DPRK has conducted five nuclear tests, four of which were conducted after the suspension of the Six-Party talks in 2008. The DPRK also continues to launch satellites and ballistic missiles very provocatively. Kim Jong-un regime has recklessly pronounced that Pyongyang will never be back to the 6 Parties Talks, and will never abandon its nuclear and missile capacity, and desperately speed up its deliverable achievement of nuclear missile arsenal instead. Latest nuclear test in September of 2016 and missile test in February of

2017 are indicators of their nuclear advancement. It's a critical moment for Beijing and Washington, along with the international community, to genuinely break the lingering impasse in the Korea Peninsular and deter Pyongyang from furthering its nuclear menace.

It's quite recognizable that mere sanctions would not produce the effect without diplomatic engagement. Furthermore, sore military deterrence against N. Korea by massive military drilling between the U. S. and S. Korea and enhanced military deployment in the South could fall short of real repercussion of scaring Pyongyang off. Washington can't also scapegoat China for its failure of policy of N. Korea. Beijing has never been more cooperative in the UNSC to support hugely tougher sanctions vis-à-vis N. Korea. Ironically, on the other hand, deployment of THAAD batteries in the peninsular has been severely detrimental to collective response to N. Korea-posed dangers.

China is committed to a “package” solution to the nuclear issue and the security of the peninsula. It tends to use the framework laid out by diplomatic and political settlement while firmly adopting “stick” to deadly hurt its potential to advance nuclear and missile capability. Pleasingly, the Mar-a-lago

summit meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Trump on April 6-7 of 2017 has productive bearing. Both leaders agreed on new seriousness of N. Korea's nuclear dangers, and vowed to strengthen their cooperation. The Mar-a-lago consensus, based on top leaders' frankness, vision and wisdom will no doubt build up new momentum to pressure N. Korea by unambiguously signaling toward N. Korea that continuation of nuclear provocation by testing new nuclear bomb and long-range missiles would increasingly cost its survival. China and the United States need to translate their Mar-a-lago consensus into real action. As their cooperation prevails, both countries will be eligible to explore concrete measures to rein in N. Korea. Once they proceed with cooperation and coordination on N. Korea, it will conceivably generate spill-over effect to push two powers closer on other regional security issues.

4. Solutions to Differing China-U. S. Perspectives in the Asia-Pacific

As the China-U. S. Shanghai Communiqué said in 1972, "Neither the U. S. nor China should seek hegemony in the Asia-

Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” This principle is still applicable today. The key to solving common issues lies with the conviction that neither China nor the United States should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. As President Xi Jinping said, “the Pacific is large enough to accommodate both China and the United States.”

Be it through a G-2 or security cooperation, China and the United States need to establish a joint vision that is based on a mutual consensus, is inclusive, and is constructive. We believe the two sides need to make the following efforts to encourage the sound development of China-U. S. relations.

Effective Communication and Dialogue is the Basis for Mitigating Disagreements

Before taking any major actions, China and the United States need to develop and promote channels for communication. Their engagement in the past and at present indicates that communication and mutual understanding is critical to their strategic assessments at any one time. Any move, no matter how small it might be, by China or the United States—the two most

important players in the Asia-Pacific chess game—will inevitably invite suspicion and response from the other. The two countries need to have more candid strategic dialogues on major issues in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s maritime strategy, America’s Asia-Pacific strategy, and the U. S. security alliance, in order to develop objective perceptions about the other’s strategic goals and explore a possible path forward for managing their differences, building mutual trust, and promoting cooperation.

As their interaction in the Asia-Pacific will cover many interests and principles, such as sovereignty, power, development, rules, and honor, as well as other sensitive issues, China and the United States need to step up high-level dialogue and demonstrate leadership. They need to build robust cross-departmental networks at home to follow through on the outcomes of high-level communication.

Mutual Strategic Adjustment Will Guarantee Long-Term Peace Between China and the United States

Both nations need to explore the possibility of peaceful coexistence and co-development from a strategic perspective. As

a traditional land power developing its naval capabilities, China's maritime strategy must be a regional one; and as a maritime power coming onshore, America's maritime strategy must be a global one.

Given the huge differences in their geographical endowments, historical traditions, and development paths, China and the United States naturally have divergent, yet inclusive perspectives and goals. Their power contradiction on the sea is not irreconcilable. China needs appropriate space and control in coastal waters. Even as it maintains maritime dominance around the world and has interests and traditional influence in the Western Pacific, the United States should not build an exclusive sphere of influence to deter China from becoming a maritime power. Both sides need to recognize shortcomings in their power and seek accommodation and compromise. What China needs to improve, first and foremost, is its way of pursuing objectives. When taking action, China needs to give reasonable diplomatic space to the traditional power—the United States—and convey its interests and aspirations more accurately. In maritime disputes, China should be cautious when using military means and be careful not to force the United States to make a hard choice

between fighting a war with China and abandoning its allies. In pursuing its offshore interests, China should give full consideration to America's concerns over freedom of navigation. China needs to build a robust military deterrence, but should note its limitations in maritime power and not seek comprehensive maritime goals as the United States does.

The United States needs to adjust its strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region. The major difference between the two nations in the Asia-Pacific region is seen in China's efforts to uphold its sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and America's efforts to maintain its own maritime dominance in the region. A cool-headed United States needs to recognize that so long as China continues to rise, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region will shift. The United States must recognize China's rise and its maritime aspirations, give due space and status to China, and avoid inflaming nationalistic sentiments in China. The United States should give up its attempt to build an alliance system against China in this region. It should also recognize and encourage China to make more contributions to economic growth, freedom of navigation, and regional stability.

China and the United States Must Jointly Build an Inclusive Order in the Asia-Pacific

The United States cannot accommodate and care for non-allies in the Asia-Pacific, which, in turn, is the institutional cause of security contention and friction in the region. There is no pathway to achieve peaceful coexistence between China and the United States other than going beyond the security status quo by jointly building a more inclusive security order within the Asia-Pacific. The two countries need to reconcile their differences regarding the future order of the Asia-Pacific region if they wish to prevent a new Cold War or the formation of separate blocs within the region.

China and the United States need to work together with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region to build a cooperative regional security architecture that should be more inclusive and comprehensive than the existing sub-regional constructs. It must also be an architecture that covers non-traditional security issues. In this architecture, the U. S. -led alliance system can coexist with an increasingly influential China in the Asia-Pacific, thus avoiding new confrontations in this region. In this more inclusive architecture, the United States, China, and other regional powers

can share responsibilities in safeguarding security, reducing tensions, and managing crises in the region. An institutionalized and regular communication mechanism between China and the U. S. -led alliance system would greatly aid in these efforts.

The key to keeping bilateral ties between Beijing and Washington dynamically stable and broadly beneficial lies in a continued persistence on both governments' side in employing cooperation, rather than confrontation, to tackle all issues that come upon them.

In his congratulatory phone call to then-President-elect Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping fondly pointed out that the advancement of the bilateral relations between China and the United States since a normalization in relations in 1979 has significantly benefited both countries while notably boosting global and regional peace, stability, and prosperity. This reality powerfully demonstrates that cooperation is the only right choice for both countries. President Xi's remarks received positive echoes from Mr. Trump, and both leaders promised to strengthen their cooperation in preparation for any challenges before them. This reaffirmation might inject a positive tone into their

burgeoning relationship.

China-U. S. relations have recently been mired by a number of contentious problems. These problems can easily be identified as the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea issue North Korea nuclear proliferation, economic and trade frictions, and currency manipulation. Washington's suspicion of China's strategic intentions has deepened, and ominously proliferates into a rising anxiety with regards to the way in which the United States could effectively reshape China's behaviors in the Asia-Pacific. Simultaneously, China's fears and worries regarding the United States have piled up as Beijing tends to see Washington as meddling in China's surroundings and consistently contemplating how to slow or prevent China's rise. Obviously, such mutual distrust, if not ratcheted down, will lead to the cooling of relations. Additionally, no one can exclude the worst case scenario of a military clash should the relationship deteriorate and become mismanaged. Given this, both governments in the Trump era should be committed to cooperating to squash any escalating confrontation in the Asia-Pacific.

Because China and the United States carry the special responsibility of upholding peace, stability, and prosperity at

both regional and global scale, both countries should adhere to the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respects, and win-win cooperation. No matter what sort of challenges emerge, both countries must figure out a way to peacefully handle them. It is a formidable test for both governments and both militaries, but in order to resolve current and forthcoming challenges both nations must demonstrate determination, will power, and perseverance.

中美军事关系：演化、前景与建议

姚云竹 张沓生 赵小卓 吕晶华 李 晨

近年来，军事关系成为中美两国关系中的重大变量之一。双方军事利益的碰撞面迅速扩大，显现出更多的零和性质和地缘战略竞争趋向。中国军事战略目标的多元化和军事力量的海外拓展，美国亚太联盟体制的强化与兵力部署的提升，预示着两国在东亚陆海衔接地带发生军事冲突的风险升高。与此同时，中美都有预防和管理危机的实际努力，并已经取得某些成果。在一个迅速变化和不确定性上升的新时期，中美都意识到有必要就全球治理开展防务合作。

一 历史与现状

1972年，中美双方基于地缘战略需要，为应对共同安全威胁开启了两国交往，军事合作自然而然成为交往中最

重要的内容之一。1979 年中美正式建交后，最先得到发展的亦是军事关系。军事交往主要围绕高层互访、对口交流和务实合作三个方面展开。1980 年两国国防部部长实现了互访，开启了其后 10 年高度务实的军事合作。防务部门和军队高层官员的互访，为军事关系的发展确定了积极的基调。军队之间频繁的对口交流，包括军事院校交流、训练观摩、条令理论研讨、军舰互访、军事设施参观等，对两国军队建立各层级的互信起到了重要作用。务实合作则突出表现在军事技术合作方面：美国国会不断放宽向中国出口军品的限制，给予其相当于非北约盟国的友国待遇，中美就军品采购、军事技术合作、技术转让等达成了一系列协议。

中美军事合作在 1989 年政治风波后戛然而止。首先，该政治风波再度突出了两国深层次的意识形态和政治制度矛盾。美国停止了与中国的所有军事交流，不再执行军售与技术合作协议，并至今对华实施军事技术封锁和武器禁运。1999 年美国国会通过《2000 年国防授权法》，严格限制与中国的军事交流。其次，冷战结束，华沙条约组织解体和苏联崩溃，使中美的共同威胁不复存在，抽走了军事合作的基石。再次，“台独”走向激化了中美的军事对立。美国不断提升对台关系、强化对台军售和在中国周边的军

事存在，中国为反“台独”进行各项军事斗争准备，双方围绕台湾的军事互动，构成了互为潜在交战对手的军事关系基调。最后，美国对华武器禁运政策迫使中国独立发展完整配套的国防工业和武器装备体系。军事技术合作内容的缺失，使军事关系出现了空心化趋势，也弱化了双方发展关系的热情。上述原因导致中美军事关系一直在低水平徘徊，难以有实质性发展。而中美之间的军事危机，如1996年的台海危机、1999年美国轰炸中国驻南联盟大使馆、2001年中国战斗机与美国侦察机在南中国海相撞，以及美国多次向台湾出售武器装备，都导致军事关系较长时间的中断。

从2008年台海两岸承认“九二共识”开始，中美军事关系逐渐步入稳定发展的轨道，并成为两国关系中的一个亮点。尽管中美在台湾、东海、南海等问题上仍存在严重分歧，并时有摩擦发生，但双方始终保持高频度的军事交往，维持了军事关系的持续性和稳定性。两军高层领导频繁互访，促进了战略沟通与理解。过去几年，中美在“战略与经济对话”框架下开设了“战略安全对话”。2017年4月，习近平主席与特朗普总统在“海湖会”上确定建立“外交与安全对话”机制，进一步提升了双方防务部门对话的级别。防务部门还定期举行“防务磋商”和“防务政策协调磋商”，

军队之间的对话机制日益增多并逐渐机制化，先后建立了国防部、战略规划部门和军种之间的对话平台，联合参谋部之间也即将建立对话机制。年度交流项目多达 50—60 项，涵盖了联合军事演习和训练、军事教育、学术研究、军事医学、军事档案、海上搜救、港口访问、抢险救灾、反海盗等内容，并在继续扩大领域。两军认识到避免冲突和对抗符合双方利益，并为此建立了预防和控制危机的机制，于 2014 年年底签署了“建立重大军事行动相互通报信任措施机制”和“海空相遇安全行为准则”两个谅解备忘录，并通过陆续增加新附件，不断扩大互信措施的范围。

此外，中美军队开始在“东盟防长扩大会”、亚丁湾护航和运送叙利亚化学武器等联合国授权的国际行动中进行合作，显示了中美超越双边，在亚太和全球安全事务中进行合作的潜力。

二 中国的战略、军队任务、军事能力建设与美国因素

（一）中国的国家战略、国家安全战略和军事战略

1. 国家战略

自 1978 年以来，中国的国家战略日益清晰明确，这就

是坚持和平发展，坚持改革开放，完成两个百年目标，实现中华民族伟大复兴。这个战略的精髓是争取和平的国际环境以发展自己，同时又以自身的发展维护和促进世界和平。

2. 国家安全战略

中国的国家安全战略涵盖广泛的内容，包括内部和外部安全、国土和国民安全、传统和非传统安全、生存和发展安全、自身和共同安全，要求运用多样化综合手段来加以维护。军队是营造良好国内国际环境、保障和平发展大局、维护国家安全的重要力量。

3. 军事战略

中国的军事战略服从、服务于国家战略和国家安全战略。实行积极防御军事战略方针，遵循防御、自卫、后发制人原则，坚持在维护国家领土主权和海洋权益的同时，维护周边的安全稳定。通过营造稳定态势，减少危机诱因来维护和平；通过实施威慑和控制行动，防止危机升级；一旦战争强加到中国头上，则坚决打赢战争。为此，中国军队要做好打赢“信息化局部战争”的准备，这种战争主要针对可能出现的台湾“独立”（2005年中国全国人民代表大会通过的《反分裂国家法》赋予中国军队以非和平手段阻止台湾分裂的使命）

和来自海洋方向的其他安全挑战。

（二）中国军队的任务

中国军队的任务是维护国家主权、安全、统一和领土完整，应对各种军事威胁和突发事件，保障宪法确立的国家政治制度和中国共产党的领导，促进社会稳定和经济持续发展，为维护世界和平做出贡献等。中国军队还实施反恐、维护社会稳定、抢险救灾、维护权益、安保警戒、国际维和、国际救援等非战争军事行动。

（三）中国军队的能力建设

根据军事战略的要求，中国将重点发展粉碎“台独”图谋、捍卫国家领土完整和主权统一的作战能力；维护领土主权和海洋权益不受侵犯的海空能力；遏制和挫败强国军事干预的拒止能力；适应未来战争形态的新兴领域攻防能力；慑止对中国国土核攻击的核报复打击能力以及维护国家政治安全和社会稳定的多样化能力。针对军队担负的维护国家发展利益、保障公民权益、提供国际公共安全产品、承担国际安全义务等任务，还应具备打击国际恐怖主义，实施国际维和、救援、海上护航、撤离海外公民等境外行动能力，以及与之密切相关的远程兵力投送和维持

能力。

发展这些能力的途径：一是军民融合，在富国的同时实现强军目标，在重大基础设施、海洋、空天、信息等关键领域逐步形成军民融合发展的格局。二是实战训练，按照实战标准从难从严训练部队，保持常备不懈，随时应对各种突发情况。三是国际合作，与世界各国防务部门和军队开展对话交流，举行联演联训，提高在国际环境中联合行动的能力。

（四）中国军事战略和防务规划中的美国因素

美国作为亚太安全的主导国家和军事上最强大的国家，对中国安全有重大的影响。美国保持和提升与台湾的防务关系，坚持对台军售，是中国解决台湾问题时不得不考虑的外部干预因素。奥巴马政府通过推行“亚太再平衡”战略，强化亚太军事同盟体系，增加前沿部署，对中国进行长时间、大范围、高频度海空抵近侦察，构建减损中国战略威慑能力的东亚导弹防御系统，恶化了中国的安全环境。美国在中国与邻国的领土争端中站在中国的对立面，增加了中国维护国家领土完整和主权权益的复杂性。中国的军事战略和防务规划需要考虑美国对中国构成的诸多安全挑战。尽管特朗普政府不

会继续使用上届政府“亚太再平衡”的提法，但其亚太安全政策的基本要素不会有大的变化。中国军队必须警惕防范，做好美国成为交战对手的准备，在必要时敢打必胜。

但是，中国并没有将美国定位为敌人，中美军事关系也与冷战时期的美苏军事关系有本质的区别。中美之间既有利益冲突，也有利益重叠，利益重叠往往大于利益冲突。中国清醒地认识到，与美国进行军备竞赛和军事对抗，不符合自身和平发展的大战略，不利于塑造安全稳定的国际环境，也不符合世界和平发展的大趋势。

三 中国视角中的美国对华战略意图 和军事力量发展

（一）美国在战略上将中国定位为军事挑战

冷战结束以来，美国政府一直将中国视为军事挑战，只是在不同时期对挑战的程度有不同判断。2013年奥巴马总统在与习近平主席举行“庄园会晤”时，对中方提出的“新型大国关系”倡议表示了赞赏。但与此同时，美国国防部仍高度警惕中国军事力量的增长，指责中国“对其日益

增长的军事能力及战略决策过程缺乏透明度，增大了地区国家对中国战略意图的担忧”^①。

从2015年开始，美国对中国的威胁判断趋于严峻。2015年2月美国公布《国家安全战略》，将中国在东海、南海与邻国的争端视作安全威胁。6月，美参联会发布《国家军事战略》报告，将首要战略目标由原来的“打击暴力极端主义”调整为“应对国家威胁”，并直接点了俄罗斯、伊朗、朝鲜和中国的名。同期美国国防部发布的《亚太海上安全战略》和《网络空间战略》等文件，美国高级将领在国会听证会上的讲话，也都严辞谈论中国“威胁”。2016年2月，美国国防部部长卡特就《2017财年国防预算》申请报告发表的讲话，以及次月国防部公布的首份《国防态势报告》，都将中国作为安全挑战，排在五大安全挑战的第二位。

与其他领域相比，美国在军事上对中国的定位更侧重交战对手而非合作伙伴，使中美军事互动具有更多的对抗性。

^① Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013”, May 2013, p. 16, available from <http://www.defense.gov>.

（二）美国在军事规划、作战概念、兵力部署和装备研发上准备与中国交战

从美国的军事规划、作战概念、兵力部署和武器装备研发中，也可以看出中国是美国的作战对手。

1. “空海一体战”和“全球公域进入与机动联合概念”

美军2009年提出针对中国“反进入与区域拒止”能力的“空海一体战”概念，2015年又将其更名为“全球公域进入与机动联合概念”。尽管美国军方声称这一作战概念并不是针对中国，但“反进入与区域拒止”能力早已成为美国军方描述中国作战能力和战法的专用术语。2012年的《防务战略指南》更是明确将中国作为实施“反进入”作战的主要敌手。

2. “第三次抵消战略”指导下的“颠覆性技术”研究

美国国防部2014年提出了第三次“抵消战略”。虽然美国从未公开宣称该战略针对中国，但美国“国家利益”网站有文章明言，该战略“意在应对中国日益上升的反进入与区域拒止挑战”^①。中国防务分析人员普遍认为，该战

^① Richard A. Bitzinger, “Why China Should Fear the U.S. Military’s Third Offset Strategy, The National Interest”, August 28, 2016, available from <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-china-should-fear-the-us-militarys-third-offset-strategy-17505>.

略对中国的针对性毋庸置疑。

3. 亚太兵力部署的调整

美国国防部在全球战略收缩的态势中，仍然决定在2020年前将60%的海空力量部署于亚太。截至2015年，美国海外驻军总兵力为23.5万人，其中亚太15.43万人，占65%。大批先进武器装备也率先部署到亚太。2016年9月，美国前国防部部长卡特宣布“亚太再平衡”战略的军事部分进入第三阶段，未来会将F-35、F-22战斗机，P-8A侦察机，升级版的“维吉尼亚级”核潜艇等更多先进装备派往亚太，并大力发展新一代战略轰炸机、无人驾驶潜航器以及太空战和网络战技术等。这些举措给中国带来实实在在的周边军事压力。

4. 在中国周边日益增加的军事活动

美军每年在西太平洋地区进行10余项例行大型军演，针对中国保持着极高频度的海空抵近侦察，在南海实施直接挑战中国主权权益的“自由航行行动”。中国军事分析家认为，美国对中国军事力量崛起的强烈焦虑感及应对措施，正在将中国与周边国家的海上主权权益争端演化成中美之间的地缘战略竞争。

5. 涉及中美军事冲突的研究报告

2015年以来，兰德公司、战略与预算评估中心、新美

国安全中心等与美军方有密切联系的智库，接连完成多项有关中美军事冲突的评估报告。^① 这些报告假设中美发生武装冲突的各种情景，量化评估双方作战能力和冲突结果，提出对策建议。

（三）美国在亚太构建制衡中国崛起的联盟体系与伙伴关系

美国在亚太地区强化联盟体系、推动防务合作的措施旨

① 参见Eric Heginbotham etc. , “The U. S-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996 – 2017” (中美军事打分表: 兵力、地理和变化中的力量对比), RAND Corporation, 2015, available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html; Jeffrey G. Engstrom and Michael S. Chase, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)” (中国人民解放军弱点分析), RAND Corporation, 2015, available from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html, 2015; Mark Gunzinger, Bryan Clark, “Sustaining America’s Precision Strike Advantage” (保持美国精确打击优势), CSBA, 2015, available from <http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010.09.14-Sustaining-Americas-Strategic-Advantage-in-Long-Range-Strike.pdf>; Kelley Sayler, “Red Alert: The Growing Threat to U. S. Aircraft Carriers” (红色警式: 对美国航母日益严重的威胁), CNAS, 2016, available from <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/red-alert-the-growing-threat-to-u-s-aircraft-carriers>; David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, “War With China: Thinking through the Unthinkable” (与中国之战: 不可思议之议), RAND Corporation, 2016, available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140_synopsis.pdf 等。

在遏制中国。

1. 双边联盟向三边和多边发展

近年来，美国在亚太除并行发展 5 组双边同盟与诸多伙伴关系外，还努力推动盟国之间以及盟国和伙伴国之间的三边和多边机制化军事合作。这些动作都使中国产生强烈的被排除感。

2. 介入中国与盟国的领土争端

在钓鱼岛和黄岩岛的紧张事态发生之后，美国确认《美日安保条约》适用于钓鱼岛，指责中国断续线主张“与国际法不符”，并借菲律宾诉中国的仲裁案裁决，不断公开指责中国的南海政策。新上台的特朗普政府，也不断指责中国在南海进行军事化。

3. 发展牵制中国的军事关系

为从地缘战略上牵制中国，美国不惜在“择友标准”上淡化意识形态、政治体制、人权等传统要素。例如，与中国有领土争端的印度、越南等国，成为美国的军事合作伙伴；可为美国前沿存在和军事行动提供支援的马来西亚、印度尼西亚等国，成为军事关系发展重点；甚至与中国关系密切的柬埔寨、老挝、缅甸等国，也成为美国发展军事关系的新对象国。

四 中美两国的军事关切及合作空间

中国的军事关切集中在周边，而美国在亚太的军事关切仅是其全球关切的一部分。这种明显的不对称，导致双方发生军事纷争时，中国视美国为“外部干涉势力”，美国则视中国为“破坏国际秩序”。

（一）中美在东亚的军事关切及合作空间

1. 美国亚太军事同盟体系

美国军事同盟从两个方面对中国产生消极作用：一是构建了防范和威慑中国的地缘战略态势，压缩了中美良性军事互动的空间；二是排他性地追求同盟成员的利益和安全、无视中国和其他非成员国的利益和安全。维护亚太和平稳定，符合中美双方的战略利益，但是以什么样的安全架构维护和平与稳定，双方的理念不同，实践上也有所不同。缓和中国与美军事同盟之间的尖锐对立，构建能够包容中国、美国及地区各国安全利益的架构和安排，符合中美双方的共同利益。

2. 朝鲜半岛

朝鲜半岛无核化是中美共同目标，但中国不能接受朝鲜

半岛出现严重的动荡，美国亦不肯放弃针对朝鲜的军事选择；中国力推六方会谈复谈，美国则侧重使用军事威慑与胁迫手段。与此同时，美国利用美韩同盟加强战略部署、应急规划和大规模演练，加紧为军事解决朝核问题做好各项准备。这些做法加剧了半岛紧张形势，也对中国的安全构成消极影响。考虑到朝鲜半岛可能出现中美不得不共同面对的紧急事态，就加强危机管理进行军事合作，符合双方的利益。

3. “萨德”反导系统

从技术上看，“萨德”反导系统无法有效保护韩国免遭朝鲜导弹的打击，却增强了美国对中国弹道导弹的早期预警、跟踪探测、弹头识别和拦截的能力，减损了中国的核威慑效能，破坏了双方的战略稳定。在“萨德”系统尚未部署、美国 and 韩国政府换届之际，有必要充分考虑各方的安全关切，重新审查“萨德”系统的部署决定，就各方关切进行认真对话，寻求更佳解决方案。

4. 台湾

台湾是中国不惜动用武力也要坚决捍卫的核心利益。美国国会通过的《2017 财年国防授权法》中包括提升美台军事交往层级和坚持对台军售的内容，当选总统特朗普破例与台湾领导人电话交谈，又称“一中原则”可以谈判，引起

中国严重关切。任何违反双方既定原则和共识的言行，都将引发台海紧张形势与危机。近期特朗普总统及其内阁高官多次重申了“一中原则”，但对这一原则的内涵还需要进一步形成默契。双方就保持台海稳定进行沟通与避免误判，防止因台湾问题爆发武装冲突，符合两国、地区和全球的共同利益。

5. 东海与南海

美国以履行军事同盟义务为由卷入中国与邻国的领土争端，借此在东海和南海采取一系列措施增强对中国的军事威慑态势，对中国的维权行动和岛礁建设做出过度反应。这些措施不利于营造解决争端的氛围，增加了中美两军一线部队之间接触与摩擦的概率。防止摩擦升级和避免直接冲突是中美的共同利益，缓和海上紧张形势也符合双方的长远利益。

（二）新兴战略领域

1. 海上安全

中美在第一岛链内形成了海上竞争态势，但竞争的程度受到双方国家战略、军事战略、军事能力以及危机管控措施的制约。维护海上航行自由是中美共同的海洋利益，用合作的方式维护东亚、亚太和全球范围内海上通道的通畅

与安全，应是双方的重大共同利益。

2. 核战略与核安全

特朗普总统在竞选中有关进行军备竞赛和扩大核能力的主张，引发了中国对战略稳定将遭破坏的担心。美国政府正在重新审查核政策和核力量，其政策结果将直接影响中国的核评估和核力量发展规划。中美有发生军事冲突的可能，也就有跨过核门槛的风险。太空、网络和电磁空间的军事能力愈发展，战略指挥与控制系统的可靠性愈下降。高超音速武器的研发以及弹道导弹、战略轰炸机、战略导弹核潜艇用途的多样化，为管控核升级带来新的挑战。在此形势下，就保持中美战略稳定进行对话，加深了解和达成广泛的共识，符合中美的共同利益。此外，中美作为核武器国家，在维护全球和地区战略稳定，防止核扩散、保障核安全、遏止核战争等领域拥有广泛的共同利益，负有共同的国际责任，更有进行合作的需要。

3. 网络空间

多年来，美国积极构建和维护网络空间军事优势，制定网络空间作战条令，设立网络空间司令部，组建网络战部队。中国军队为了适应军事变革，打赢信息化局部战争，也在发展网络作战能力，但不谋求与美国进行网络军备竞赛和对抗。同时，美国不断批评中国维护网络安全的措施，

炒作中国网络威胁。网络空间是新的战略领域，无论是在多边还是双边框架，都尚未建立起完善可行的国际行为准则。中美两国在这一领域既有重大共同利益又有严重分歧，对话、合作与冲突都有巨大空间。

4. 外层空间

长期以来，美国在外空拥有巨大优势，并希望把这一优势永远保持下去。对于中俄提出的签订禁止外空武器化条约的建议，美国一直持拒绝态度。然而，随着中国外空能力的不断增长，美国对中国外空能力的关切已经大大增加。在双方都具备一定太空军事能力的情况下，需要通过对话管控涉及太空的军事竞争，协商制定太空军事行为的规则。

（三）非战争军事行动与反恐

两国军队根据各自政府的对外政策，通过实施救灾、人道主义救援、非战斗人员撤离等非战争军事行动为国际社会提供公共产品。在全球治理和海外利益保护中，中美两军存在合作的必要性和潜力。

特朗普政府高度重视打击国际恐怖主义，并将重点放在消灭伊斯兰国极端恐怖势力上，中国政府也一贯坚定不移地推进反恐，两国在反恐领域存在巨大的合作空间。但是美国指责中国的反恐行动违反人权，中国反对美国对主权

国家进行军事干涉。随着中美利益交集的扩大、国际反恐合作机制的增加，也随着中国军队反恐能力的提升和经验的积累，中美两军在反恐领域的合作空间将不断扩大。

五 对发展稳定中美军事关系的建议

在中美两国政府换届的重要时期，保持稳定的军事关系，是保持良好中美关系的重要前提。中美首脑2017年4月的“海湖会晤”，为中美关系的发展奠定了建设性的基调，并再次强调将致力于推动两军关系的发展。

（一）为发展军事关系制定指导方针

中美双方都曾就构建新型军事关系提出了一些基本原则，包括互信、合作、不冲突、可持续等。政府换届时这些原则的表述可以改变，但核心内涵应得到肯定，特别是明确军事安全互信是中美战略互信的基础。此外，双方还应明确，在当前及今后较长时期，在双边领域和西太地区，发展军事关系的重点应是管控分歧与危机，避免滑向美苏冷战时期的军事对抗和地缘战略对峙。而在多边及全球，则应以协调合作为主，为应对共同安全挑战和为国际社会提供公共安全产品做出努力。

（二）加强军事安全对话

双方应充分利用并建立更多的机制化对话平台，坦诚清晰地阐述各自的战略意图，并逐步增加军事能力的透明度，以深化了解，建立互信。

（1）对已经建立的防务部门和军队的对话平台，要提高对话质量，注重内容而非形式，美方应争取国会放宽对华军事交往的法律限制，使对话内容更加广泛。

（2）增加两军对口部门之间的对话平台，逐步增设防务部门与军队直属机构、战区司令部、军种、军队智库和院校之间的对话机制。要充分利用“海湖会晤”开启的“外交和安全对话机制”和即将建立的联合参谋部对话机制，增强高级别对话和战略互信。

（3）开展战略稳定对话，将涉及全球战略稳定的核政策与核战略、反导系统、网络和外层空间军事安全、防扩散等议题纳入对话范畴。

（4）在地区和全球多边对话和论坛机制中，积极开展双边对话。

（三）加强危机管控

两军须将危机管控作为稳定中美军事关系和避免军事冲

突的核心，从危机防范和控制两个方面采取措施。

(1) 双方领导层应就危机管理的基本原则——始终保持直接沟通渠道、发出清晰信号、避免“承诺陷阱”、缓慢升级、做出对称反应等达成共识。

(2) 将危机管控作为重要内容纳入各层级的安全和军事对话。

(3) 进一步完善危机管控联络机制。应赋予国防部热线危机管控的明确功能，确定简化、快捷的使用程序。适时考虑建立两国海空军及有关战区之间的热线，形成多层次紧急联络机制。

(4) 落实两国军队签署的“建立重大军事行动相互通报信任措施谅解备忘录”和“海空相遇安全行为准则谅解备忘录”，定期评估备忘录履行情况，修改和扩充内容，逐步强化约束力。

(5) 就危机事态和管控措施等进行 1.5 或 2 轨对话与预案模拟推演。

(四) 扩大亚太地区和全球的军事安全合作

中美军事关系早已超越双边，涵盖亚太甚至全球安全事务。需要跳出双边摩擦的桎梏，在多边平台寻找合作机会。

(1) 加强在打击恐怖主义、核安保、防止大规模杀伤

性武器扩散、维和、海上搜救、人道主义救援、打击跨国犯罪等领域的合作。

(2) 在维护全球航行自由、保卫海上通道安全等领域增加合作。

(3) 应改变在网络、太空和核等全球战略领域中的对抗式互动，通过共同维护现行国际规则和建立新领域的国际规则，逐步增加关系中的积极成分。

(五) 改变中国与美军事同盟之间的零和关系

为缓解中国与美国亚太双边军事同盟之间日益加深的对立：

(1) 中国需要认识美国同盟体系的存在是历史也是现实，要准备与之长期相处，发展关系。美国需要推进同盟的转型，降低其排他性及对军事手段的过度依赖。

(2) 探索建立中国与美国亚太同盟之间的对话机制。如中美之间的“外交和安全对话机制”（2+2机制），可以必要时增加其他国家，形成“2+2+2”的机制。

(3) 美国将其与盟国之间的重大政策调整、兵力部署变化和军事演习等活动纳入现有中美情况通报机制；中国将其与战略伙伴国的重大军事活动纳入现有中美情况通报机制。

(4) 美国邀请中国参加或观摩其与盟国举行的联合军事演习；中国邀请美国参加或观摩其与别国举行的联合军事演习。

(5) 两国应共同支持“东盟地区论坛”“东盟防长扩大会”“东亚峰会”“六方会谈”和“亚太经合组织”等地区多边机制，推动形成中美都能发挥重要作用的亚太安全机制。

(六) 就避免陷入安全困境达成共识

为防止两国在亚太陷入“安全困境”：

(1) 两国和两军领导人应就亚太与全球未来的安全秩序、双方的亚太安全利益和目标、各自拟发挥的作用、对地区安全架构的期许及对现有规则的看法等重大问题进行对话，在相互理解与形成共识的基础上，建立战略层次的长期互信。

(2) 双方应就军事力量对比达成默契。在战略威慑能力上，保持虽不对等但却有效的相互威慑。中方不寻求发展与美国对等的核军备水平，美方不寻求减损中国的核威慑效能。在常规军力方面，中方不寻求在全球和亚太地区与美国军力的平衡，但要发展和保持能有效维护国家主权、海洋权益和领土完整，能维护国家发展利益的军事力量。

美方在保持全球及亚太军力优势的情况下，应对中国的军力发展和发挥建设性作用持包容的态度。

(3) 双边应就东亚安全热点问题达成共识。在南海，把缓和紧张、避免军事化作为共同目标。中方坚持以和平手段解决领土争端，积极推动双轨政策取得进展；美方停止在南海的“自由航行行动”，减少对中国的军事侦察，不在南海周边谋求新的军事基地。在东海，双方要避免因第三方因素卷入冲突与对抗。中国加强与日本的危机管理机制建设；美方应约束日本，不使其采取进一步的挑衅行为。在朝鲜半岛，双方应就防止军事冲突以及一旦发生紧急突发事件时的核安全管控等问题进行对话，或事先确定进行紧急对话的条件、方式与机制。在台海，中方坚持一国两制、和平统一的基本方针，美方坚持“一个中国”和不支持台湾独立的政策，双方共同维护两岸和平发展的局面。

美国特朗普政府刚刚开始执政，中国共产党也将在2017年召开第十九届全国代表大会。两国首脑“海湖会晤”取得了巨大成功，两国和两军关系的发展也步入新的时期。保持近年来两军交往对话的良好势头，努力发展健康、稳定的中美军事关系，不仅有利于推动两国关系的发展，也有利于亚太和全球的和平稳定。

China-U. S. Military Relations : Evolution, Prospect and Recommendations

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In recent years, military relations between China and the United States have gained increasing significance in the overall bilateral relationship. The potential for clashes over security interests between the two countries has grown rapidly, leading towards zero-sum situations and increased geostrategic competition. At a time when China is multiplying its strategic military objectives and gaining a larger military footprint overseas, the United States is beefing up its alliances and furthering its own military presence in the Asia-Pacific, foreshadowing growing risks of military contention between the two in the East Asia region. At the same time, both

China and the United States have demonstrated a strong desire and made sincere efforts to prevent and manage crises together, with notable achievements. Both have realized that in an era of rapid change and mounting uncertainty, it is imperative for them to cooperate on military affairs as part of their joint effort in global governance.

I. History and the Present

China and the United States started to engage with each other in 1972 out of the geostrategic necessity of countering the former Soviet Union—a common security threat at the time. Military cooperation was naturally one of the most important aspects of their initial relationship. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, military relations were given top priority, featuring high-level contact, functional exchanges between Chinese and U. S. counterparts, and pragmatic cooperation. In 1980, the Chinese National Defense Minister and U. S. Secretary of Defense exchanged official visits, ushering in a decade of fruitful military cooperation. The visits by high-ranking defense officials and military officers set a positive tone for

military ties. Bilateral exchanges included visits to military academies, observations of ongoing military exercises, discussions of doctrines and operational concepts, reciprocal port calls, and visits to military facilities. These contributed greatly to building trust at all levels of the two military establishments. The U. S. and China were also able to achieve considerable cooperation in the exchange of military technology. The U. S. Congress passed laws lifting restrictions on arms exports to China, giving it the same treatment as a non-NATO partner. The two sides agreed on projects of weapons procurement, technical cooperation, and technology transfers.

This positive trend came to an abrupt halt after the political turmoil in 1989 which, first and foremost, laid bare the deep-rooted differences in the two countries' ideological and political systems. The United States responded by cutting off all military exchanges, revoking its arms sales and technical cooperation agreements, and imposing technology and arms embargoes on China. Most of the military sanctions are still in place today. In 1999, the U. S. Congress passed the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000* imposing strict restrictions on military exchanges with China. Second, the collapse of the

Warsaw Pact Organization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the common threat that served as the foundation of China-U. S. military cooperation. Third, the debate regarding “Taiwan independence” further deteriorated China-U. S. military relations. The United States continued to sell weapons and upgrade its defense relations with Taiwan and strengthened its military presence around China, while China sped up its military preparation to deter “Taiwan independence” . Such interactions set the tone for future military relations and the potential for competition. In addition, the U. S. arms embargo has forced China to build an independent and comprehensive defense industry and arm its military with indigenous weaponry and equipment. The absence of military technology cooperation has somewhat hollowed out bilateral exchanges and dampened enthusiasm for building a robust relationship in that area.

The combination of the above-mentioned reasons keeps the military relationship between China and the United States to a minimum and make it difficult to bring about any substantial improvements. Recurrent crises, such as the missile launch crisis over the Taiwan Strait in 1996, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision between a Chinese

naval fighter and a U. S. spy plane in the South China Sea in 2001, and the numerous arms sales to Taiwan have all led to suspensions in China-U. S. military relations.

It was not until 2008, when both sides across the Taiwan Strait agreed to base their relation on the “1992 Consensus” and establishing the One China Policy, that we saw steady improvement in China-U. S. military relations, which have recently been declared a highlight of the whole bilateral relationship. Despite serious differences and frictions in the Taiwan Strait, the East and the South China Seas, etc., the two countries have maintained frequent, sustained, and stable military exchanges. The creation of a strategic dialogue at the national level that includes discussions on defense issues and frequent high-level visits have enhanced strategic communication and understanding. A Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) was set up in the framework of the China-U. S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S & ED). And in recent Mar-a-Lago Summit between President Xi and President Trump, a diplomatic and security dialogue was created which elevated the level of participating defense officials. Chinese and American military establishments have regular defense consultation talks (DCT) and defense policy coordination talks (DPCT).

Dialogues have multiplied and become increasingly institutionalized, including those between the Ministry of National Defense and the Department of Defense, strategic planning departments, and military services. A new dialogue between the two joint staffs will be set up soon. There are as many as 50 to 60 exchanges between the two militaries each year, covering joint military exercises and training, military education, academic research, military medicine, archival research, maritime search and rescue, port calls, disaster rescue and relief, and anti-piracy operations. The scope of military exchanges continues to grow. Realizing that conflict prevention serves the interests of both sides, they have cooperated to build crisis management mechanisms. Two MOUs, one on the Notification Mechanism for Major Military Activities and another on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters were signed at the end of 2014. New appendixes have been added to expand the coverage of confidence-building measures. In addition, the Chinese and U. S. militaries have worked closely together within the framework of ADMM-Plus, a UN-mandated escort missions in the Gulf of Aden, as well as on a transport mission of Syrian chemical weapons. These missions indicate that China-U. S.

military relations have moved beyond their frictional bilateral dimensions and found increased opportunities for potential cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and around the world.

II. Strategies, Tasks, Capacity Building, and the U. S. Factor

1. China's National Strategy, National Security Strategy, and Military Strategy

National strategy: Since 1978, China's national strategy has been clear and consistent: adhere to the idea of peaceful development in addition to its reform and opening-up policy, and realize the "two centenary goals" and the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". The essence of this strategy is to secure a peaceful environment for China's development and to maintain and promote world peace through its development.

National security strategy: China's national security strategy covers both internal and external security, homeland and public security, and traditional and non-traditional security to ensure its survival and security for its continued development, and common security. This requires diverse and comprehensive measures to

ensure China's security. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is an important instrument in forging stable domestic and international environments, in upholding peace and development, and in safeguarding national security.

Military strategy: China's military strategy serves its national strategy and national security strategy. China follows the strategic military guideline of active defense, as well as the principles of defense, self-defense, and retaliation as opposed to pre-emptive strike. China attempts to strike a balance between securing the nation's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and maintaining security and stability in China's peripheral regions. It aims to promote peace by mitigating crises and creating a stable environment. China's military strategy seeks to prevent crisis escalation through deterrence and crisis control. Should a military confrontation erupt, China's military strategy will consist of taking resolute actions to achieve victory. To this end, the Chinese PLA is tasked with preparing to win in an "informationized local war", which mainly aims at the scenario of "Taiwan independence" and other security challenges arising from China's maritime territorial interests. Indeed, in 2005 China's 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law which authorizes the PLA to use

non-peaceful means to stop Taiwan from gaining independence.

2. The PLA's Tasks

The Chinese PLA has been given the following tasks: maintain national sovereignty, security, unification, and territorial integrity; address military threats and emergencies; safeguard the political system and the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) stipulated in the Constitution; promote social stability and sustained economic development; and contribute to world peace. The Chinese military is also tasked with carrying out military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as counter-terrorism, social stability maintenance, disaster rescue and relief, upholding rights and interests, internal security and vigilance, international peacekeeping, and international assistance.

3. China's Military Capacity Building

As required by its military strategy, China takes priority in developing operational capability to thwart attempts of “Taiwan independence” and safeguard territorial integrity and unification; improving its air and sea capability against infringement upon China's territorial sovereignty and maritime interests; increasing its denial capability for deterring and offsetting military

interventions of foreign powers; augmenting its offensive and defensive capabilities in emerging strategic domains consistent with the future shape of war, maintaining retaliatory nuclear capability in order to deter any nuclear attacks against China, and diversifying its capability for maintaining political security and social stability. Given the tasks of upholding national development interests, safeguarding Chinese citizens, providing international public goods, and fulfilling international security obligations, the PLA should also be capable of carrying out such overseas operations as cross-border counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime escort and evacuation of Chinese nationals, and developing relevant capabilities for long-range force projection and sustainment.

To develop such capabilities, China will (1) promote civil-military integration, realizing the goal of building a strong army and achieving such integration in major infrastructure, maritime, aerospace, information, and other key sectors; (2) enhance combat training according to the criteria of real combat and be ready for all types of emergencies; and (3) step up international cooperation, hold dialogues and exchanges with defense and military establishments around the world, conduct joint exercises,

and improve its capacity for joint operations in the international environment.

4. The U. S. Factor in Chinese Military Strategy and Defense Planning

As a country that dominates Asia-Pacific security affairs and possesses the strongest military in the world, the United States has a huge impact on China's security. The fact that the United States maintains and may even elevate its defense ties and arms sales with Taiwan constitutes a major external factor China has to consider in addressing the Taiwan issue. In its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration reinforced its alliance system, increased military presence, conducted enduring, extensive, and frequent close-in aerial and maritime surveillance against China, and built an East Asian missile defense system which undermines China's strategic deterrent capability. As a result, China's security environment has worsened. The United States takes the opposite side of China in its territorial disputes, which complicates China's efforts to uphold its territorial integrity and sovereign rights and interests. China's military strategy and defense calculus have to take into account the multiple security

challenges America poses to China. Although the policy catch phrase “rebalance” or “pivot” may not survive the Obama administration, the new presidency is expected to keep most of the military components inherited from previous administrations in its Asia-Pacific policy. And the Chinese military has to hedge against this potential rivalry by getting ready to fight and win.

China and the United States, however, are not enemies and their military relations are far cry from the Soviet-U. S. relations during the Cold War. China and the United States have conflicting interests and, more importantly, overlapping interests. China recognizes that an arms race and military confrontation with the United States does not serve China’s peaceful development strategy, and is not conducive to a favorable environment for China or for the general trend of peace and development in the world.

III. U. S. Strategic Intention and Defense Building Regarding China: the Chinese Perspective

1. China as a Military Challenge in U. S. Strategies

Since the end of the Cold War, consecutive U. S.

administrations have considered China a military challenge with differing opinions on the severity of the “China threat” depending on the context. During his meeting with President Xi in Sunnylands, California in 2013, President Obama appreciated the Chinese proposal on building “a new model of major country relations”. At the same time, however, concerned about China’s military growth, the Pentagon blamed China for a “lack of transparency surrounding its growing military capabilities and strategic decision-making … [which] has also increased concerns in the region about China’s intentions”^①.

Since 2015, the United States has made increasingly stern assessments on the “China threat”. In its *National Security Strategy* released in February 2015, the United States viewed China’s disputes with its neighbors in the East and the South China Seas as a security threat. In the *National Military Strategy* made public in June 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replaced “to disrupt, degrade, and defeat VEOs (violent extremist organizations)” with “to deter, deny, and defeat state

① Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* 2013, May 2013, p. 16, available at: <http://www.defense.gov>

adversaries” as its primary strategic objective. State actors listed in this document included Russia, Iran, the DPRK, and China. *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* and *DoD Cyber Strategy* issued in the same year, as well as testimonies by senior officers in Congress, also made stern reference to the “China threat” . China ranked second in five evolving strategic challenges in the remarks made by Secretary Carter while previewing the *FY 2017 Defense Budget* in February 2016 and in the first *Defense Posture Statement* released the following month.

Compared with other fields, the U. S. perceives China more as a rival than a partner in the military aspect. Military hedging against each other has made interaction between the two militaries inherently confrontational.

2. War Preparation Against China in U. S. Defense Planning, Doctrine Development, Force Deployment, and Equipment R&D

Recent trends in U. S. military planning, doctrine development, force deployment, and equipment R&D also indicate that it considers China as a military rival.

Operational concepts: The U. S. military put forward the

concept of Air Sea Battle in 2009 to counter China's anti-access and area-denial capability (A2/D2). In 2015, it was renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. Although the U. S. military repeatedly claims that these concepts do not target China, the anti-access/area denial capability has long been a special term for the U. S. military to describe China's military capability and operational tactics. The 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance* clearly identified China as its adversary in anti-access operations.

Research on disruptive technologies guided by the “Third Offset”: In 2014, the Pentagon proposed a strategy named the “Third Offset”. Although the United States never officially said that this strategy specifically targets China, an article on the website of the National Interest made clear that “almost certainly it is intended to deal with the growing A2/AD challenge posed by China”^①. Chinese defense analysts generally believe this strategy undoubtedly has China in mind.

Force deployment in the Asia-Pacific: Despite its global

^① Richard A. Bitzinger, *Why China Should Fear the U. S. Military's Third Offset Strategy*, in *The National Interest*, August 28, 2016. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-china-should-fear-the-us-militarys-third-offset-strategy-17505>.

retrenchment, the Pentagon plans to deploy 60% of its naval vessels and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. By 2015, the United States deployed 154,300 military personnel in the Asia-Pacific, accounting for 65% of the military's total 235,000 overseas personnel. Some new weapon systems have also been assigned to the Asia-Pacific Theater. In September 2016, Secretary Carter announced that the Pentagon had entered the third phase of the rebalance. Among the capabilities to be fielded to the Asia Pacific are F – 35 and F – 22 fighters, P – 8A maritime surveillance aircraft, upgraded Virginia-class submarines, new-generation strategic bombers, undersea drones, and space and cyber capabilities. China can sense the increasing military pressure from these moves in its peripheral region.

Military activities against China: The U. S. military holds a dozen of large-scale routine exercises in the Western Pacific every year, carries out highly frequent close-in aerial and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance against China, and conducts Freedom of Navigation operations that directly challenge China's sovereignty in the South China Sea. It is a common understanding among Chinese military analysts that U. S. anxiety over China's military modernization and its responsive actions in the region are

transforming the disputes between China and its neighbors over sovereign rights into a geo-strategic competition between China and the United States.

Research projects on China-U. S. military conflicts: Since 2015, think tanks closely associated with the Pentagon, such as the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Center for a New American Security have published a series of reports assessing China-U. S. military conflicts^①. These reports set up scenarios of China-U. S. armed conflicts, conducted a quantitative analysis on Chinese and

① Such reports include but are not limited to: Eric Heginbotham etc. , *The U. S-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017*, RAND Corporation, 2015, available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html; Jeffrey G. Engstrom and Michael S. Chase, *China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)*, RAND Corporation, 2015, available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html, 2015; Mark Gunzinger, Bryan Clark, *Sustaining America's Precision Strike Advantage*, CSBA, 2015, available at: <http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2010.09.14-Sustaining-Americas-Strategic-Advantage-in-Long-Range-Strike.pdf>; Kelley Sayler, *Red Alert: The Growing Threat to U. S. Aircraft Carriers*, CNAS, 2016, available at: <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/red-alert-the-growing-threat-to-u-s-aircraft-carriers>; David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, *War With China: Thinking through the Unthinkable*, RAND Corporation, 2016, available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140_synopsis.pdf etc. .

American force capabilities and conflict outcomes, and put forward proposals.

3. A Hedging Network of Allies and Partners Against China

The U. S. intends to contain China by strengthening its alliances and expanding its defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

In light of this strategy, the United States is (1) shifting bilateral alliances toward trilateral and multilateral mechanisms. In recent years, aside from developing 5 bilateral alliances and several partnerships in parallel in the Asia-Pacific, the United States is also promoting trilateral and multilateral military cooperation mechanisms among its allies and partners. These moves gave China a strong sense of being excluded; (2) intervening in China's territorial disputes with its allies. After the situation grew tense over the Diaoyu Islands and the Huangyan Island, the United States confirmed the application of the U. S. - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to the Diaoyu Islands, blamed China for breaking international law for its claims over the dotted line in the South China Sea, and continued to point a finger at China's response after the Philippines

unilaterally initiated arbitration proceedings against China. The Trump administration also criticized China for militarizing the South China Sea; and (3) developing defense relationships against China. In forging defense relationships with countries around China, “hedging China” seems to be a more important consideration than the traditional calculus of values, political systems, and human rights. For example, the United States views India and Vietnam, both of which have territorial disputes with China, as its defense partners, while Malaysia and Indonesia, which may provide support to future U. S. military presence and operations, as a new focus to expand military cooperation. Finally, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, which have close ties with China, are perceived by the United States as potentially new defense partners.

IV. Military Issues Between China and the United States and Prospects for Cooperation

Chinese concerns are concentrated in its peripheral regions, while U. S. concerns in the Asia-Pacific are just part of its global security concerns. Given this asymmetry, whenever they have a

dispute in the military field, China protests that the United States is “an external interventionist force”, while the United States accuses China of “disrupting the international order” .

1. Military Concerns and Prospect for Cooperation in East Asia

U. S. military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific: This military alliance system has negatively impacted China in two ways: (1) it takes on an increasingly hedging and deterring posture against China, squeezing the space for positive military interaction between China and the United States; (2) it exclusively pursues the security interests of the United States and its allies at the expense of those of China and other states. Reducing intensified antagonism between China and the U. S. military alliance system and establishing a regional security architecture that accommodates the security interests of China, America, and other regional players serves the interests of both countries.

The Korean Peninsula: China and the United States view the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a common objective. However, as this crisis has worsened, the United States has

placed more emphasis on military deterrence and coercion. It intensifies strategic deployment, contingency planning, and large-scale exercises within the framework of the U. S. -ROK alliance to prepare for a military solution to the nuclear crisis. However, such moves have heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and exerted a negative impact on China's security. Given the tense military situation on the peninsula, it is imperative for China and the United States to step up cooperation in crisis management.

The THAAD system deployment: Technologically speaking, the THAAD system can't effectively protect the ROK from the DPRK's ballistic missile threats. However, the THAAD system will be able to upgrade U. S. capability for detecting launches of China's ballistic missiles, tracking, identifying, and intercepting them, thus undermining China's nuclear deterrence and damaging the strategic stability between China and the United States. As both the deployment of THAAD and the political transition of the ROK are underway, the two sides still have opportunities to seek better solutions through continued and patient dialogue.

Taiwan: Taiwan is China's core national interest and China is determined to resort to using force to defend it if necessary.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017 requests an elevation of military relations with Taiwan and suggests adequate arms sale to Taiwan. As President-elect, Donald Trump had an unprecedented phone conversation with the Taiwan leader and stated the One China policy should be negotiated. Words and deeds that break away from long-held principles and acknowledged consensus—namely the One China policy—will revive tensions and could even trigger a crisis across the Taiwan Strait. It is not only in the interest of China and the United States, but also in the interest of the region and the world at large to prevent a military conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, China and the United States share the need to maintain extensive communication, avoid misunderstanding and surprises, and stick to existing consensus and policies.

The East and South China Seas: The United States has adopted a series of military deterrence measures against China and overreacted to China's efforts to uphold its sovereignty and its construction activities on the South China Sea land features. These measures are not conducive to creating an environment for dispute resolution, and have increased the chances of encounters and friction between the two military forces on the frontline.

China and the United States share a common interest in preventing such frictions from escalating into a military conflict. Reducing maritime tensions also serves the long-term interest of both countries.

2. Emerging Strategic Domains

Maritime security: China and the United States are entering into a limited competition in maritime affairs within the first island chain. However, the competition is restrained and controlled by their respective national and military strategies, defense capabilities, and crisis management measures. It serves the interests of both countries to work together in ensuring secure sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific and around the world.

Nuclear strategy and nuclear security: Statements by President Trump on nuclear arms race and expansion of nuclear capability during his campaign have raised China's concern over strategic stability. The Trump administration is conducting a nuclear posture review, and the resulting policy change would have significant impact on China's nuclear calculus and posture. Any military conflict between China and the United States will

bear the risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. As competition in outer space, cyberspace and electromagnetic space becomes increasingly fierce, the command and control systems of Chinese and U. S. strategic forces will have to bear mounting pressure in crisis and conflict. Hypersonic weapon research and usage, as well as diverse utilities of ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, have brought new challenges for both sides to control nuclear escalation. Therefore, maintaining a strategic stability between them is of paramount significance. In addition, both countries share extensive interests and an international obligation in maintaining a global non-proliferation regime, promoting nuclear security, and deterring nuclear war. It is imperative for them to cooperate in these fields.

Cyberspace security: The U. S. enjoys a large military advantage in cyberspace by formulating a cyberspace operational doctrine, setting up a combatant command for cyber operations and building cyber warfare units. The Chinese military needs to develop its own operational cyberspace capability, as well, in order keep up with recent trends in the military technological revolution and prevail in an informationized local war. China,

however, does not seek an arms race or confrontation with the United States in cyberspace. The United States is consistently critical of China's measures in safeguarding cybersecurity and hypes China up as a cyber threat. As cyberspace is an emerging strategic domain, no sound and feasible rules and norms have yet been set up to regulate cyberspace behavior, either in bilateral or multilateral frameworks. China and the United States have both shared and conflicting cyberspace interests, leading not only to ample opportunities for dialogue and cooperation, but also to conflict.

Outer space: The United States enjoys a tremendous advantage in outer space capabilities, which it intends to maintain. It has rejected a draft *Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects* by China and Russia. However, the United States has become more concerned as China has rapidly built up its space capability. The necessity for China and the United States to engage with each other is ever increasing in order to formulate rules of behavior for regulating their interactions in outer space, especially as both countries continue to expand their military capacity.

3. MOOTW and Counter-Terrorism

In light of their governments' foreign policies, the two militaries provide public goods to the international community through the MOOTW, such as disaster rescue, humanitarian aid, and non-combatant evacuation operation. The Chinese and U. S. militaries can and need to work together in global governance and for the protection of their overseas interests.

The Trump administration's strategic focus on counter-terrorism seems to match China's growing willingness to fight terrorism. As the Chinese military becomes more capable and experienced in counter-terrorism operations, and as the international counter-terrorism mechanisms flourish, there will be growing space for the two militaries to work together in this field.

V. Recommendations on Building Positive and Stable China-U. S. Military Relations

In the critical period of government transition of both countries, a stable military relationship between China and the United States helps to ensure positive bilateral interactions. The

Mar-a-Lago summit in April has set up a constructive tone for promoting the China-U. S. relationship and both presidents once again committed themselves to the improvement of the military relations.

1. Formulating Guidelines for Military Relations

The two militaries have already established some basic principles to guide the development of a new model of military relations, including mutual trust, cooperation, no conflict, and sustainability. Both governments need to reiterate and confirm these core principles once again, making mutual trust in military and security aspect the foundation for strategic trust. It should be realized that at present and for a fairly long time to come, bilaterally and in the Western Pacific in particular, the two militaries should focus on managing and controlling differences and crises so as to avoid falling into a Cold War-style military confrontation or geostrategic competition. Multilaterally and globally, the two sides should give priority to coordination and collaboration and make a joint effort to deal with common security challenges and provide security public goods to the international community.

2. Strengthening Military and Security Dialogues

The present report suggests the following steps for strengthening military and security dialogues between China and the United States:

— Improve the quality of existing dialogue mechanisms and emphasize substance over formality so that the two sides are able to frankly and clearly state their strategic intentions and gradually increase military capability transparency. The U. S. side should strive for a relaxation by Congress of restrictions on military exchanges with China.

— Counterpart dialogues should be increased in a step-by-step manner, such as between defense departments, affiliated institutions, theatre commands, services, defense think tanks and military educational institutions. The Diplomatic and Security Dialogue opened at the Mar-a-Lago Summit and the Joint Staffs' Dialogue should be used as platforms for high-level exchanges and strategic trust building.

— Develop a strategic stability dialogue covering sensitive topics such as nuclear policy and strategy, missile defense system, and military security in cyber and outer space.

— Conduct bilateral dialogues on the sideline of multilateral dialogues and forums.

3. Upgrading Crisis Management

The two militaries must place crisis management at the center of their effort to stabilize China-U. S. military relations and avoid military conflicts. Measures may be taken in two aspects: crisis prevention and crisis control:

— The military leadership in both countries should reach a consensus on the crisis management principles, including maintaining at all times direct communication channels, sending clear signals, avoiding commitment traps, and exercising escalation control and proportionate response.

— Crisis management should become an important topic in security and military dialogues at all levels.

— Communication mechanisms for crisis management should be further improved. The MOD-DOD direct telephone line should be given a clear function of crisis management, with simplified and convenient procedure. The two sides should consider establishing hotlines between their navies, air forces, and relevant theater commands at appropriate times so that emergency

contact mechanisms are established at different levels of hierarchy.

— Implement the two MOUs, one on the Notification Mechanism for Major Military Activities and another on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters signed between the two militaries with regular reviews, timely expansion of contents and increased binding force.

— Conduct track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues through think tanks to explore crisis scenarios and management measures by tabletop exercises and scenario development discussions.

4. Expanding Military and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region and Globally

China-U. S. military relations have long extended beyond bilateral scope into Asia Pacific or even global security affairs. The two sides need to get out of the shackles of bilateral frictions and seek cooperation in multilateral platforms

— Strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism, nuclear security, WMD non-proliferation, peacekeeping, maritime search and rescue, humanitarian aid, counter transnational crimes, etc.

— Increase cooperation to safeguard global freedom of navigation and defend the safety of SLOCs.

— Make a change to negative interactions and increase positive elements in their relations through cooperation for maintaining current and establishing new international rules in global strategic domains, such as cyberspace, outer space, and nuclear weapon affairs.

5. Changing the Zero-Sum Nature between China and the U. S. Led Military Alliances

To mitigate antagonism between China and U. S. bilateral military alliances in East Asia:

— China needs to recognize that the U. S. alliance system is both a result of its history and an inherent characteristic of the current world order—one that China should be prepared to accept and work with for a long time. The United States needs to facilitate the transformation of its alliances and decrease its exclusivity and overreliance on military means.

— Efforts should be made to explore dialogue mechanisms between China and U. S. alliances in the Asia Pacific. The newly opened bilateral Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (2 + 2

mechanism) may invite a U. S. ally to a 2 + 2 + 2 mechanism for high-level consultation.

— The U. S. government may consider including major policy readjustments, force deployment changes and military exercises with allies into the existing Notification Mechanism for Major Military Activities. And the Chinese government may consider including its joint military activities with partners into the same mechanism.

— The United States may invite China to attend or observe its joint military exercises with allies, while China may invite the United States to attend or observe its joint military exercises with other countries.

— The two countries should jointly support regional multilateral mechanisms, such as the ARF, ADMM-plus, East Asia Summit, Six-Party Talks, and APEC, while promoting an Asia-Pacific security mechanism in which both China and the United States may play major roles.

6. Reaching an Agreement on Avoiding Security Dilemmas

— Such topics as the future regional and global security order, respective security interests and objectives, respective

roles in Asia-Pacific security affairs, international laws and norms, etc. should be included in the dialogue between top leaders of the two military establishments, in order to help build an understanding and reach a consensus at the strategic level.

— The two sides should reach a tacit understanding on military power balance between them. In terms of strategic deterrence capability, an asymmetric but effective mutual deterrence should be kept, in which China does not seek nuclear parity with the United States while the United States does not seek to neutralize China's nuclear deterrent. In terms of conventional forces, China does not seek equality of military capabilities with the United States globally and in the Asia-Pacific, but China will develop and maintain a military force capable of effectively safeguarding national sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, territorial integrity, and development interest. On the other hand, the United States should, while pursuing continued military superiority globally and in the Asia-Pacific, adopt an accommodating attitude toward the development and constructive role of the Chinese military force.

— A common understanding should be reached on security hotspot issues in East Asia. In the South China Sea, reducing

tensions and avoiding militarization should be a shared objective. To this end, China should persist in resolving territorial disputes by peaceful means, and promoting progress in its “Dual-Track” approach (seeking solutions to territorial disputes through bilateral negotiations and maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries). The United States should stop its freedom of navigation operations, downgrade its military reconnaissance against China, and refrain from expanding military basing in and around the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, the two sides should avoid being drawn into conflict or confrontation by third-party factors. The Chinese side should seek to build crisis management mechanisms with Japan. The U. S. side should deter Japan from taking provocative actions. With regards to the Korean Peninsula, the two sides should conduct dialogues on preventing military conflict and on nuclear security in case of contingency, or set in advance the conditions for and modality of emergency dialogues. With regards to the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese side will insist on the basic principle of “ peaceful reunification and one country, two systems ” . The U. S. side should adhere to its One China policy, which entails not supporting Taiwan independence. This way,

China and the United States can jointly safeguard peace and development across the Taiwan Strait.

Since the Trump administration came into office, and given the forthcoming Chinese Communist Party 19th National Congress late 2017, China-U. S. military relations face new opportunities and challenges. With the great success at the Mar-a-Lago Summit, the overall bilateral relation and the military relation in particular, have entered a new phase. Building on the current positive momentum and furthering our effort in developing a healthy and stable military relation between China and the United States will be conducive not only to the overall bilateral relationship, but also to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

中美关系中的政治因素

倪 峰 樊吉社 刁大明

一 历史与现实

政治制度和意识形态问题上的分歧是中美关系发展演变中的制约因素，是中美关系中长期存在的结构性矛盾之一。自 1949 年以来，在中美关系发展的不同时期，政治制度和意识形态分歧都深刻影响着中美关系的状态。

冷战初期，中国选择“一边倒”向以苏联为首的社会主义阵营。在中苏分裂后，采取了同时反对美苏两霸的战略姿态。美国对中国进行政治孤立、经济制裁和军事围堵。在中美对抗的 20 多年中，意识形态对抗是最重要的内容之一。20 世纪 70 年代，随着苏联逐步扩张，中美曾经因为面临共同威胁而超越政治制度和意识形态分歧，走向共同应对苏联威胁的战略合作。

冷战结束前后，中美政治制度差异和意识形态分歧再度凸显，美国对中国内政的干涉不断冲击中美关系的健康发展。在中美关系最糟糕的时期，邓小平曾经明确表示：“中国威胁不了美国，美国不应该把中国当作威胁自己的对手。中美不能打架，我说的打架不是打仗，而是笔头上和口头上打架，不要提倡这些。”“我多次讲过，美国的制度中国不能搬，美国制度究竟好不好，美国人自己说，我们不干预。两国相处，要彼此尊重对方，尽可能照顾对方，这样来解决纠葛。只照顾一方是不行的。双方都让点步，总能找到好的都可以接受的办法。”

冷战结束后，中国贯彻了邓小平关于处理中美分歧的上述原则。美方则看到了双方之间越来越大的共同经济利益和战略合作机遇，没有将意识形态分歧置于双边关系的首位。但中美在“人权”和“民主化”等政治问题上的分歧，仍然时刻影响着双边关系的稳定和发展。克林顿担任总统后，美国曾经企图将中国人权问题与最惠国贸易待遇挂钩，一度冲击双边关系。此后，虽然美国将两者脱钩，但在诸如宗教自由、持不同政见者、西藏、新疆、香港等中国内政问题上仍然攻击中国政府，一些美国机构继续在中国进行政治和思想渗透，影响中国的社会稳定。

在中国人看来，美国在过去几十年中始终存在用自己的

价值观改造世界的冲动，试图通过各种方式改变其眼中的“非民主国家”的社会政治制度。在冷战时期，对社会主义国家进行“和平演变”是美国的阳谋。冷战结束后，美国除了进行较为频繁的所谓“人道主义干涉”之外，还积极支持、推动东欧和中亚国家的“颜色革命”，支持“阿拉伯之春”，在伊拉克、叙利亚、利比亚、阿富汗等国搞“民主试验”。此外，“民主和平论”“历史终结论”“第三波民主化浪潮”在美国学者中有很影响，这些学说认定各国政治制度的发展趋势应遵循西方民主原则，否则就是站在“历史的错误一边”，同美国发生冲突。

介入中国内政以改变中国的政治走向，始终是美国对华政策目标之一，在这方面有非常多的案例。多数中国人认为，美国对中国内政的介入存在明确的指向性，其根本目的是动摇中国共产党在中国的领导地位，改变中国基本制度和主流意识形态。实际上，在美国官员讲话和专家学者的研究成果中，也常常看到美国对中国政治制度和意识形态的批评和疑虑。美国积极推动并且协助中国“融入国际社会”，中国经济和社会发展也从现存国际体系中受益颇多。但美国推动中国融入国际社会的基本逻辑和假设，似乎是期待中国在此进程中出现“政治民主化”、思想舆论自由化，以及经济上的资本主义市场化。当美国看到，自己

所期待的中国内部变化没有出现，反而看到一个坚定地走向与其期待相反的道路时，美国的抵触、怀疑、防范心理就与日俱增，认为中国的迅速崛起可能对美国构成政治制度、地缘战略、经济规则等多方面挑战。冷战结束后20多年来在美国出现过不同形式的“中国威胁论”，究其思想根源，都可以追溯到对中国现行政治制度、意识形态、发展道路的反感、忧虑和恐惧。

相比而言，中国在涉及美国内政问题上异常谨慎。美国在政治问题上偏好“己所欲，施于人”，而中国奉行的政治哲学根植于传统文化，即“己所不欲，勿施于人”。中国国内政治治理的实践不但从未企图损害美国利益，而且在美国所关切的具体问题（例如某些人权个案和最近通过的《境外非政府组织管理法》的讨论和执行方面）上倾听美方意见并予以妥善回应。各国的政治制度是该国人民根据自身国情选择的结果，中国从来没有也不打算介入美国内政事务。

2013年6月，习近平主席同奥巴马总统在安纳伯格庄园会晤，双方达成共同努力构建“中美新型大国关系”的重要共识。“中美新型大国关系”的基本特点包括三个层面：一是不冲突、不对抗；二是相互尊重；三是合作共赢。其中，相互尊重就包括要尊重各自选择的社会制度和发展

道路，尊重彼此核心利益和重大关切，求同存异，包容互鉴，共同进步。在中国看来，中国宪法确立的国家政治制度和社会大局稳定是中国的核心利益，这与中国早在20世纪50年代提出的互不干涉内政、和平共处一脉相承。对于中国政府关于“相互尊重”的倡议和解释，美方一直含糊其辞。这一态度给中国人造成的强烈印象是，美国在需要中国配合的国际领域积极寻求支持，却在中国最关切的核心问题上避免表态和承诺，不愿意尊重中国共产党及其领导下的国家所取得的进步和成就，这难免加深中国人对美国战略意图和道德标准的怀疑。

中美在政治上的互疑影响了两国合作共赢的深度与广度，同时也在某种程度上对中美关系中的其他分歧具有放大作用。如果中美在政治上相互尊重的问题上无法达成基本共识，中美在诸多领域方面的合作仍将继续受到影响和限制。

回顾中美关系过去几十年的发展可以注意到，虽然中美两国在政治制度和意识形态上的分歧一直没有得到解决，但这远非中美关系的主要部分。自中美关系实现突破以来，中美在双边、地区以及全球事务上享有越来越多的共同利益，并进行了广泛的合作；中美共同利益的内涵和外延都在拓展，中美合作的广度和深度也在拓展。这些共同利益

与合作有助于中美两国有效排除政治因素干扰，促进两国关系稳步发展。

面对在中美关系中时隐时现的政治因素，中国的基本立场是全力排除干扰、强调共同利益；美方一方面始终不放弃政治议题，一方面也追求共同的利益与合作。在冷战结束之后，美国国内政治因素持续介入中美关系，促使中美关系中的政治分歧愈发显性化。长期以来，人权、台湾、西藏、宗教自由、新闻自由、司法独立、持不同政见者等政治议题持续存在，但由于中美共享的利益合作点，这些政治议题仍处于相对可控的状况。

二 中国的立场和关切

“社会主义制度是中华人民共和国的根本制度”，“人民行使国家权力的机关是全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会”，“中华人民共和国的国家机构实行民主集中制的原则”，这是中国宪法确立的基本政治制度。

实行改革开放三十多年来，中国经济社会发展取得长足进步，在世界上人口最多的国家初步实现了工业化与城镇化，正朝着全面实现小康、达到中等发达国家发展水平的目标迈进。与此同时，中国在提高国家与社会治理水平，

推进民主法治建设、改善人权，促进民族平等团结等政治领域也取得了显著的进步。

在中国的政治、经济和社会进步过程中，中国共产党的领导是凝聚国家力量、保持社会团结、实现战略性发展的制度基石，是中国稳定与发展的根本保障，是中国道路的基本特征。中国共产党将领导中国持续实行改革开放政策，改革不适应发展的经济政治社会体制；对外开放是中国将长期实行的基本国策。中国正在全面、继续深化各个领域的改革，进一步对世界开放。反腐倡廉是现阶段中国政治建设的主要内容，是为了保证中国社会的公正和平等，因而得到了全社会的积极响应，得到了人民群众的广泛支持。加强反腐倡廉的核心任务是制约和监督权力的运行，确保国家机关按照法定权限和程序行使权力。

2004年3月，第十届全国人民代表大会第二次会议通过《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》，将“国家尊重和保障人权”明确写入宪法。在《宪法》第二章“公民基本权利和义务”中，对公民享有的政治、人身、宗教信仰、经济、文化和社会等各项权利和自由作了详尽规定。中国政府不仅从法律上保障公民的各项权利和自由，还在国家治理实践中确保公民的各项权利和自由不受侵犯。当然，任何公民在行使自由和权利的时候，不得损害国家的、社会的、

集体的利益和其他公民的合法的自由和权利。

中国国力增强，中国在道路、理论、制度和文化意义上日益自信，不断继续完善国内治理体系和实践。这包括：完善立法工作机制和程序，扩大公众有序参与，充分听取各方面意见，使法律准确反映经济社会发展要求，更好地协调利益关系，发挥立法的引领和推动作用；健全司法权力运行机制，确保依法独立公正地行使审判权、检察权，加强和规范对司法活动的法律监督和社会监督；通过反腐败行动强化权力运行制约和监督体系，坚持用制度管权、管事、管人，保障人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权，确保决策权、执行权、监督权既相互制约又相互协调，确保国家机关按照法定权限和程序行使权力；完善人权司法保障制度，保障全体公民享有广泛的权利，保障公民的人身权、财产权、基本政治权利等各项权利不受侵犯，保证公民的经济、文化、社会等各方面权利得到落实，努力维护最广大人民的根本利益等。

中国已经成为世界第二大经济体，中国在发展中维持了国内政治稳定，中国的道路是正确的和符合中国国情的，美国期待的中国政治体制演变并没有成为现实。与此同时，美国受两场反恐战争和金融危机影响，相对实力有所下降，对于能否继续维持其全球霸主国地位和世界事务的主导地

位自信心有所下降，对中国崛起可能构成的挑战较为担忧。这是否会导致两国在排除政治干扰方面的能力下降？政治因素是否对中美关系的健康发展构成新的挑战？美方对中国崛起的认知和判断日益成为影响两国关系的重要问题，也是影响两国战略互信的重要问题。

在中美关系中，美国始终不愿放弃政治议题，在人权、涉台、涉藏、涉疆、宗教自由、新闻自由、司法独立、异见分子等政治议题上持续指责中国。尽管多年来美方提出的长长的人权个案单子不断缩小和更换，尽管事实证明中国在保护人权上不断取得可见的巨大进步，但美方总试图挖掘新话题，表达对中国国内政策的疑虑和对中国外交行为的担忧。例如最近开始对中国完善国内治理的政策和立法提出怀疑或者指责。例如《反分裂国家法》《国家安全法》《境外非政府组织管理法》《网络安全法》等，美方认为这是对所谓“公民自由”的威胁，从而抨击中国政治体制。美国一度抵制中国倡议成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行，企图阻止其盟友参加。一些美国人认为中国提出的“一带一路”倡议是输出中国模式，用“中国梦”对抗“美国梦”等。中国政府提出全面从严治党、打击腐败，一些美国人则认为中国国内“排除异己的政治斗争”，并且在反腐问题上迟迟不愿意与中国展开合作。对于中国在国内打击恐

怖主义的行动，美国设定双重标准，等等。中国同样怀疑美国在香港所谓“雨伞革命”中是一只“看不见的手”，幕后予以煽动支持；美国驻华官方机构包庇个别异见分子，做出有损中国政治形象的行为，等等。

中国民众对美国的认知已经开始出现一些变化。2016年10月皮尤发布的一份调查报告表明，只有三成（29%）的中国公众相信美国愿意接受中国的崛起，有一半（52%）的民众则认为美国正试图阻止中国成为能与之抗衡的大国。此外，有约一半（45%）公众表示，美国是中国最大的国际威胁，持这个观点的民众同2013年相比，增加了6个百分点；对美国持负面看法的公众也占44%。

近年中美在双边和地区问题上的一些分歧和摩擦逐渐表面化，美国一些重要官员的讲话甚至隐含了类似与中国开展冷战的内容。在美国重返亚太的背景下，中方担心台湾问题再度困扰中美关系的良性发展。在过去十几年中，由于中美两国妥善处理台海问题，两岸关系得到了发展，保持了稳定状态。随着2016年岛内政党轮替，过去一贯主张“台独”的民进党当选，美国政府未来能否恪守中美三个联合公报确立的政治立场，能否坚持一个中国原则、不支持台湾“独立”，不仅事关两岸关系的发展趋势，也将影响中美关系的未来。

另一方面，美国的国内政治发展变化也使许多中国人感到困惑和担忧。由于美国国内贫富分化、族群对立严重，政治极化日益突出，反全球化呼声强烈，排外情绪上升，民粹主义发酵。在这一背景下，某些政治人物和利益群体诱过于外，将中国视为在国家发展模式与国际地位方面对美国的双重威胁，描绘为抢夺美国工作机会和利益的“汇率操纵国”。2016年5月的另一份皮尤调查报告表明，有近1/4的调查对象视中国为美国的对手。在中国方面，主流媒体和社交媒体纷纷报道2016年美国大选中的乱象、政客相互攻讦、媒体报道失实、智库预测失灵等，中国人普遍感到，美国现行的政治模式也存在自身的弱点和问题。

三 关于未来的思考

中美之间的政治分歧是深刻的，但是同时也是可以管理的，这是过去中美关系发展的基本经验。在中美关系新的背景下，如何管理日益凸显的政治分歧是关心中美关系的智库学者需要探讨的重要课题。

第一，如何认识当前的政治分歧：相似的问题，不同的解决方案。

在后金融危机的背景下，世界上许多国家面临的国内政

治问题是有相似性的，即经济全球化带来的弊端开始持续发酵，社会分化严重、贫富差距加大、精英对民众的回应性下降等社会不公正现象导致社会各种焦虑情绪蔓延。中美两国曾被视为在全球化进程获益最多的两个国家，但也遭遇到同样的问题，并都在探索应对之道。从目前的情况来看，中国积极回应社会关切，采取的是全面从严治党、反腐、扶贫攻坚等自上而下的方式来加以应对，而美国则付诸竞争性的政治方式，2016年大选中引人注目的种种现象和观点，实际上是美国民众对各种全球化弊端不满的宣泄。应当说，对于相似的问题，两国都在探索解决之道，不能用自己的政治思维简单地否定对方的探索。

未来，中美两国可在共同关心的政治治理议题方面展开更多的理论性探讨，议题可以涉及“国家政权在国内的善治”，“主导族裔群体与少数群体之间关系的协调机制”，“公民权利的疆界与辩证逻辑”，“民主价值的普遍性与个体差异性”，“网络时代的信息管理和公民自由”等中美两国共同面对的议题，从而实现两国彼此更加深入的了解与理解。

第二，如何看待中国的发展道路：坚持与完善。

自中华人民共和国成立以来，在中国共产党的领导下，中国取得了举世瞩目的成就，尤其是改革开放以来，中国正用自己特有的方式开始人类历史上规模最为宏大的现代

化进程。今天的中国不再是一个传统社会、农业社会，而是一个商业社会、工业社会，而且几乎与全球同步进入信息社会。所有这些成就表明，中国不可能放弃取得这些成就行之有效的做法。同时，中方也意识到，中国自身的政治发展仍处于一个不断完善的过程中，需要和希望了解包括美国在内的国际上其他政治制度和政治文化，以从中获得启发和教益。中国也注意到，美国对外输出所谓民主政治模式，将美国认同的政治制度强加给其他国家的做法导致了许多国家的政治乱局，这是中国坚决不能接受的，而且这种局面客观上对美国也是不利的，例如伊拉克和叙利亚的乱局导致了伊斯兰国势力的崛起，使美国和欧洲面临更为严峻的反恐形势。

中国坚持自己的发展道路，并将继续完善自己的政治制度。中国政治制度与政治现状是与目前中国发展态势相适应的。在“民主集中制”的框架下，中国政治中的“集权”与“分权”形成了二元对立的有机统一。任何强加给中国、迫使中国接受的别国模式都会“水土不服”，都无法保证中国政治、经济、社会等多层面的持续稳定与发展，甚至反而会给中国乃至世界带来无法预期的负面影响。

中美关系要想有更好的发展，美国不应期待与一个臆想的“未来”中国打交道，而应立足于现实，与现实的中国

打交道。

第三，相比政治分歧，中美应关注更重大、更紧迫的地区性和全球性议题。

经过几十年的努力，中美已经建构了某种具有战略稳定意义的双边关系，包括中美在核领域的非对称战略稳定、中美在经济领域的相互依赖、中美对一个和平稳定国际政治经济环境的依赖等。中美“合则两利，斗则俱伤”，这已经被过去几十年中美关系的发展所证实。

不仅如此，中美在诸多地区和全球性议题上的共同利益不断拓展，就此而言，地区的动荡、政治混乱、全球性传统和非传统安全威胁的蔓延，远比中美之间的政治制度和意识形态分歧更为重要。作为最大的发展中国家和最大的发达国家，这些挑战需要中美共同应对，中美两国在防止世界走向失序、完善各种有效治理等方面肩负重大责任，也有着广阔的对话和合作空间，在这方面需要两国不断的探索和挖掘。如果中美能够管控在政治制度和意识形态问题上的分歧，避免从根本上挑战对方的国内政治制度和政治稳定，中美完全能够超越“修昔底德陷阱”，构建不冲突、不对抗、相互尊重、合作共赢的新型大国关系。

2017年4月6—7日，习近平主席与美国总统特朗普在美国佛罗里达州海湖庄园举行了首次会晤。两国元首就中

美双边重要领域务实合作和共同关心的国际及地区问题广泛深入交换意见。双方愿意共同努力，扩大互利合作领域，并在相互尊重的基础上管控分歧。习主席介绍了中国的发展理念，强调中国坚定不移地走和平发展道路，不奉行“你输我赢”的理念，不走“国强必霸”的老路，愿同美方一道维护世界和平、稳定、繁荣。特朗普总统表示，美方将同中方开展合作，努力消除影响两国关系的因素和问题，使中美关系实现更大发展，中美关系一定能发展得更好。

值得一提的是，中方表达了对美方在反腐败追逃追赃方面给予更多配合的希望，美方则积极表示了对中方追逃追赃方面努力的支持。中美两国在反腐败方面的理解与合作有助于进一步降低政治分歧在两国关系中的负面影响。

Political Factors Shaping China-U. S. Relations

Ni Feng, Fan Jishe, Diao Daming

I. A Brief Historical Overview

Scholars from both China and the United States have argued that the political and ideological differences between the two countries are long-standing structural conflicts that have impacted bilateral relations to varying degrees throughout the history of relations beginning in 1949.

At the very beginning of the Cold War, China adopted a new foreign policy, pledging full support to the Socialists in the Soviet Union. This policy was consequently followed by close to thirty years of hostility between China and the United States—a strained relationship mainly characterized by ideological conflicts and

confrontation. China endured political isolation, economic sanctions, and military containment by the United States. The United States' response to the China-Soviet split in the 1960s came slowly. It wasn't until the 1970s, when confronted by the common security threat of an aggressive Soviet Union, that China and the United States began to normalize bilateral relations. The necessity of strategic cooperation in dealing with the same major security threat overshadowed, to an extent, political and ideological differences between the two nations.

Pragmatic security cooperation lasted until the end of Cold War, but after the the collapse of the Soviet Union new political factors emerged and began to define the relationship. American interference in China's domestic affairs plagued the overall state of bilateral relations. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping made the following remarks when China-U. S. relations reached its lowest point, which has since then had profound implications for both countries: "China cannot be a threat to the United States, and the United States should not consider China as a threatening rival. We have never done anything to harm the United States... China and the United States should not fight each other. I'm not talking just about a real war, but also about a war of words. We

should not encourage that. As I have said on many occasions, China cannot copy the system of the United States. It is up to the Americans to say whether their system is good or bad, and we do not interfere. When conducting bilateral relations, each side should respect the other and consider the other's interests as much as possible. That is the way to settle disputes. Nothing will be accomplished if each country considers only its own interests. But if both sides make concessions, they can reach a good settlement acceptable to both. ”

China has observed the above-mentioned principles in handling China-U. S. relations, while the United States has grasped opportunities to expand bilateral economic and strategic cooperation by engaging with China. While differences in political systems and ideologies were not the first priority in bilateral relations, political disputes over issues such as human rights, democratization, and religious freedom have exerted continuous influence on bilateral ties. When Bill Clinton took office, he tried to link China's "most favored nation" status to its human rights conditions, which negatively impacted bilateral relations. One year later, the two were again delinked, but the political disagreements have not disappeared. The U. S.

government still criticizes China for its internal affairs, such as freedom of religion, management of political dissidence, and regional issues involving Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.

In the Chinese view, over the past several decades the United States has put great effort in transforming other countries according to its own value system. From a Chinese perspective, the United States believes that any non-democratic system should adopt the values of democracy and freedom as defined by the United States. In the Cold War era, the strategy of “peaceful evolution” —a policy formulated by U. S. Secretary of State John Dulles that referred to attempts to subvert the political regimes of socialist countries through peaceful means by spreading alternative political ideas meant to incite social discontent—was an openly known American policy. The United States conducted many so-called humanitarian interventions in several countries. Additionally, it also actively supported the “color revolution” in Eastern European countries and Central Asian countries. It offered support to the Arab Spring, and the democratic experiments in countries like Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. Moreover, theories and concepts like the “democratic peace theory,” “the end of history,” and “the third

wave of democratization” were very popular among American scholars and experts, who sincerely believed that Western democratic principles should apply to all countries regardless of their political systems, labeling those that did not have a democratic political system as being on “the wrong side of history” —destined to enter conflicts with the United States and fail as a nation-building project.

At that time, changing China or making China change itself was one of the key goals of U. S. policy toward China, and interfering in China’s domestic affairs was a convenient tool to achieve such policy goals. Most Chinese people believed that the hidden agenda behind American interference was to sabotage the political leadership of the China Communist Party (CCP) and to change China’s basic political system and mainstream ideology. In fact, it is not difficult to find this kind of tendency and preference in the speeches and academic work of American officials’ and experts’.

The United States has played a significant role in China’s integration into the international community since the early 1980s, and China has benefited greatly from its relationship with the United States, as well as its interaction with other countries.

However, it seems that the United States has been acting on the false presumption that China would transform from a socialist country to a standard capitalist country during this process. After several decades, this policy has not yielded the results that the United States had hoped for, as China's Communist Party remains in power. Meanwhile, China is becoming increasingly strong and confident in the path it has chosen, much to the frustration of some American officials and scholars. As a result, there has been mounting anxiety and concern over a rising China. Some even believe that China constitutes a perfect peer competitor to the United States in terms of political system, ideology, economic model, and even military capability. Two decades after the end of Cold War, the concept of China as a threat still prevails. Many variations of this view of China as a threat can be traced back to deep-rooted U. S. concern, antipathy, and fear of China's existing political system, ideology, and economic model.

In comparison, China has taken a very prudent approach when dealing with issues involving American domestic affairs. China and the United States address political issues differently due to their different philosophical traditions. The United States prefers to 'do unto others what one wants to do,' while China

abides by the Golden Rule of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” To paraphrase what Deng Xiaoping said in late 1989, China has never done anything to harm the United States, and China does not want the United States to do anything to harm China either. China’s domestic political practices have never been intended to undermine American interests. In fact, China has been very responsive to the United States’ major concerns, such as some human rights cases and the discussion on the recently enacted 2016 PRC Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities within Mainland China. A country’s political system should be chosen by its own people and China has never and will never take interfere in the United States’ internal affairs.

In June 2013, when President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama met at the Sunnylands estate, they reached a consensus on jointly building a “new model of major power relations”. This concept has three core principles: no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. Among them, the principle of mutual respect means respecting each other’s political system and development path instead of imposing one’s own will and public policies on the other. The

national political system dictated by the Chinese Constitution and the preservation of social stability are among China's core interests. These are important preconditions that lay the foundation for China-U. S. relations to remain sound and pursue a stable development. These three principles are very much in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which were first proposed by China in the 1950s. However, the United States has reacted with ambivalence to the principle of mutual respect. This has left China with the strong impression that the United States would only actively seek China's cooperation when required and would try to avoid making any commitments over issues primarily concerning China. If the United States is reluctant to acknowledge and respect the CCP's leadership in China and the great social and economic achievements made under the CCP's leadership, China is justified in doubting the United States' strategic intent and moral standards.

China-U. S. mutual strategic distrust has deterred further cooperation, and to some extent, has intensified the two countries' divergence in other areas. If China and the United States are not able to reach a consensus over mutual respect for their respective political systems, further cooperation and

collaboration in other areas will be threatened.

Over the past several decades' development in China-U. S. bilateral relations, China and the United States have managed to work together on a number of issues despite fundamental political and ideological differences. China and the United States have broadened and deepened cooperation on bilateral, regional, and global issues in which they share common interests since achieving a breakthrough in diplomatic relations in 1979. Focusing on these common interests and working together are conducive to warding off political interference and ensuring the stable evolvement of bilateral ties.

The Cold War has long passed, but the United States' mentality during that period has persisted. Political factors have been at play in the China-U. S. relationship both visibly and invisibly, and directly and indirectly. Within this context, China has made consistent efforts not to interfere and focus on common interests. The United States, on the other hand, has been playing a double game: while it never let go of the political issues posed by ideological differences that have led to a difference in political regimes, it has also cooperated with China in the pursuit of mutual benefits. It is important to remember that political and

ideological differences have never outweighed pragmatic cooperation and collaboration over the past several decades, and today those differences remain manageable for both sides.

II. China's Stance and Concerns

The leading role of the CCP, the socialist system, and China's political structure and basic political system have all been described in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China of 1982.

Over the past three decades, China has tended to stick to the policy of opening up and reform, and tremendous progress has been made in the fields of social and economic development. As the most populous country in the world, China has achieved the preliminary stages of industrialization and urbanization, and steady efforts are made to complete the ongoing construction of a prosperous society all round. This includes transforming China from a developing country to a moderately developed country. Meanwhile, notable progress has also been made in improving national and social governance, promoting democracy and the rule of law, enhancing the protection of human rights, and

promoting ethnic equality and solidarity.

All of these significant achievements have been made possible under the leadership of the CCP—the political cornerstone of the whole system. Indeed, it is the CCP that helps to mobilize resources across the country, enhance social solidarity, achieve strategic growth, and ensure social stability. Under the leadership of the CCP, China will continue to open up and reform itself by changing its social, political, and economic systems should they fail to meet development needs. Opening up and reform will remain the cornerstone of China's public policy for the foreseeable future. At its current stage, anti-corruption is another important component in China's political development. With the aim of ensuring justice and equality, anti-corruption campaigns have raised nation-wide attention and received extensive support from the people. The main task is to restrict and supervise the use of power and ensure that state organs fulfill their duties within their mandates and according to legal procedures.

In March 2004, the Amendments to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China were approved by the Tenth National People's Congress at its second session. A third paragraph was

added to Article 33, which states that “the State respects and preserves human rights.” Chapter II of the Constitution, titled “the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens,” illustrates in great detail the rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens, including political, economic, cultural and social rights, and freedom of the person and religion. The Chinese government not only safeguards its citizens’ rights and freedoms through legislation, it also puts them into practice. Needless to say, the exercise of such rights and freedoms must not infringe upon the interests of the state, society, and the collective and public good, or upon the lawful freedom and rights of other citizens.

As China’s strength has grown, so has its confidence in its chosen model of development, the theories that have guided it, its current political system, and its cultural model. The structures and practices of internal governance have been further improved, including but not limited to the following areas:

1. Improving legislative mechanisms and procedures, broadening public participation, and listening to the opinions of various stakeholders, so as to make sure that laws and regulations can accurately reflect the requirement of social and economic development;

2. Refining the operating mechanism of judicial power, so as to ensure the exercise of judicial power independently and impartially, to strengthen and standardize the legal and social supervision of judicial activities;

3. Strengthening the restriction and supervision systems of power by carrying out anti-corruption activities, safeguarding the people's right to know, express, and supervise, and ensuring that state organs fulfill their duties within their mandates and according to legal procedures;

4. Improving judicial systems to safeguard human rights, ensuring that the people's rights of freedom, property, basic political rights, and other rights are not violated, and that their economic, cultural, social, and other rights are implemented.

China is now the second-largest economy in the world. Throughout its rapid development, China has maintained social and political stability, which proves that it has made the optimal decision in choosing a path for development that is in line with its national conditions. Expectations of a peaceful evolution of China's political system to a U. S. -style democracy have proven to be unfruitful. At the same time, in between two wars waged against terrorism and the financial crisis, the United States

seems to have lost confidence in its global supremacy and leadership. Its concerns and suspicions regarding the strategic intent of a rising China have been rapidly mounting in recent years. Will this lead to a decrease in both countries' capacities and willingness to manage the political differences that prevent a more effective bilateral relationship? Will political difference further challenge the current state of China-U. S. relations? As it stands, the ways in which the United States perceives and reacts to China's rise will become an increasingly important factor in the future direction of the bilateral relationship.

As of yet, the United States is not willing to take the tense political issues currently impacting the bilateral relationship off the table. It continues to criticize China's handling of issues ranging from human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and judicial independence to political dissidents. In reality, over the years, the so-called list of China's human rights violations filed by the United States has grown shorter and shorter, and enormous progress in the field of human rights has been made by China. However, the United States is still trying to find new areas in which to express its constant doubts and concerns over China's domestic policies and

diplomatic practices. China has recently made great efforts to improve its internal governance by making new regulations and passing legislation, yet these efforts have been met with renewed suspicion and criticism from the United States. For example, the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law, the National Security Law, the Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities within Mainland China, and the Network Security Law have all been interpreted as moves by the Chinese government to curb civil liberties, and has repeatedly brought China's political system under fierce attack.

The United States has also boycotted the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and strived to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB. China's Belt and Road Initiative has been viewed as yet another attempt to promote the ' China model ' elsewhere, and the Chinese Dream has been interpreted as a deliberate move to compete with the American Dream. The Chinese government's anti-corruption campaign and the all-out effort to enforce strict CCP Party discipline are interpreted as nothing more than a political witch-hunt, and the United States has thus long been reluctant to cooperate with China on anti-corruption issues. The United States has used double

standards toward China's efforts to combat terrorist activities—some China-based American agencies once harbored a number of dissidents and incited them to undermine China's political image. In a similar vein, China has sufficient grounds to suspect that the United States is the invisible hand supporting and manipulating Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution.

Chinese people's views of the United States are gradually changing. According to a recent survey of Chinese opinions by the Pew Research Center, only 29 percent of respondents agreed that the United States is willing to accept China's rise, while more than half of them (52 percent) agreed that the United States is trying to prevent China from becoming a peer competitor. In addition, about half (45 percent) of the respondents consider the United States to be the biggest threat to China, a 6 percent increase compared to a similar survey carried out in 2013. Finally, 44 percent of respondents give the United States a negative rating.

Meanwhile, China's concerns over American foreign and domestic policy are rising, as well, the once-submerged disputes and frictions between China and the United States over bilateral and regional issues have begun to resurface over the past year.

Remarks made by some high-ranking officials have even implied that the United States intends to wage a sort of new cold war against China. Cross-Strait relations have improved greatly and remained stable over the past decade, thanks to Chinese and American decision-makers' political wisdom in handling the Taiwan issue. However, as the Obama administration has continued to promote the Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy, the danger that the Taiwan issue might once again become an irritating topic for China and the United States has reemerged. In Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party—a political party advocating Taiwanese independence—became the ruling party after the 2016 election. Since then, Ms. Tsai Ing-wen has managed to avoid making any clear statements over the 1992 Consensus or the One China Principle. The cross-Strait relationship, however, is likely to deteriorate, making American policy toward Taiwan potentially critical given the situation. The recent telephone call between President-elect Donald Trump and Ms. Tsai sent a misleading and dangerous signal for all parties concerned. China wonders whether the United States will still stick to its commitment made in the Three Joint Communiqués, the One China Principle, and the Three No's—a consensus

developed over the past four decades.

American domestic political developments have puzzled and confused many Chinese observers, such as the widening gap and even polarization between the rich and the poor—the degree of political polarization manifested in Trump’s recent presidential campaign characterized by an anti-globalization sentiment and the rise of populism. Under such circumstances, some politicians tried to make China the scapegoat for the United States’ domestic and social problems. Another survey conducted by Pew in May 2016 revealed that about a quarter of Americans (23 percent) view China as an adversary of the United States. It would appear that media coverage during the 2016 presidential campaign in the United States has left the Chinese people with the impression that something must have gone wrong in the American political system.

III. Reflections on the Future of China-U. S. Relations

There are a number of profound political disagreements between China and the United States, but the past few decades

tell us that they should be manageable. Now, with China and the United States as the respective No. 2 and No. 1 economies in the world, there has been a deepening of economic interdependence and an increase in people-to-people exchanges. This makes it essential for Chinese and American experts to investigate further how policy-makers should manage the increasingly prevalent political disagreements in the bilateral relationship.

1. A better understanding of the political disagreements: similar problems but different solutions.

In the world following the 2008 financial crisis, many countries face similar—if not identical—political challenges, such as the negative externalities incurred by economic globalization, the widening gap between rich and poor regions and communities, ethnic conflicts, political elites becoming less aware and responsive to the general public, and the list goes on. Overall, anger and anxiety over social injustice and inequality are spreading rapidly, while the political elites and political systems are slow in addressing these problems in an adequate way. Both China and the United States have been the main beneficiaries of economic globalization, yet they have nonetheless encountered

the same problems, as mentioned above. Similarly, they are both attempting to find appropriate solutions. China and the United States took different approaches when addressing their respective social problems. China opted for a top-down approach, which has included the enforcement of party discipline, an anti-corruption campaign, and alleviating poverty. The United States, meanwhile, has resorted to increased political competition between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, embodied in the most recent presidential and congressional elections. It seems fair to say that both countries have dived deep into the exploration of solutions to similar problems, and each should not deny the other's efforts simply based on its own mainstream political mindset.

If the above understanding of political disagreements is well received, then it will be very important for both sides to have more substantial and theoretical discussions and dialogues on relevant issues, such as better internal governance, managing the relationship between the majority and minority ethnic groups, defining the boundaries of civil rights, the universality and individual differences of democratic values, information management, civil liberty in the internet age, and so on. By

doing so, both can better their understanding of the other side in terms of internal governance and social and political systems.

2. A better understanding of China's development model: persistence and improvement.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, China has made significant achievements under the leadership of the CCP. Since China decided to open up and carry out socio-economic reforms, it has achieved one of the most ambitious modernization processes in human history in its own way. Today's China is no longer a traditional agricultural country, but an industrial and commercial giant that has embraced the information age at nearly the same pace and time as other developed countries. It is impossible for China to abandon the effective approaches it has used in achieving these major progressions. Meanwhile, China is fully aware that its political system requires further improvements, and China hopes to better its understanding and learn from other political systems and cultures, including the United States. China also realizes that the American attempt to export its democratic political model to other countries has created more problems than solutions—this is

absolutely unacceptable to China. In fact, the fallout of such failed efforts has led to the United States being in a much more unfavorable position. The American invasion of Iraq and subversion of the Saddam regime led to a chaotic situation in leading to the average Iraqi being the one that suffers most—in addition to creating a worrying vacuum which enabled ISIS to increase its influence and power. Ultimately, this has only added more pressure to the international fight against terrorism.

China's political system has proven to be suitable for the current stage of its national development, and China will thus adhere to its own development pathway and continue to improve its political system. Under the framework of democratic centralism, the centralization and decentralization of state power are two sides of the same coin. China will not accept any other model of development or political system imposed on it by external agents, as they might have negative externalities on China in particular.

To maintain a sound China-U. S. relationship, the United States should not place its hopes in an imaginary future China, but face the reality of China today.

3. Other than political disagreements, the two countries should focus on more important and urgent regional and international issues.

Over decades of concerted efforts, China and the United States have developed a strategically stable bilateral relationship. There are four pillars in that relationship, namely asymmetric but mutually vulnerable nuclear programs, economic interdependence, common interests, and mutual reliance on a peaceful and stable international political and economic environment in which both can prosper. From the normalization of relations to the present day, both China and the United States have stood to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation.

Moreover, the two countries have witnessed the continuous expansion of their common interests in various regional and international issues. Thus, regional or global political turmoil and chaos and traditional and non-traditional security threats far outweigh the political and ideological differences between China and the United States. These challenges need to be addressed by both countries in a cooperative way. In addition, China—one the world's largest developing countries and the United State—the biggest and most powerful developed country, they have a great

responsibility to avoid adding to global instability and ensuring effective global governance. Therefore, there is tremendous potential for both sides to work together. As long as the two countries can properly handle their political and ideological differences and refrain from fundamentally challenging the other's domestic political system and stability, there is every possibility that China and the United States can escape the Thucydides Trap, and instead foster a new model of major power relations with no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.

Chinese President Xi held talks with his U. S. counterpart Donald Trump for the first time at Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Florida, U. S. from April 6 to 7, 2017. During their talks, Xi and Trump exchanged views on key areas of bilateral cooperation as well as global and regional issues of common concern, and pledged to expand mutually beneficial cooperation and manage differences on the basis of mutual respect.

President Xi introduced China's development concept, emphasizing that China will take the path of peaceful development, will not pursue the idea of zero-sum game, and will maintain the world's peace, stability and prosperity with the

United States. President Trump said that the U. S. will cooperate with China to make efforts to eliminate the factors and problems that affect the relations between the two countries so that the China-U. S. relations can achieve greater development and the China-U. S. relations will be able to develop better.

It is worth mentioning that the Chinese side expressed the hope that the U. S. side will give more cooperation in the fight against corruption, and the U. S. side expressed its support for the efforts of the Chinese side to hunt for fugitives who have fled abroad and recovering illicit money. The understanding and cooperation between China and the United States in anti-corruption will help to further reduce the negative impact of political differences on bilateral relations.

迈向更好的全球治理

达 巍 王 文 等

2016年，全球化在世界多地陷入了空前的被批评、被责难的境地。唐纳德·特朗普出人意料地当选美国总统，加上英国多数公众稍早前令人讶异地决定退出欧盟，都反映了发达国家部分民众内心的深切疑问：全球化是否仍对自己有益？

我们认为，自冷战结束以后在全球迅猛扩展的、以新自由主义为核心理念的经济全球化模式确有其不足。中美两国与世界其他国家一样，既从全球化中获得巨大收益，也承受着全球化的代价。我们当然应该追求更好的全球化模式，但是我们认为这只能通过更好的全球治理来实现。

过去八年，中美在全球经济治理机制改革、气候变化等领域进行了卓有成效的合作，全球治理成为中美关系中的重要亮点。中国期待与美国新一届政府扩大全球治理合作。

但是坦率地说，美国总统大选结果带来的巨大不确定性使我们担心这一合作是否仍具有光明前景。正是在此背景下，本章的讨论反而变得更加重要、紧迫。

一 中国对全球治理的基本态度

中国近年来越来越关注全球治理问题。2015年10月，中共中央政治局曾就全球治理格局与体制进行集体学习，这在世界各国领导层中恐怕十分少见。2016年9月，中国成功主办了二十国集团（G20）领导人杭州峰会，中国参与全球治理的热情被进一步激发。

（一）中国重视全球治理的原因

中国人越来越关心全球治理，根本上源于国家实力的增强。中国能在短时间内成长为全球第二大经济体，一个重要原因就是全球化的国际环境。当中国有了更大的力量，很自然就会想到自己有责任为全球治理做出更大贡献。中国是一个身份特殊的国家：既是一个大国，又是一个发展中国家；政治上实行社会主义制度，经济上实行市场经济；广泛吸收西方发达国家的发展经验，同时又为本国悠久而独特的历史文化深感骄傲。总之，中国似乎拥有一种“双

重身份”，既能沟通南北，又能联通东西，完全有可能在全球治理中做出独特贡献。

毋庸讳言，中国对全球治理的热情也基于具体的国家利益考量。中国期待通过积极参与全球治理，有效维护利益，也期待在为全球治理提出中国方案的过程中，在国际社会赢得更大话语权，以做出更大贡献。

（二）当前国际治理领域存在的问题

当前全球治理领域存在一系列问题需要解决。第一，全球治理需要行动。世界经济仍处于相当困难的阶段，恐怖主义、难民危机、气候变化等挑战迫在眉睫。我们需要全球治理的高效机制，不能停留在口号和方案层次。第二，全球治理需要创意。一些全球性问题已经持续多年难以解决。我们需要提出新思路和新方案。第三，全球治理机制应更具代表性。由于历史原因，发达国家一直在全球治理实践中发挥着主导作用。作为发展中国家和新兴市场国家的一员，中国尊重这一历史事实，但认为目前时机已经成熟，全球治理应更多地倾听发展中国家和新兴市场国家的声音，扩大这些国家在治理机制中的作用。

（三）中国参与全球治理改革的基本路径

首先，与一些外国观察者的担心恰好相反，中国是现有

国际治理体系的受益者，主张维护现有机制，同时对其进行必要的改革和补充。中国不是国际体系中的所谓“修正主义国家”，也不希望抛弃这一体系“另起炉灶”。

其次，中国主张渐进、务实、基于共识的改革。对于国际治理机制，中国并非手拿一纸“蓝图”、对现有体系“大破大立”，而是基于各方共识，能改什么改什么。

最后，全球治理是一个多利益攸关方共同参与的过程，但是作为全球最大的发达国家与发展中国家，中美两国的合作对有效的全球治理至关重要。过去几年中美在全球治理领域的合作已证明，“通过中美双边合作推动全球多边合作”的路径是有效的。

（四）中国的疑虑与面临的制约

2016年美国总统大选结果揭晓之后，中国人对全球治理最大的疑虑是，特朗普政府对全球治理将持何种态度？从竞选期间的言论看，特朗普政府的世界观似乎更强调民族国家层次，对全球层次的议题要么缺乏兴趣、要么充满怀疑。

中国在参与全球治理过程中的另外一个长期疑虑是西方国家的意识形态因素。在很多西方人的视野中，全球治理是所谓“自由主义国际秩序”的一部分；而一个西方人眼

中“非自由主义”的中国快速崛起，且试图提出全球治理的“中国方案”，是国际政治的重大变化。中国的积极参与是会被美国等西方国家善意地接受，还是因意识形态“本能”而被“膝跳反应式地”拒斥（正如中国在成立亚洲基础设施投资银行的案例中所看到的），甚或被戴上“修正主义国家”的帽子。这是中国的长期关切。

中国积极参与全球治理也面临着制约。一方面，中国对全球治理知识储备不足，虽有贡献之愿望，但对全球治理及其中的各个子问题缺少清晰、操作性强的方案，容易给人以口号多、却不知到底想做什么的困惑。在这方面，中国期待向美国等其他全球治理经验丰富的国家学习。另一方面，中国仍是一个发展中国家，在未来很长时间里，只能将主要资源投放于国内建设。中国国内的主流观点认为，把自己的问题解决好就是对全球治理的巨大贡献。这可能与一些发达国家对中国“承担更多责任”的期待有一定落差，给人以中国“选择性参与全球治理”的印象。

二 国际治理体系的建设与改革

第二次世界大战后，世界主要国家建立了以联合国体系及相关机构为核心的一系列国际机构、机制和规则，如国

际货币基金组织（IMF）、世界银行、关贸总协定（后改为世界贸易组织）等。冷战结束特别是金融危机之后，世界主要国家又建立了二十国集团（G20）等机制。中国认为，这些机制是世界上唯一一套已经相当成熟、覆盖所有主权国家的多边治理机制。尽管存在诸多问题，这一机制仍是全球多边治理的核心。

中国对这些全球治理机制的总体态度是支持其运作，加强其权威性、效率和执行力，同时对这一机制进行必要的补充和改革，使之朝着稳定、开放、包容、全面、可持续发展的方向发展。

中方对美方在这一领域的立场仍存在疑问与疑虑。双方应通过言辞和行动减少误解，给予对方战略信心。

首先，历史上，美国在某些重大事件上曾采取绕过联合国、本国利益至上的单边主义行为。美国国会也拒绝批准一些重要的联合国文件。美国既可以拿起这些工具，也可以随时“绕开”。2017年起共和党执政并在国会占据多数，美国单边主义是否会大行其道，令人心存疑虑。

其次，美方对全球经济治理体系特别是WTO与G20是否能认真投入？很多中国专家认为，美国对国际经济治理改革持勉强和拖延的态度，在美国国会审批国际货币基金组织的过程中即有所表现。中方认为美方对WTO与G20机

制不甚积极，并试图以区域贸易协定取而代之。特朗普当选后美国选择不再推动 TPP，中美应在这类问题上重新协调立场。

最后，美方对人民币国际化持何态度？美国一些人似乎更多地从“货币体系竞争”的视角看待这一问题，担心中国要颠覆以美元为核心的货币体系；而中方则更多地从经济视角也即中国构建开放型经济体的需要看待这一问题。在人民币国际化的过程中，中美如何稳定货币关系是下一步的关键问题。中美两国既要避免采取“以邻为壑”的货币政策影响对方国家的经济状况，也应当共同为国际货币体系的稳定和健康做出贡献。

放眼未来几年，我们建议：

第一，中美合作维护和强化联合国体系作为全球政治和安全多边治理核心机制的权威。推动联合国等多边机制的机构改革，优化内部机构，提升运行效率。加强联合国的代表性，率先提升非洲、拉丁美洲等发展中国家和地区话语权；加快联合国财政改革，强化财政监督，同时逐步解决联合国会费的拖欠问题。充分发挥联合国在气候变化、难民、减贫、全球可持续发展、自由贸易等方面的多边议程。

第二，中美加强宏观经济金融政策协调和相关战略意图

沟通。中美双方都应对自身的能力和对方的意图有足够的认知。美元依然是未来一段时期内全球金融秩序的根基，美国应认识到中国没有意愿、也没有能力对此挑战。第二次世界大战后逐步确立的国际经济秩序目前仍符合大多数国家的利益。美国应当和中国共同维护这一秩序的稳定。

第三，巩固和发挥 G20 全球经济治理主平台作用，推动 G20 建章立制，向长效治理机制转型。落实 G20 杭州峰会成果，解决全球宏观经济政策协调不足、失衡严重、国际货币体系代表性不足等问题。国际税收合作、绿色金融投资等领域是中美可以率先取得合作成果的领域。同时，中方应在 G20 机制下平衡推进国际金融架构改革议题，寻求美方较能够接受的稳妥方式。

第四，维护 WTO 多边贸易体制主渠道地位，反对贸易保护主义，避免全球贸易治理体系碎片化。中美应当针对多哈回合谈判的市场准入、国内支持等敏感问题深入探讨。各种讨论中的区域或双边经济自由化安排都应是对多边贸易体制的补充而非替代。中美双边投资协定谈判应当为整个多边贸易体系的回暖做出示范和注入信心，在非农市场准入、服务贸易等领域上寻求突破和早期收获。

第五，中国欢迎美国积极参与“一带一路”建设、全球伙伴关系网络、亚洲基础设施投资银行、金砖银行等中

方提出的新倡议。即使不能正式参加机制，也希望特朗普政府注意到中方倡议中的积极因素，做出正面回应。

第六，在金融监管领域密切合作。美方应在 G20 机制下推进金融监管改革，至少不应从政治上或技术上阻拦 G20 达成相关成果。中美两国都应采取宏观审慎政策，尤其是作为主要储备国的美国，其货币政策应当更加透明，预防系统性风险。

三 全球气候变化的治理

过去几年，中美在应对气候变化领域的有效合作，使得这一领域从中美的分歧点转变为合作亮点，有力地推动了全球气候变化巴黎峰会的成功。我们注意到美国新任总统特朗普在竞选期间的相关言论，期待新政府就美国的气候变化政策做出澄清。在未来几年里：

第一，美方应充分认识到中国在应对气候变化上严肃认真、积极参与的态度。中国之所以积极参与气候变化治理，对外是为了争取发展空间，推动全球气候正义；对内则是要推动供给侧结构性改革，推动低碳转型，节能减排，推动新能源产业发展，保障能源安全。因此，中国的气候变化政策是坚定而可持续的，不会以美国的态度变化为转移。

第二，美方应继续积极落实《巴黎协定》中的承诺。美国不履行其对《巴黎协定》的承诺，将对美国的国际公信力造成巨大的负面影响，不利于美国在其他方面引领国际共识。

第三，中方希望中美在新能源方面的合作继续积极推进，实现共赢。中国希望为新能源产业发展争取更公平、开放的国际环境，降低全球能源供给对中东石油的过度依赖。美国作为发达国家，有义务为中国等发展中国家提供资金、技术转让等方面的支持，至少不应对相关的技术国际转移制造障碍。

第四，美方应改变频繁对中国新能源产品实施“双反”调查的做法。美国频频使用“双反”大棒，给不少中国人留下了不良印象，认为气候变化只是美国制约中国发展的借口，不利于中国国内气候政策的推行。中方认为，用新加坡作为成本标的认定中国产品倾销非常不公平。

四 中美网络空间治理合作

中美作为全球的网络大国与强国，均高度依赖互联网。一个安全、稳定与繁荣的网络空间符合双方根本利益。

两国在网络空间的关系曾经一度非常紧张。2015年9

月，中美达成“双边网络安全协议”，高层沟通与合作机制得以建立，中美网络关系总体趋缓，也为中美在网络空间的国际治理合作提供了基础和机遇。中方愿与美方加强在此领域的合作，以稳定良好的双边网络关系，为国际社会带来积极示范效应。

中方认为，中美在网络空间存在的主要问题有：

一是缺乏战略互信。传统空间中的冷战思维与零和博弈在网络空间仍大行其道。中美彼此间的战略疑虑直接制约双方在网络空间的合作意愿与作为。

二是利益诉求不同。中美处在不同互联网发展阶段，对治理优先与重要领域的判断不同，核心关切有所差异。美方更重视“经济利益考量”，而中方强调“安全与发展平衡”。

三是存在理念差异。双方网络空间治理的原则、模式与机制有不同认识与主张。美国重视现有治理机制的有效性，中方希望在现有机制的基础上，更多地关注机制建设的“公平”与“公正”。

四是中美似有陷入无谓的“阵营”之分的风险。由于上述差异，很多人认为中美分属网络空间治理的不同阵营。这种划分是错误的，但却造成了负面舆论氛围，在中美间形成思维定式，使中美在诸多治理议题上未能形成有效

合作。

未来几年，中美双方应秉持务实的态度，共同考虑以下几个问题：

一是建立讨论网络空间治理的对话机制。就网络空间的国际治理进程与议题进行充分沟通和讨论，争取取得一致立场，至少可以避免误判。

二是选取优先领域开展务实合作。数字经济发展、关键基础设施保护、供应链安全、防范第三方大规模网络攻击、网络空间国际行为准则等领域是中美双方有较强合作意愿与良好合作基础的领域。

三是关注互联网发展援助项目。当前互联网发展进入“大南移”的历史新阶段。未来互联网接入与市场增长主要移向发展中国家。但受技术水平所限，发展中国家未来可能成为网络安全的短板。中美作为网络大国和强国，可以共同推进发展援助专项，帮助发展中国家加强能力建设。

五 中美反恐合作

以“基地”组织、“伊斯兰国”为代表的极端恐怖势力对包括中美在内的国际社会构成长期安全威胁。因此，反恐应成为中美合作的增长点。在这一问题上，中美应更多

沟通信息、开展合作。中方愿在以下重点议题上与美方开展进一步合作。

(1) 推动阿富汗、叙利亚等地区热点问题的解决。中方致力于通过推动政治和解、经济重建实现阿富汗的和平稳定，防止其沦为恐怖势力的藏身窝点。中国“一带一路”倡议将有助于促进沿线国家根除恐怖主义乱源。

(2) 推进打击暴力极端主义进程，尤其是在联合国和全球反恐论坛框架下的活动。

(3) 防范打击外籍“圣战”分子跨境流动问题。外籍“圣战”分子的流窜对中美构成共同威胁，也是当前国际反恐的突出挑战之一。中美两国应继续加强外籍圣战分子信息的共享，携手堵住其流窜的通道。同时，鉴于部分发展中国家缺乏应对该威胁的资源与能力，在其提出请求的前提下，中美两国可联手行动，优化援助方案。

(4) 商讨加强海外利益保护的合作。针对在第三国的海外公民和设施的保护，中美两国驻当地使领馆可建立沟通渠道，共享威胁信息。同时，两国可探讨建立应急预案，在突发恐袭事件中进行协调配合。

(5) 开展多层次反恐对话与交流。对话可以包括反恐政策、战略的交流；也可以对国际恐怖主义的理论（包括定义、根源）、“基地”组织与“伊斯兰国”等国际恐怖组

织的发展趋势进行联合研究，增进共识。

(6) 继续推动在港口、集装箱安全、反恐融资、自制爆炸装置等问题上的双边合作。

(7) 中方希望美方摒弃双重标准，更好地理解中国的反恐政策；在遣返“东突”恐怖分子问题上充分考虑中方的关切；放弃对在美国境内的“东突”势力的支持。

六 中美在核安全领域的合作

中美在防扩散、核安保、核电安全领域交集多，分歧少，可将相关双边合作打造为推进全球治理和润滑中美关系的亮点。

在防扩散领域，随着伊朗核协议的签订、朝核问题的不断升级，国际防扩散形势进入转折关头。中美可合作进行朝核导能力评估，加强对涉核导物项和相关技术的管控；中美应共同维护核不扩散机制的权威性，推动2020年核不扩散条约审议大会取得成功；在无人武器管控等新兴技术领域加强磋商与合作。

在核安保领域，2016年核安全峰会落幕后，重点应转移到相关国际及地区机制建设上，确保全球核安保合作的持续。当前，“伊斯兰国”染指核生化武器风险增加，技术

发展带来新安保隐患，国际原子能机构作用尚存不足。中美有必要加强双边反核恐情报合作和核法证学、辐射探测等技术合作；在核设施网络安全等新兴技术领域开展合作、研议标准；支持国际原子能机构加强主导作用；以“核安全示范中心”为基点，深化亚太地区核安保合作。

在核电安全领域，福岛核事故并未中断新一轮全球核电复兴，不少国家为初次涉足核电，技术落后、人才匮乏、监管滞后。中美两国核电技术与安全标准相似性强，在提高核电安全监管及运行能力方面有共同利益。可在中方“推广国家核电安全监管体系”倡议基础上，考虑联合提供核安全监管能力的全面培训服务，提高新兴核电国家核安全水平，降低全球核电安全风险。

Towards Better Global Governance

Da Wei and Wang Wen

Globalization has been criticized and blamed in many parts of the world in 2016 for causing various problems. Donald Trump's victory in the U. S. presidential election and the UK's surprising decision to exit the European Union highlight a profound question in many people's mind in developed countries: Is globalization still beneficial?

In our view, the economic globalization model, which is based on neo-liberalism and has expanded rapidly throughout the world since the end of the Cold War, has its shortcomings. Like other countries in the world, China and the United States have both enjoyed huge gains from globalization, but have also borne its costs. In light of this, we should begin to pursue a better

globalization model, which can only be achieved through improved global governance.

In the past eight years, China and the United States have had fruitful cooperation on global economic governance reform and climate change. Global governance has actually become an important highlight of China-U. S. relations, and China looks forward to cooperating further on this issue with the Trump administration. Frankly speaking, however, the huge uncertainty arising from the result of the American presidential election casts a shadow on global governance. Are there still bright prospects for cooperation? The context in which this question is being asked makes this chapter's discussion even more important and urgent.

I. China's Basic Attitude Toward Global Governance

China has paid increasing attention to issues impacting global governance in recent years. The Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee conducted a collective study session on global governance in October 2015, a rare action among world leaders.

In September 2016, China successfully hosted the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, which further fostered China's enthusiasm to participate in global governance.

1. Reasons for China's Enthusiasm

The fundamental reason underlying China's increased interest in global governance is its enhanced national strength. A globalized international environment has been an important factor in helping China become the world's second largest economy. As its strength increases, China has naturally become concerned about its responsibility in making greater contributions to global governance. China's identity is rather special: It is both a major power and a developing country, pursues both socialism and a market economy, and draws extensively on experiences from the Western developed countries while remaining proud of its long-standing unique history and culture. In short, the country seems to have a dual identity, which enables it to talk to both the South and the North and link the East and the West. It is therefore fully possible for China to make a unique contribution to global governance.

China's enthusiasm in global governance is also based on specific considerations of national interest. China hopes to effectively safeguard its interests through active participation in global governance and to gain a greater say, thus making a greater contribution to the international community in the process of putting forward Chinese propositions.

2. Existing Problems in Global Governance

At present, a series of problems must be addressed in global governance. First, more action is needed. The world economy is still in a rather difficult stage and is faced with imminent challenges such as terrorism, the refugee crises and climate change. We need to go beyond mere rhetorical slogans or unrealistic plans and put in place efficient mechanisms for global governance. Second, creativity is needed in global governance. Some global issues have been lingering for many years and have yet to be resolved. We need new thinking and new programs. Third, inclusiveness in global governance is key. For historical reasons, developed countries play a dominant role in global governance. As a developing country and an emerging market, China respects this historical fact. Meanwhile, we believe that

conditions are now ripe for the voices of developing countries and emerging markets to be better heard and their roles expanded.

3. China's Approaches to Global Governance Reform

First of all, China has benefited from the existing global governance regime, and wants to reform it only when necessary. Contrary to some concerns voiced by foreign observers, China is by no means a revisionist country seeking to change the international system.

Further, China advocates gradual, pragmatic, and consensus-based reform. China is not here to smash the old and set up the new with a blueprint. Rather, it is ready to pursue attainable reforms on the basis of common understanding among all of the involved parties.

Additionally, global governance is a process that involves many stakeholders. Nevertheless, cooperation between the United States and China, the world's largest developed country and largest developing one, respectively, is critical to effective global governance. Bilateral cooperation over the past few years

has proven the effectiveness of “promoting global multilateral cooperation through bilateral China-U. S. cooperation.”

4. China’s Concerns and Constraints

After the 2016 U. S. presidential election results were revealed, China’s biggest question regarding global governance became, what will the Trump administration’s attitude be towards global governance? Trump’s campaign rhetoric implies that the administration tends to view the world from the nation-state level. When facing global issues, it either lacks interest, or views them with strong suspicion.

Another concern that has long haunted China’s participation in global governance is Western countries’ ideological mindset. In the view of many Westerners, global governance is part of the liberal international order, and the rapid rise of an illiberal China and the attempt to table China schemes constitute a major change in international politics. Will China’s active participation be accepted by the United States and other Western countries with good will, or rejected in a metaphorical knee-jerk reaction out of ideological instinct (as we have seen in the case of Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank), or even labeled as a revisionist country? This is China's long-standing concern.

China also faces constraints in actively participating in global governance. On the one hand, China does not have adequate knowledge or experience in this area. Although it has a strong desire to contribute, it does not have clear operable plans for global governance on a subset of issues. This image has baffled many observers, who concluded that China is merely chanting meaningless slogans. In this regard, China looks forward to learning from the United States and other countries with rich global governance experiences. On the other hand, China remains a developing country. For quite some time to come, it will have to concentrate its resources on domestic development. It is a mainstream opinion in China that successfully addressing China's own problems will constitute a huge contribution to global governance. There may be a certain gap with some developed countries' expectation for China to undertake more responsibilities, feeding an impression of China selectively taking part in global governance.

II. Construction and Reform of the Global Governance Regime

After World War II, major countries in the world set up a series of international institutions, mechanisms, and rules around the UN system and its agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank and GATT (later developed into the WTO). After the end of the Cold War and the financial crisis in particular, major countries decided to set up the G20 and relevant mechanisms together. China believes that these are the world's only set of fairly mature multilateral governance regimes that covers all sovereign states. Although there are many problems associated with them, the regime remains the core of global multilateral governance.

China's overall attitude towards these global governance mechanisms is to support their operations, enhance their authority, efficiency, and execution, and to properly supplement and reform them so that they will develop in a stable, open, inclusive, comprehensive, and sustainable direction.

China still has some doubts and questions on America's position in this field. The two sides should reduce misunderstandings through both words and deeds and strengthen each other's strategic confidence.

- Historically, there are precedents of the United States bypassing the UN on major events and conducting unilateral actions in pursuit of U. S. national interests. In that light, the U. S. Congress has previously refused to ratify important UN documents. As a superpower, the United States has a strong impulse to take up those tools or bypass them at any time based on convenience. The Republican Party now controls both the White House and Congress. Will American unilateralism reemerge?

- Will the United States seriously invest in the global economic governance regime, the WTO, and G20? Many Chinese experts believe that America's grudging approach toward international economic governance reform was already on display during the congressional review of IMF-related legislation. In the eyes of China, America does not have a positive view towards the

WTO and G20, and is attempting to replace them with regional trade agreements. Contradictory to this, however, President Trump then chose not to advance the TPP. China and the United States should work together to coordinate their positions on these issues.

– What is America’s attitude towards the internationalization of the RMB? Some people seem to view this issue from the perspective of currency wars and worry that China is set to disrupt the dollar-centered currency system. The Chinese perspective is more concerned with its national growth in the sense that China needs to develop an open economy. In the course of RMB internationalization, how China and the United States can stabilize currency relations will be key in furthering cooperation. They must avoid taking “beggar-thy-neighbor” monetary policy and should jointly contribute to the stability and health of the international monetary system.

When looking toward the coming years, we would recommend the following:

– China and the United States should cooperate to safeguard and strengthen the UN system as the authority at the core of global multilateral political and security governance regime. They may advance institutional reforms at the UN and other multilateral mechanisms by optimizing internal structures, cutting down personnel redundancy and enhancing operational efficiency. The UN should be strengthened by first giving more say to developing countries and regions such as Africa and Latin America. Fiscal reforms should be accelerated to improve financial supervision and gradually resolve the question of contribution arrears. The role of the UN in addressing issues such as climate change, refugees, poverty reduction, sustainable development, and free trade needs be fully defined.

– China and the United States should strengthen macroeconomic and financial policy coordination and discuss their respective strategic intentions. Both sides should have an adequate understanding of their own capacity and the other party's intentions. The U. S. dollar will still be the foundation of the global financial order for some time to come. America should recognize that China has neither the desire nor the capacity to

challenge this status quo. The international economic order that has gradually developed after World War II still conforms to the interests of most countries. The U. S. and China should jointly maintain the stability of this order.

– To consolidate and bring into full play the G20’s role as the main platform for global economic governance, advance rule-setting in the G20 and other new mechanisms, and steer the G20 toward becoming a long-term governance mechanism. The outcomes of the G20 Hangzhou summit should be implemented. A roadmap for participating in global economic governance should be created to address such problems as insufficient macroeconomic policy coordination, serious imbalances, and underrepresentation of the international monetary system. International taxation and green finance could be areas where the first results of China-U. S. cooperation could be seen. Meanwhile, China should advance the topic of international financial structure reform under the framework of the G20 in a balanced manner and look for a plan of action that is also acceptable to the United States.

– To maintain the WTO’s position as the main channel for a multilateral trade regime to oppose trade protectionism and avoid a fragmentation of the global trade governance regime, China and the United States should have in-depth discussions on sensitive issues emerging from the Doha Round, such as market access and domestic support. The various regional or bilateral economic liberalization arrangements under discussion should supplement rather than replace the multilateral trade regime. China and the United States should, through their bilateral investment treaty negotiations, take a leadership role and infuse confidence that would lead to a rebound in the multilateral trade regime as a whole and seek notable breakthroughs in non-agricultural market access and trade in services.

– China welcomes America’s active role in new Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, a global partnership network, the AIIB, and the New Development Bank. It is hoped that the Trump Administration will see the constructive elements of these Chinese proposals and respond to them positively, even if he does not go so far as formally participating.

– Cooperate closely in the field of financial regulation. The United States should advance financial regulation reforms under the G20, or at the least avoid politically or technically standing in the way of progress made by the G20. Both China and the United States should adopt a macro-prudential policy. As the country with the world’s main reserve currency, the United States in particular should have a more transparent monetary policy so as to prevent risks linked to a lack of transparency.

III. Global Climate Change Governance

In the past few years, China and the United States have had effective cooperation on the topic of climate change, turning it from an area of difference to an area of cooperation and powerfully contributing to the success of the Paris climate conference. We note President Trump’s relevant statements during the campaign and expect clarifications from the new administration on America’s climate change policies. In the coming years:

– The United States should fully realize China’s deep

commitment to and active participation in climate change affairs. Externally, this active involvement is aimed at upholding global climate justice. Internally, it is designed to promote supply-side reforms, low carbon transformations, energy savings and emission reductions, as well as the development of new energy industries and energy security. Chinese policies are therefore firm and sustainable and will not sway due to changing attitudes in the United States.

– The United States should actively implement commitments agreed upon in the Paris Agreement. Failure to fulfill commitments under the Paris Agreement will have a hugely negative impact on U. S. international credibility, which will harm its effort to build an international consensus in other areas.

– China hopes that its cooperation with the United States in renewable energy will continue to be a win-win situation. It hopes to strive for a fairer and more open international environment for new energy industries and to reduce global overdependence on the Middle East to supply oil. As a developed country, the United States has an obligation to provide financial and technological

transfer support to China and other developing countries. At the very least, it should not create obstacles for relevant international technology transfers.

The United States should stop its frequent anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations targeted at new energy products from China. Such moves have left a bad impression in China, which believes climate change is only an excuse used by the United States to restrict China's development. Prevalence of this view is not conducive to rolling out climate policies in China. China holds that the use of Singapore as the subject of the cost of Chinese goods to identify dumping is very unfair.

IV. Cooperation in Cyberspace Governance

China and the United States both have commanding presence on the internet. Both countries are highly dependent on the internet. A secure, stable, and prosperous cyberspace serves their fundamental interests.

The two countries have experienced tension in cyberspace.

In September 2015, a bilateral cyber security agreement was reached and a high-level communication and cooperation mechanism was thus set up, leading to an overall relaxation of tensions in this area and providing a foundation and opportunity for China-U. S. cooperation in the international governance of cyberspace. China remains ready to strengthen cooperation in this area and to lead the international community by working toward a stable and sound bilateral cyber relationship with the United States.

In China's view, problems with the United States in cyberspace are mainly the following:

- Lack of strategic mutual trust. The traditional Cold War, zero-sum game mentality is also widely seen when it comes to cyberspace. Strategic doubts between the two powers directly restrict their intentions and attempts to cooperate on cyber security issues.

- Diverging interests. China and the United States are at different stages of development when it comes to cyberspace. This

means that between the two countries, there are large gaps in priority-setting and varying core concerns. While China stresses the need to balance security and development, the United States pays more attention to economic-interest considerations.

- Conceptual differences. The two sides have different ideas and propositions with regards to the principle, model, and mechanism of cyberspace governance. The United States focuses on the effectiveness of existing governance mechanisms while China's attention is more on fairness and equity.

- China and the United States risk getting trapped in a pointless differentiation between the two camps. Given the above-mentioned differences, many people put the two countries in different camps when it comes to cyberspace governance. Such a division is wrong. It fuels negative public opinions and creates stereotypes. As a result, China and the United States have failed to develop effective cooperation on many issues regarding cyber governance.

In the coming years, China and the United States should

adopt a pragmatic approach and jointly consider the following:

- Establishing a dialogue mechanism to discuss cyberspace governance. Full communication and discussion should be conducted on the procedures and agenda of international cyberspace governance so as to achieve common understanding or at least to avoid misjudgment.

- Selecting and prioritizing areas of pragmatic cooperation. The two sides already have a fairly strong desire and a sound basis for cooperation in the development of digital economy, critical infrastructure protection, supply chain security, preventing large-scale cyber attacks by a third party, and international code of conduct for cyberspace.

- Following and supporting internet development assistance projects. Internet development is now in a new historical stage as it transfers to the developing world. Looking to the future, internet access and market growth will shift to developing countries, which may well become points of vulnerability in terms of cyber security due to their limited technical capabilities. China

and the United States may jointly advance development assistance in capacity-building for developing countries.

V. Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

Extremist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS pose long-term security threats to the international community—China and the United States included. In this context, counter terrorism should be a positive factor to push for deeper China-U. S. cooperation. The two countries should therefore communicate more and develop further cooperation. The Chinese side stands ready to have further cooperation with the American side on the following priority subjects:

- Push for a resolution of regional hotspots such as Afghanistan and Syria. China is committed to the realization of Afghan peace and stability through political reconciliation and economic reconstruction so as to prevent the country from becoming a terrorist hideout. The Belt and Road Initiative will help countries along the belt and road routes to address the root causes of terrorism.

– Advance the progress against violent extremism, especially within the framework of the UN and Global Counterterrorism Forum.

– Guard against cross-border movement of foreign jihadists. Foreign jihadist fighters mobilizing across countries and regions is a threat for both China and the United States. It is also a prominent challenge confronting international counter-terrorism efforts. China and the United States should share more information on foreign jihadists and jointly block their movement channels. As some developing countries lack the resources and capacity to deal with this threat, China and the United States should join hands and forge optimal assistance plans when requested.

– Consult each other on strengthening cooperation to protect overseas interests. With regard to the protection of overseas citizens and facilities in third-party countries, Chinese and American embassies and consulates should set up channels of communication and share information regarding threats. The two

countries may also explore contingency plans for coordination during terrorist attacks.

- Develop counter-terrorism dialogue and exchanges at various levels. These dialogues may cover counterterrorism policies and strategies. Joint research may be conducted on theories of international terrorism (including definitions and sources) and development trends of international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.

- Continue bilateral cooperation on ports, container security, counter-terrorism financing, and improvised explosive devices.

- China hopes that the United States will abandon its double-standard, so as to better understand China's counter-terrorism policy, take into full account Chinese concerns on the question of repatriating East Turkistan terrorists, and stop supporting East Turkistan forces in the United States.

VI. Cooperation in Nuclear Safety and Security

China and the United States have more similarities than differences in the fields of non-proliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear power safety. Relevant bilateral cooperation may be used to promote global governance and improve China-U. S. relations.

In the non-proliferation field, with the signing of the Iran nuclear deal and the escalation of the DPRK nuclear issue, the situation is now at crossroads. China and the United States may cooperate to evaluate DPRK nuclear and missile capabilities and strengthen control of relevant items and technologies. They should also jointly safeguard the authority of international non-proliferation regimes and help make the 2020 NPT Review Conference a success. Consultation and cooperation should also be strengthened in the management and control of emerging technologies, such as unmanned weapons.

In the nuclear security field, after the conclusion of the

2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the priority should shift to developing relevant international and regional mechanisms and ensuring the continuation of global nuclear security cooperation. At present, the risk of ISIS having a hand on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is increasing. Moreover, technological development continuously fuels new security threats and there is still a gap in the role of the IAEA. China and the United States need to strengthen bilateral counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation and technical cooperation in nuclear forensics and radiation detection, develop cooperation and standards in emerging technologies, such as those in nuclear facilities and cyber security, support strengthened leading role of IAEA, and build on the nuclear security demonstration center to deepen nuclear security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

In the field of nuclear power safety, the Fukushima accident has not interrupted the new round of global nuclear renaissance. Some countries are just beginning to explore nuclear power, using backward technologies, lacking adequate talent, and failing to institute needed regulation. China and the United States have fairly similar technologies and safety standards in this field and

share common interests in building up regulatory and operational capacities for nuclear safety. On the basis of the Chinese proposal to roll out national nuclear safety supervision system, the two sides may consider jointly providing comprehensive training services in nuclear safety regulation, thus enhancing the nuclear safety level of states with emerging nuclear power capabilities and reducing global nuclear safety risks.